Slavery In The Forced Service Economy example essay topic

I thought I'd take this time to reply to the critics of my little essay on distributive justice. -- For Paul Hsieh: -- I'm not quite sure how to take your comments. Some of the time, you seem to be agreeing with me, because you say things like " the forced labor is cleverly concealed" which makes it sound like you agree that even in your counter-example the surgeon is still doing forced labor. But at other points, you appear to be arguing that a different injustice than forced labor is achieving the same effect. Namely: the government first imposes what may be called " forced leisure" on everyone in a certain field, and then allows exceptions for those that agree to its terms. -- Indeed, we could imagine this system under other circumstances.

Imagine that after slavery was declared illegal in the United States, Alabama passed a law that barred blacks from every occupation. Then, it offered licenses to work to those that met its terms. And what would the terms be They could return to work for their previous masters, and receive minimal food and shelter. -- I'm not sure whether we should call the blacks' new condition " slavery" or whether we should just say that it is just as bad as slavery, since it has exactly the same effect.

But it is hard to see why this round-about means of achieving the same end should make a moral difference. Rather, it appears to just be a means of (as you say) concealing the fact that one thing is just as bad as the other. Since you agree with my conclusion anyway, this should be pretty clear to you; but I venture to affirm that almost anyone would have difficulty arguing that this round-about manner of extracting forced labor is morally less objectionable than slavery. (Unless they are confused by the round-about ness itself, which as you suggest is probably just a way of disguising what would otherwise be a patent injustice.) Fo Alan Eaton: -- I'm having a little trouble understanding your reply. Are you saying that educators will charge high prices, and that the poor will come to them to get hand-outs Even supposing that e.g. medical schools could charge exorbitant prices, why would they automatically give their extraordinarily large profits to the medically needy You do correctly describe how a monopolist would price (namely, ifthe value of the education he offered were very great, he could extract a very high price for it), although normally we would expect competition to drive price down to average cost (which in my hypothetical economy is just the cost of getting someone to get out of bed and do some teaching). -- I'm also puzzled by your remark that morality in such a society might change its emphasis.

Are you talking about "morality" inthe anthropological sense of "what people in X think is right " Or are you talking about morality in the objective sense of "whatis actually right" Obviously morality in the latter sense cannot change its emphasis. But maybe what you mean is that confronted with this hypothetical, you begin to think that you were wrong about forced labor, and it is actually perfectly just in some cases. If that is what you think, then my thought experiment has utterly failed for you. All I could ask you to do it reflect further and see if you are actually convinced of the propriety of forced labor, or if you have been too hasty in changing your initial intuition. For Steve Blatt: -- You make a lot of points here, so I'm only going to try with the main ones. -- 1.

Getting a Clearer Picture of the Pure Service Economy. -- I admit that it is a little hard to visualize at first. Let " spot it this way: for all of the goods that there are, the reis superabundance. Plenty of food growing everywhere, pleasant climate, natural shelter in caves, etc. And let's add further that none of the services involve transforming naturally occuring goods into new goods; rather, they are things like surgery, maid-service, offering lessons, and so on. The world is a little bare, but surely it is conceivable without the silliness of toasters growing on trees.

-- 2. Relevance -- What is the relevance of my hypothetical I do indeed try to extend it to the real world; but I think that it is interesting in itself to see how far the redistributionist is willing to go. It is interesting to see if this hypothetical will make him start drawing lines and admitting that justice constrains his pursuit of equality and the like. Even if you don't buy my extension, I still think the example is instructive if it merely points to "the limits of redistribution", since so many advocates thereof seem to take its an overriding good. -- 3. Examining Origins of Property Holdings -- Well, I suppose that there are two senses in which one could bea redistributionist.

The first (and normal sense) is that of person who believes that the even the results of a free market- in which initial holdings were not taken from anyone by force -ought to be modified, by force if necessary. The second (andidiocyncratic) sense is that of a person who believes that some current holdings are unjust and must be rectified by forced transfer from the unjust holders to the just holders. -- As far as I can tell, my argument only supports redistribution inthe second sense. And if someone tried to use my argument to justify massive transfers from e.g. the current rich to the current poor, I would challenge their empirical, not their moral argument. I agree that stolen holdings ought to be returned to their true owners; I just think that most current holding are held by their just owners.

-- Even on a very strict interpretation of property rights, according to which the transfer must be voluntary at each and every nexus, it is easy to avoid the conclusion that most current holdings are unjust. Most obviously, if we also hold strictly to the principle of individual guilt and individual restitution, it would be necessary for a complainant to show that a certain individual unjustly held his own property. If NO individual can show this, then even ifthe chain of just transfers were broken some point in the past, why shouldn't current property be considered unowned or abandoned property which was re-homesteaded by the current possessor -- Or consider the case where a criminal grabs your bag of gold dust and blows it to the wind. This dust is going to land on the land of a mass of individuals, and it will be completely impossible for you to recover it from them. Should we not then treat the original thief as if he had simply destroyed your property, and hold him accountable And if he then killed himself and had no estate, why should we think that an unknowable percentage ofthe population owes you an unknowable amount of restitution Why not think that the robber has robbed you and escaped punishment, without in anyway placing guilt on the rest of the populace -- 4. Rules of Valid Argumentation -- Well, there are at least two rules for an argument to work.

First of all, as I said in my first posting, it is necessary that the premise be more initially plausible than the conclusion. If pis the premise and q the conclusion, then P (p) P (q). This avoids absurdities like trying to argue that the external world exists because I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the idea of God, and God would not deceive me. -- Second of all (as Mike Hummer pointed out to me), it is also necessary that the premise be more initially probable than the denial ofthe conclusion. This avoids absurdities like trying to argue that we have no knowledge because all statements are either analytic or synthetic.

The denial of the conclusion (We have knowledge) is more initially probable than the premise, so the argument doesn't work. Ma them -- -- at ically, P (p) 1-P (q). For example, my argument would be a good one if P (slavery is wrong) = . 99 and P (redistribution is right) = . 7 For. 99 .

7, and. 99 (1-. 7). 5. Is Having Children Wrong, The Duty of Slaves to Commit Suicide, etc. Now Steve's attempt at reductio ad absurdum don't even slightly convince me, for they make a critical conflation: With regards to having children, all that my argument says is thatit is wrong to oneself impose forced labor on another.

Itdoesn't say that it is wrong to fail to avoid it; nor does it say that it is wrong to create another human being who is likely or even certain to be victimized. Similarly, my argument that slavery is wrong for the slaver to commit does not mean that itis wrong for the slave to submit to it or fail to kill himself. -- To put this in teleological / deontological terms, I am saying thatit is wrong to enslave people. This is distinct from it being wrong to be a victim of slavery. We would only be driven toSteve's conclusion if we thought of slavery as a teleological moral cost which exceeded all others. Hence, the moral cost-minimizing solution requires the production of no further children and suicide for existing slaves.

I however am saying that slavery is a deontological moral wrong; it is wrong for it to be done atall, but it may despite this be teleological ly good that people exist even if they are enslaved. In Nozick's terms, I see " no slavery" as a side constraint rather than a moral goal. -- -Bryan Caplan -- [Moderator's note: You know, Brian's essay and the little controveryit started might be a very interesting thing to include in the ASP. If Brian or one of his commentators would like to organize and edit it all, I could very easily include it as a special feature.

Larry] -- From: Ben Fischer B.D. Caplan's essay means to a prove the following conditional, where A = redistribution in a pure service economy and B = forced slavery in a pureservice economy: A - Since forced slavery is unacceptable in a just society, he argues, by modus tollers redistribution is unacceptable. In this response I mean to show that the conditional is false, at least in any interesting way. That is to say, I mean to show that it is possible to have a situation inthe pure service economy which would be acceptable to the redistributionist, yet would not entail any interesting kind of forcedslavery. We can imagine a certain group of people unhappy with the state of affairs in the society which Caplan describes. They come together to discuss what they see as a problem, that there is too much suffering in the pureservice economy.

They agree that none of them will conduct business (i. e., conduct the kind of voluntary exchanges that Caplan describes) with anyone not in their group. Furthermore, everyone in their group will be required (on pain of expulsion) to devote a certain percentage (which might differ from profession to profession) of their services to those whocouldn't otherwise afford them. In return for such a donation, they receive the privilege of trading with the other members of the group, a privilege not otherwise available. The first question is whether such a voluntary association would satisfy redistributive requirements. If the organization was large enough, it surely would.

Assuming that the voluntary association is large enough, would forced slavery necessarily result It would not for the people inthe voluntary association, for it is voluntary. Neither would those outside the voluntary association be subject to any interesting kind of forced slavery. This latter group would have two options: join the voluntary association or don't. If they do, the only question is whether they were forced to do so. Again, the voluntary nature of the organization assures that they were not.

Imagine that only one person refused to join the voluntary association, and that that person needed emergency surgery. Without joining, that person will die. Yet if we want to say that this amounts to a kind of forced slavery, that the choice between joining the "voluntary" association and death is no real choice atall, we also have to say that the members of the voluntary association (or perhaps just the surgeons) are doing something incompatible with justice. If the voluntary association is submitting the lone holdout to forcedslavery, it is not interesting forced slavery, for in a system of voluntary exchanges like Caplan describes, we surely want to keep the right not to exchange. If the holdout chooses not to join, the same argument obtains. If the voluntary association, in letting him die, is submitting him to forced slavery (or, more accurately, killing him), it i snot an interesting crime.

We cannot claim that the voluntary association has done wrong without denying the people in it to organize on the basis outlined above, which we surely don't want to do. The likelihood of such a voluntary association ever forming is admittedly very low. However, in the pure service economy I suspect that redistribution would never be a problem because the very wealthy, the surgeons, say, would have to work so little that they would be bored and gladly perform operations for the poor. So I don't feel compelled to base my argument on what is likely, for Caplan's is not-indeed, the pureservice economy itself could never exist. My point is simply thatCaplan's argument that redistribution entails slavery in the forced service economy fails. If a large enough voluntary association could accomplish the kind of institutionalized redistribution that Rawls, say, would favor, and it seems to me that it could, no interesting form of slavery would exist and Caplan's argument fails.

Ben From Wed Apr 5 18: 28: 52 1995 Received: from bottom. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by ponyexpress. princeton. edu (8.6. 12/1.7/newPE) id SAA 21115; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 28: 48-0400 Received: from [128.146. 24.182] by bottom. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu (8.6. 10/4.940426) id SAA 01944; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 26: 44-0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 26: 44-0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economyStatus: RFrom: "Bryan D. Caplan" Well, I don't disagree with Ben Fischer argument. Why would IHe imagines voluntary institutions which pressure people into helping others; and these functions exert a redistributive function. But, as Ben points out, no one either in or out of the institutions is being forced, so were have voluntary redistribution.

Very well. Then my argument only demonstrates the moral illegitmacyof redistributive organizations which were not formed voluntarily. Since this describes every government which ever existed (need I mention Lysander Spooner's No Treason), my argument only shows that all of the redistribution which exists in reality is wrong. Which is all that I ever intended to show. In fact, if we slightly modify Ben's example, we will see my intuition in all its moral starkness. Imagine that Ben's association is formed by threatening to kill people who don't join.

Once 50% of the population is enrolled, the leaders of the group only threaten to occasionally beat up non-joiners; another 40% of the population joins. The remaining 10% are then told that if they don't join, the 90%remaining will boycott them. Is this acceptable I doubt it. But this process describes the actual formation of states far better than any contract theory ever could, so it is this hypothetical, not Ben's benign one, which should inform our judgments of redistributive practices of actual governments. -Bryan From Wed Apr 5 18: 29: 09 1995 Received: from bottom. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by ponyexpress. princeton. edu (8.6. 12/1.7/newPE) id SAA 21160; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 29: 04-0400 Received: from [128.146.

10/4.940426) id SAA 02019; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 27: 27-0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 18: 27: 27-0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economyStatus: RFrom: (David Rader) Ben, Although your reply to the idea of forced slavery in a pure service economy does permit the possibility of redistribution through charity, it does not address the main point of the argument, namely: If a government forces redistribution against someone's will, is that just Admittedly, in a republic, the government is elected by presumably a majority of the populace. And therefore any rules made by the governemtnhave the effect of being made by the majority of the electorate (hey, this is an idealized situation - ignore politics and special interests). But, is tyranny by the majority any more excused for taxation than it is for racism, or (excuse the spelling) apart hied If every person within society choses to willing donate part other labor for charitable causes, as you have outlined, that is fine. It inthe individual's right to do so. But, what if, as your great association was forming, another formed right along side it, and whose members pledged themselves to help each other (ie trade and perform services for one another) conditional on the an individual member donating to charity, ifthe felt like it.

If this association grew large enough to be self-supporting, then it would very easily allow any member of society to chose to donate, or chose not to donate, as her individual right. I am sure you would have no problem with this. But, would the other association Would the humanitarians who wish to coerce other members ofsociety into donating some of their personal labor to charity think it was okay if some people did not Most importantly: if (as I assume would happen) most of the segregation between associations was based upon personal donating choices (ie most of those who chose to donate would join the forced donation group, and those who did not want to donate would join the " your choice" group) would the two sides fight each other in order to determine which chosen path was "correct" Would they try to legislate the legality of their view, in order to force the other members ofsociety to conform You may scoff at the idea, but consider any of a number of national issues today, in which the choice is personal, and the effect is societal. Both sides wage huge legal and legislature battles to try to force the other side to conform. To name a few: gun control, abortion, prayer in school, farming, and environmental concerns. In each of these cases, the pro and anti sides are polarized, and very hostile towards each other.

The battles have evolved from "is it right to... " into " should someone be legally allowed to... ". And, because many people who respect an individual's choice fight to protect that choice, as opposed to fighting in favor of a specific action, it is very difficult to determine which members of each "association" feel that an actions right. The problem, as I see it, with each of these cases, is not that individual members of society feel that one action is or is not morally right. The problem is that one side of each argument has chosen to try to force every member of society abide by that side " moral code.

Morality is most likely not a universal truth. And certainly, no moral system that has been proposed is universally accepted. Forcing your own system upon other people is wrong, according to my personal view. And, in that way, any kind of forced action, be it donations to charity, the refusal to allow abortions, the taking of guns, or the stopping of voluntary prayer sessions in school is wrong.

Sorry, Ben, but I just don't think you can escape the fact that forcing members of society to give away their possessions against their will is unjust. Certainly not by saying that in one situation there could spring up a voluntary charity organization. dave From Wed Apr 5 21: 58: 25 1995 Received: from top. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by ponyexpress. princeton. edu (8.6. 12/1.7/newPE) id VAA 21425; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 58: 20-0400 Received: from [128.146. 24.95] by top. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu (8.6. 10/4.940426) id VAA 11987; Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 57: 03-0400 Date: Wed, 5 Apr 1995 21: 57: 03-0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: Re: a response to the problem of distributive justice in a pure service economyStatus: RFrom: Mike To David Rader: I can't resist answering this one, although I'm sure Bryan could answer it just as well. I agree with your central point, which is that you shouldn't force people to give to charity.

But the justification you offer at the end of your message renders your position incoherent. You say the reason we should not force people to give to charity (i. e., the reason it is unjust too force people) is that "morality is most likely not a universal truth " and it's wrong to force people to abide by one's own morality, in your personal opinion. You seem to be overlooking the fact that the view you just offered, like the view Bryan was defending, is a moral judgement. Therefore, it is obscure how you can defend its truth by claiming that moral judgementsaren't really true.

Furthermore, I presume you would say that it was permissible to use force to prevent people from c omitting random murders. Yet wouldn't this be 'forcing our morality' on the would-bemurderersIf you say that it is categorically wrong to use force against people, then that must mean that it is also wrong to use force to prevent people from using force; and so it winds up that people should be permitted to use force after all. From Fri Apr 7 01: 18: 39 1995 Received: from top. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu by ponyexpress. princeton. edu (8.6. 12/1.7/newPE) id BAA 13435; Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 18: 36-0400 Received: from [128.146. 70.55] by top. magnus. acs. ohio-state. edu (8.6. 10/4.940426) id BAA 23070; Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 17: 50-0400 Date: Fri, 7 Apr 1995 01: 17: 50-0400 Message-Id: To: (Recipient list suppressed) From: (ASP-Disc) Subject: redistribution as charity Status: RFrom: Ben Fischer Perhaps I didn't make all the implications of my argument clear.

Suppose that a government decides that anyone who wants to stop paying taxes, etc., can simply give up their citizenship and set up tiny principalities constituted of the land that they own. But the old government is surely well within its rights in denying these new principalities the right to travel on their land. Well, it is clear that the residents of this principality, presumably only a family, would starve relatively quickly, unless they owned a farm. In that case, the government wouldn't be forcing anyone to participate in their system of redistribution (another undesirable things, I suppose), but if the redistribution that does exist is charity, it's of a strange kind. Essentially the government would have presented its citizens with the choice of death or redistribution-entailing citizenship, but the conditions under which death would be "imposed" are perfectly reasonable. The government would just be exercising its right over the property it owns.

In this way I avoid the question of whether redistribution is good public policy, but the denial of its morality entails a denial of the government's right to use its property in any way it chooses. My point is that you cannot deny the right of the government to enforce redistributive policies without also denying them the right to use their property in any way they see fit. In a way, the U.S. goes beyond the call of duty, for the choice isn't redistribution or death, but simply redistribution or jail for income-tax evasion. This is another version ofSocrates' contract argument. If the government gives you the opportunity to make another choice (and surely it's reasonable to make allowances forage here), you are bound the strictures it sets on you, even death.

I can see no way that redistribution necessarily entails slavery of any kind, if there is a contract which you aren't forced to sign. Of course, the situation changes markedly in non-democratic systems. Ben.