Second Russian Military Intervention In Chechnya example essay topic

Russia's two previous interventions into Chechnya between 1994 and the present day have proven costly in both financial terms and in human lives. Public confidence in the government's actions has fluctuated wildly between staunch support and deep scepticism, to add to this the Chechen rebels have become increasingly radicalized by the conflict. But despite this the government of Vladimir Putin is still eager to continue the fight to bring a favourable end to the Chechen conflict. In answering the question of whether or not Russia can win the war this essay will begin by addressing the reasons behind Russia's decision to intervene. These reasons have differed between the two wars, and this is reflected in the different methods and motivations adopted by the Russians in the two wars. For example Russia have, in the past, felt that Chechen leaders such as Aslan Mashkadov have been sufficiently moderate to offer a political solution to the conflict, at other times the predominant view has been one of a need for a war of annihilation.

The successes and failures of these and other methods will be assessed along with the different tactics used by the Chechens across the wars. Examination of these factors should then provide a clearer answer to the question of whether Russia can win its war in Chechnya. The primary reason for Russia's first move into Chechnya was the declaration of independence made by Dzhokar Dudayev. This secession was unacceptable to the Russian government for a number of reasons; firstly it could lead to a 'domino effect' in which other provinces in the region would follow, undermining the strength and influence provided to Russia by its size and diversity. The threat of a spread of secession was exaggerated by the fact that Chechnya is at the centre of an unstable region where ethnic Russians are in a minority. Secondly, Chechnya a key route for Russia's oil and gas pipelines on which much of its natural wealth depends.

Russia also wanted to unite its people under a new Russian identity following the collapse of the Soviet Union; Yeltsin had previously announced a desire to build a Russian identity based on civic, not ethnic lines. But the Chechen breakaway arguably provided a convenient location to build a shared identity through the patriotism of a perceived security threat. Initially Russian actions in Chechnya were covert and limited in size with the aim of supporting the local opposition to Dudayev. But this soon escalated with large numbers of Russian troops entering Chechnya to try and reintegrate the province into the Russian Federation through military means. This intervention was generally seen as a complete failure, Russian techniques were crude with disproportionate levels of force used against both rebels and civilians by poorly trained and coordinated Russian troops. This approach was characterised by indiscriminate shelling and bombing of targets such as Grozny in 1994-5 despite the presence of large numbers of innocent civilians.

This approach may have been reasonably effective in strictly military terms but it also created new problems that would make winning the war much harder in future. For example Dudayev's forces, realising they couldn't defeat the Russians in direct military confrontation resorted to guerrilla tactics. This not only resulted in their ability to hide within civilian populations but also led to a steady death toll amongst Russian troops as they were caught in ambushes or by snipers within civilian areas. This led to a steady decline in Russian public confidence in the governments' ability to successfully prosecute the war as well as large amounts of criticism from the international community at a time when Russia was keen on normalising relations with the West. The bombing of civilian targets also resulted in the displacement of large numbers of the Chechen population, many of whom moved to neighbouring Dagestan resulting in a potential for further de stabilisation in the region. Even when the Russians had reached a peaceful resolution to the Chechen conflict in 1996 they were unable to maintain this peace with the Chechen leadership of Aslan Mashkadov.

Mashkadov was seen by many in Russia as sufficiently moderate to lead to a compromise between Russia and the Chechens; his promise to eradicate organised crime, terrorism and banditry in the region met with, many Russian demands. However whilst this could have potentially been a way for Russia to win its war in Chechnya the opportunity was not fully grasped as the Yeltsin government failed to provide Mashkadov's government with sufficient financial aid. This is the argument put forward by An atol Lieven, his case is that without the resources to tackle such large problems the Chechen leadership was bound to fail. However in defence of the Yeltsin government of the time, corruption was rife within Chechnya and most if not all financial aid given to the region would quickly be siphoned away to various individuals. Mashkadov's failure to maintain control of Chechnya led to a break up of his government, with the most important defection being Shamil Basayev who had previously held the post of Prime Minister under Mashkadov's Presidency. Basayev's departure marked not only the end of the Mashkadov government but also an increase in the radicalisation of the Chechen cause as he allied himself with Islamic radicals.

This led to the second Russian military intervention in Chechnya; the motivation behind this conflict was far simpler and more positive than the first war. The Russian armed forces felt that they had made sufficient improvements to effectively carry out a successful operation in Chechnya with the stated aim of restoring "constitutional order" to the region. Another major difference in comparison with the first war was that public opinion was supportive of government intervention in Chechnya with 66% of those polled supporting action in October 1999. The Russian campaign began with an intense air campaign to weaken Chechen positions, with the aim of reducing future infantry casualties that had proved to be a major factor in weakening public opinion in the past. However this reliance on air power soon turned international opinion against the Russian campaign with the warning by Russian commanders to the inhabitants of Grozny to "leave or die". In spite of international condemnation and rising casualties the Russians were able to take much of Chechnya.

But despite these successes the Russian authorities maintained a narrowly militaristic view of security that could cost them victory in the long term. The intensive military campaign has alienated most if not all Chechens from the idea of rejoining the Russian Federation as well as accelerating the radicalisation of Chechen tactics. The emphasis on a strong approach was strengthened by the appointment in 2000 of Vladimir Putin as President. Putin has made substantial political capital from his image as a strong leader in contrast to Yeltsin's indecision or indifference. Public confidence in Putin has remained relatively high, but possibly more importantly Putin has gained the trust of the military. The conventional military, as a Presidential body is reliant on strong, reliant leadership.

The lack of such leadership provided by Yeltsin proved to be a major factor in the failures of the first war, Putin's leadership led to an increase in confidence and morale within the military that in turn led to an increased hope of victory. In the event that Putin doesn't rely on strictly military means in Chechnya, his leadership could prove to be a key factor in Russian attempts to win its war in Chechnya. However, Putin's election isn't the only positive change since the end of the 1st Chechen war. Both public and international opinion has moved in Russia's favour in recent years. The main reason for this is the increase in terrorist methods adopted by the Chechen rebels.

Chechen rebels had long been accused of organised crime, with various criminal warlords controlling parts of the region. Elements of these groups had been charged by the Russian government of involvement in 'terrorist' incidents since the 1st war, but these allegations gained impetus after the collapse of the Mashkadov government as Shamil Basayev allied himself with a group led by an Islamic revolutionary named Omar Ibn al Khattab. Khattab led a number of successful attacks on Russian forces in Chechnya including one ambush in 1996 that resulted in over 100 Russian dead. Basayev and Khattab also organised attacks on areas in Dagestan with the aim of uniting it with Chechnya as a single Islamic state, something the Russian authorities feared would lead to a spread of separatist movements.

But the terrorist methods linked to Basayev and Khattab were based more on their incursions into Russian territory than their actions in Chechnya; attacks on civilian buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999 were all blamed on groups linked to the two men. These attacks on civilian targets in Moscow and Chechnya in 1999 helped strengthen public resolve prior to the beginning of the second war. More recently the taking of civilian hostages at a Moscow theatre in October 2002 resulted in a hardening of public opinion with 64% of those questioned in an independent poll claiming that Russia should toughen its stance in Chechnya, with only 15% thinking the policy should be eased. Public confidence in the war had been gradually decreasing in the years following the outbreak of the 2nd war (see table below), Oct 99 May 00 Sept 00 Oct 00 Mar 01 Jul 01% Supporting war 66.4 51.5 53.2 46.4 42.8 33.7 but the Moscow hostage-taking have provided Putin with the freedom to act as he chooses in Chechnya, loosening any public constraints that may have existed previously. From an international perspective the events of September 11th 2001 in the United States altered the Western perspective of the very Islamic groups that Russia claimed to be fighting. Russia's assertion that it was battling international terrorism gained new credence with the alleged links between the Chechen radicalism of Khattab and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda.

In this way it is possible that whilst not desirable, the Chechen terrorist attacks could help Russia find a military victory to the conflict. The justification of an international 'war on terror' would allow Putin's government to harden its military position. However military power alone will not be enough to win the war in Chechnya. It could be argued that the overwhelming military force displayed by Russia in Chechnya over the two wars has done more to deepen the crisis than resolve it.

The past bombardment of civilian areas such as Grozny will not only have alienated the international community but also any Chechen people involved. It will also have helped unite the disparate warlords throughout Chechnya. The criminal divides that characterise relations between various warlords in Chechnya should have been identified by the Russian government as an opportunity to 'divide and conquer' the territory; but in reality these groups are now united in their hatred of the Russian presence. As a result of this Vladimir Putin should not use the opportunity presented to him by the 2002 Moscow theatre attack to strengthen the military position in Chechnya but should take the opportunity to marginalize the terrorist element with the aim of achieving a political settlement. The Russian forces have shown in the past that their military power is easily able to push back the Chechen rebels, who are currently restricted to southern areas of the country. The American experience in Vietnam provides the perfect example of how military dominance alone cannot win a war of this type; in order to truly win the war the Russian authorities need to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Chechen people.

In failing to do this the Russians will simply produce more volunteers for the Chechen cause, perpetuating the very conflict the military action is designed to resolve. Mikhail Alexeev argues that the Moscow theatre attacks provide the perfect opportunity to find a political solution to the conflict. The extreme position of the Chechen rebels involved allows the Russian government to turn to other elements of the Chechen cause in search of a more moderate figure with whom they can negotiate. In order to achieve this Alexeev argues that the Russian government must first recognise that there are four types of fighter in Chechnya; criminal bandit, freedom fighter, revenge seeker and terrorist. Without publicly recognising the difference between the four groups the Russian government is unlikely to find a moderate because such an individual will not come forward for fear of being linked to terrorism.

In addition it could also be argued that the aftermath of the 2002 Moscow attacks is the perfect time to make such a move. Not only is the terrorist element clearly visible but it comes at a time when the Russian military is in control of most of the Chechen territory and Russian public opinion supports government policy over terrorism, as a result the Russian government can negotiate without appearing weak in the face of a terrorist threat. The attempts at normalising relations with Chechnya may already have begun with the proposal of a constitutional referendum on the future of the country. Such a political settlement could prove popular with a war-weary public in both Chechnya and Russia. The constitution itself seems to be far to Moscow-centric to be adopted legitimately by the Chechen people but the very fact that the Russian government has recognised the need for such a vote is promising. In addition the vote itself, the Russian authorities have announced a reduction in troop numbers in the region, and whilst the numbers involved are small it again shows an apparent recognition by Putin's government that military means alone cannot win the war.

However, having achieved a form of political settlement the Russian government must avoid repeating past mistakes. If a moderate Chechen leader can be found then the Russian government must do all it can to maintain the stability of any new Chechen leadership to prevent a repeat of the collapsed Mashkadov government. In doing so the Russians would be able to claim victory in achieving their objectives of restoring "constitutional order" as well as retaining some control over the oil and gas pipelines in Chechnya without the need for further military action. In conclusion, Russia can win its' war in Chechnya, but to do so it must move away from a strictly military approach. The military attacks have been successful in some respects such as gaining territorial control of much of Chechnya and providing an example to any other potentially secessionist regions. But in order to achieve a true victory the Russians must accept the need for a wider range of measures to regain the 'hearts and minds' of the Chechen people; a move that is more likely to result in a peaceful victory on Russian terms.

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