Sexual Indulgence Of The Julio Claudians example essay topic

Despite the brutality, sexual practices, social indulgence, and general moral deficiencies inherent (on the whole) in the Julio-Claudian Emperors, it was not these attributes that undermined the effectiveness of their Imperial rule. These social and moral blemishes facilitated rule that was loved, admired and even worshiped by the Roman populous. Additionally, it is true to say that these character traits did influence Imperial policy. They never, however, undermined their ability to maintain a strong and stable power base.

Whilst in some cases over-spending the Imperial budget was not uncommon, the Julio-Claudian's fiscal indulgence catalyzed popularity increases and revolutionary market reform. Politically, moral depravity and sexual indulgence became policy that helped maintain a strong and stable power base. Moreover, whilst the Julio-Claudians were undoubtedly immoral and sexual debauchees, these indulgences in no way affected their rule. In fact, the greatest threat to Imperial power lay in neglecting the military which facilitated (in part) the end of both Caligula's and Nero's reigns. The power base of the Julio-Claudian Emperors was rarely undermined. However, when it did occur, it was not a result of any moral degeneration but rather, an inability to please the military and, in particular, the Praetorian Guard.

Whilst erratic at times, the economic policy provided by Julio-Claudians was sufficient to satisfy the needs of the growing Empire. Obviously, the economic polices varied depending on the Emperor of the day, so it is therefore not surprising that there was great diversity in Imperial fiscal policy. However, it is evidenced that indulgent policies did act as catalysts for popularity. Tiberius was known for his very conservative approach to the spending of public funds (Kiefer: 1975, 54).

As economically minded as Tiberius endeavored to be, his "frugal and austere" (Salmon: 1985,148), policy led to much resentment throughout Rome. Suetonius wrote that "He reduced the cost of the games and shows by cutting down the pay of the actors and limiting the pairs of gladiators to a fixed number" (Suetonius quoted in Halsall, P "De Vita Caesarum - Tiberius"). The implicit consequence of this conservative policy was that "he kept expenses down, but dissatisfaction up" (Salmon: 1985,148). In this way, the morally sound and non-indulgent frugal fiscal policy of Tiberius actively damaged his popularity amongst the citizens, and therefore, due to a lack of indulgence and extravagance, he undermined his own power base. Conversely, Nero and Caligula, unlike their predecessor, were generous in their allocation and use of Imperial funds. Suetonius was very critical of their respective economic polices stating that, "In just a few months he (Caligula) entirely exhausted the treasury which Tiberius had filled by years of economy" (Suetonius quoted in Barrett: 1989,237).

Suetonius focused on elaborate spending on items such as "Luxurious yachts, his palaces and manor houses... ". (Suetonius quoted in Kiefer: 1975), rather than the actual public works achievements. Furthermore, with regard to Nero's policies, he stated that "the treasury reserves were quickly run down" (Suetonius quoted in Warmington: 1981, 97). Therefore, in both the cases of Nero and Caligula, he neglects to mention their public works achievements and their visionary economic policy. On the other hand, Tacitus was more objective in his remarks regarding their economic policies.

Nero was an economic visionary, verging on the notions and concepts of the implementation of free trade. He suggested the "abolishing of all indirect taxes... most importantly the customs taxes on the Imperial frontiers and harbors" (Tacitus quoted in Warmington: 1981, 56). Moreover, instead of focusing on the extravagance of the various building projects in Rome, he comments on the superior building regulation. Tacitus explains that "Nero's rebuilding was not indiscriminate or unplanned as it was after the burning of the city by the Gaul's" (Tacitus quoted in Warmington: 1981, 63) In fact, in the case of Nero, after the great fire of AD 64, we see that "Nero undertook the cleaning of debris from the sites before returning them to their owners at his own expense" (Tacitus: 1969, Book XV). Furthermore, Nero and Caligula's spending was not merely limited to public works but was also evident in the field of entertainment which gained them much popularity (Wiedeman: 1989,117). Caligula who indulged in entertainment, "provided spectacular games and shows", (Salmon: 1985,148), albeit at great expense to the administration.

This, in turn, increased his popularity immensely with the Roman people. Consequently, whilst the non-conservative Julio-Claudians indulged greatly in both their private lives and the public arena, their extravagance secured them popularity, and an inevitable reinforcement of Imperial rule. Politically, the more promiscuous Emperors used their sexual practices and acts of debauchery as a tool for the consolidation of power. Whilst it was common for extra-marital affairs and sexual indulgence to occur in Rome (Blond: 1994: 16), the Julio-Claudians used these practices to remain close to enemies and those who may threaten their power base. Augustus, the supposed reformer of Roman morality and marital laws, "himself was no pattern of righteousness" (Kiefer: 1975, 63). It was Augustus who founded the policy of 'sleeping with the enemy'.

In fact, according to Suetonius, Not even his friends deny that he often committed adultery... but they pleaded his motive was not lust but policy, since he could more easily discover the plans of his enemies by making love to their wives. (Suetonius; 1957, Augustus, 49) Similarly, Nero was involved in dubious activities with his enemy's wives (Kiefer: 1975,221). However, it was Caligula that took this consolidation of power principle one step further; The incestuous relationship between Caligula and his sisters, lies behind an expression of Caligula's concern that their husbands might become political rivals. (Weideman, 1989, 40). Politically to this extent, the sexual indulgence of the Julio-Claudians acted as a tool of power consolidation, minimizing the ability of their potential enemies and political rivals to conspire against them. Whilst the extent of some of these acts of sexual debauchery were to be shammed, in no way did they undermine the effectiveness of their rule, but, rather consolidated the power base of the Imperial administration.

Albeit, the moral and sexually licentious lifestyles of Julio-Claudians were far more liberal than that of Roman society, it did not undermine their ability to maintain power and political stability. Whilst it is true to say that "the Romans were not just infernal sex machines geared to gratifying lust" (Blond: 1994, 7), the Romans themselves were by no means a parsimony culture. It is widely understood that "Romans were not much obsessed by morality" (Earl: 1967, 11). However, the acts of the Julio-Claudian Emperors were far more perverse than those acceptable by the values of Roman society. For instance, according to Suetonius: He (Nero) castrated the boy Sports and actually tried to make him a woman and he married him with all the usual of ceremonies... and treated him as his wife... going so far as to make him imitate the cries and lamentations of a maiden being deflowered... (Suetonius quoted in Halsall, P "De Vita Caesarum - Nero").

Yet, by no means was this the extent to which their sexual dissipation occurred. The Julio-Claudians also have a history of sadistic, cruel and even brutal sexual practices. Perhaps these perverted and observed actions are best illustrated by Nero; He devised a kind of game, in, which, covered with the skin of some wild animal, he was let loose from his cage and attacked the private parts of men and women who were bound to stakes". In spite of these acts, "for a Roman to be known as a debauchee didn't affect his social or political progress... ".

(Blond: 1994, 9). However, most importantly, even these most perverse of acts didn't undermine their political power. They might have caused gossip, scandal and controversy but not ineffectiveness of government, as the key to stable and effective political rule lay in the control of the military. Within the Roman Imperial administration, the military facet of the government was as would be expected, a major power broker, with the potential to seriously disrupt the effectiveness of the Empire. Particularly, in the case of the Julio-Claudian Emperors, where inter familial disputes were common, it was important, if not imperative that the Emperor had the support of the military, and, in particular, the Praetorian Guard for the security of power (Scullard: 1963,117).

Tacitus noted that displeasing the army was a dangerous maneuver as, "Politics could be stifled, civil affairs controlled, but the army made and unmade Emperors" (Tacitus quoted in Earl; 1967, 24). Augustus realized this early on in his career, placing a substantial grip around the military early in life. As a consequence in later life, he had a very stable and effective rule. It was understood that regardless of his sexual preference or actions and, "regardless of what company he kept... his power was in the military which enabled the control" (Earl: 1967, 58), of the Empire.

In this way, military strength was imperative in maintaining political control. Furthermore, the importance of controlling the military in order to maintain political power is exemplified through Tiberius. According to Tacitus and Suetonius, Tiberius's reputation for sexual depravity reached fever pitch in later life whilst "indulging his pervers ities on Capri" (Scullard: 1963,211). Yet, despite these immoral actions during his reign, he almost never suffered from military revolts that had potential to undermine his power. The exception being a rare spate of restlessness in Pannonia at the very beginning of his reign in AD 14, long before he had gained any reputation for being a sexual pervert. Moreover, due to his successful military career in his early life, and the adoption of Germanic us, a powerful military general, as his son, he gained the respect and control of the military, which enabled him to keep them occupied and satisfied throughout the entirety of his reign (Scullard: 1963,210).

Furthermore, during the reign of Claudius the importance of controlling the military also came to light. Claudius understood the power of the military from the very beginning of his reign. It was, in fact, .".. in the Praetorian camp, where he was acclaimed Emperor" (Weideman: 1989, 44). Moreover, in his later life the Praetorian Guard saved Claudius from being overthrown by his wife, Messalina, who was found to be unfaithful and conspiring against him with several important Senators. (Fagan: 1998, ). In addition, Claudius gained great favor and acclaim from the legions by successfully leading them in the invasion of Britain.

However, while it was true that Claudius's downfall came about as a result of foul play, it was a carefully calculated plot developed by his manipulative wife Agrippina, which, due to its secretive nature, could not have been stopped by any amount of military support. Just as the military had a significant role in securing Emperors' power and maintaining it, it also was involved in their respective downfalls. This was exemplified through the reign of Caligula. He was by nature, "first and foremost, a sexual degenerate" (Suetonius quoted in Barrett; 1989, 63), however, this was by no means a vehicle for his fall from power. Rather, it can be attributed to his neglect of the military and the Praetorian Guard.

According to Fagan, there were several conspirators in the plot to dispose of Caligula, many of whom were members of the Praetorian Guard (Fagan; 1997, ). In particular, the Praetorian Tribune Cassius Chaerea was believed to have started the conspiracy against him, due to a personal rift between the two. Josephus noted that, One may justly ascribe this act to Chaerea; for although many concurred in the act itself, yet was he the first contrived of it all... he got the dispersed conspirators together. (Josephus quoted in Whiston; "Book 19") Accordingly, the fate of Caligula was testament to the need to maintain a strong relationship with the military. From that point onwards, the power of the Praetorian Guard was acknowledged. For instance, after "Caligula's wife and daughter were promptly slain all those once loyal to their oaths fell quiet" (Dio quoted in Thayer; "Book 59").

Therefore, it can be seen that the sexual perversion of Caligula did not undermine his power base, but rather, his inability to appease the Praetorian Guard facilitated an inevitable downfall. Correspondingly, the reign of Nero was also disrupted due to his inability to control and placate the military and Praetorian Guard. It was apparent from the beginning of Nero's reign that he showed no interest in the affairs of the military, nor did he feel any "ambition or hope to extend or enlarge the Empire" (Suetonius; 1957, Nero, Section 25). However, whilst it is true that Nero was "polymorphic ally perverse" (Kiefer; 1975,198), this inherently immoral attribute was in no way the cause of his apathy towards the military. Rather, his neglect of all military affairs lay in the fact that "Nero wanted to be a professional artist, and that was more important than being Emperor" (Picard; 1968, 86). Consequently, Nero's focus remained set on the Arts and all cultural facets of the government, rather than controlling and occupying the military.

As a result, loyalty within the military legions shifted from the Imperial administration to their respective commanders. The fact that he "never visited his soldiers and... lacked interest in them altogether" (Tacitus quoted in Warmington: 1981,118), led to a number of uprisings by legions around the Empire, including legions in Spain, Germany and Gaul. Through Nero's own actions, he alienated himself from the military and military commanders, which facilitated disloyalty and restlessness amongst troops on the Imperial frontiers. As a consequence, this loss of control paved the way for his inevitable downfall. It must be noted, therefore, that whilst, arguably the two most perverted sexual debauchees' (Nero and Caligula) did have their power undermined and rendered ineffective, it was not because of their inherent character traits but rather their lack of appeasement towards the military, and more specifically, the Praetorian Guard. The Julio-Claudians were undoubtedly a group of sexual debauchees who indulged in immoral acts of perversion, and cruel and brutal sexual gratification.

However, in no way did these socially undesirable character traits render their rule ineffective. Rather, these acts of sexual gratification and indulgence were accepted and even admired by the Roman people. Economically, fiscal indulgence, when compared to a more frugal Imperial spending policy, catalyzed an increase in popularity and paved the way for revolutionary concepts of macro-economic reform. Politically, sexual indulgence was a tool used by the Julio-Claudians for the consolidation of a stable and effective power base. Moreover, despite the already liberal Roman society, the immoral and sexually licentious lifestyles of the Emperors were by no means acceptable everyday practices, and yet, did not diminish their ability to rule effectively.

Furthermore, the key to maintaining a stable and effective rule lay in the appeasement of the military and, more specifically, the Praetorian Guard. The Julio-Claudians were indubitably sexual degenerates; however, these traits vigorously catalyzed efficient rule through the consolidation of power and increasing popularity amongst the Roman people. When their rule was eventually undermined or rendered ineffective, it was not as a result of a perverse and indulgent lifestyle, but rather, an inability to control the military and the elite power-wielding Praetorian Guard. Sexual perversion and debauchery were not character traits that undermined the effectiveness of rule; rather, they were a refined method of power consolidation.

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