South Central Los Angeles example essay topic
For 4 days violent civil unrest raged in this Metropolis of 9,000,000 (U.S. census population estimate for Los Angeles County, California State demographic Research Unit, California Department of Finance), causing the deaths of 54 people, injuring over 2,400 (University of Southern California, "The Los Angeles Riots 1992", web is / archives / la / la riot. html) and causing property damage of approximately $1,000,000,000 USD (Falkenrath & Rosegrant, 2000). Over these four days, more than 7,000 people were arrested on looting, assault, arson and weapons related charges (Salak, 1993, pg. 33). Starting at the intersection of Florence and Normandie, in the predominantly black and hispanic inhabited area of LA known as South Central, a small group of 25-40 teens took to the streets and began a rowdy protest, striking cars with baseball bats and shouting anti police slogans. The Los Angeles Police Department responded with 6 officers and during the course of attempting to arrest 2 gang members, they became surrounded by a mob of 300-400 people (Vernon, 1993, pg 18) throwing rocks and bottles and shouting at the officers.
More back up was called and within minutes there were 25 officers there. As the violence escalated, the LAPD commander at the scene ordered his officers to retreat from the area (Vernon, 1993, pg 19). The LAPD would not return to this flashpoint for over 3 hours (Cannon, 1997, pg. 304). This signaled the beginning of the rampant destruction and brutal violence which captivated much of the world for 4 days. Over those 4 days the spring of 1992, roaming mobs of protesters carried out random beatings and murders, looted and firebombed over 5,300 buildings (The Toll, LA Times, May 7, 1992, pg A 6). There are many documented cases, most from early in the riots of innocent motorists being pulled from their cars and beaten.
The most famous case, involving a white truck driver named Reginald Denny was captured live by a news helicopter circling above. Mr. Denny was a classic case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, as he attempted to maneuver his transport truck through the intersection of Florence and Normandie minutes after the police retreated and the violence began to escalate. Mr. Denny was pulled from the cab of his truck, punched and kicked relentlessly, beaten in the head with a hammer, then smashed in the head with a cinder block as he lay motionless on the pavement. As he lay on the ground, one assailant did a victory dance around his body, and another casually walked up and rifled through his pockets (Cannon, 1997, pg. 305). I can still remember watching this carnage at my home, and thinking, as many were, "where are the police". Mr. Denny is alive today thanks to the efforts of four black strangers who watched the live footage on TV of him being beaten and drove to the intersection, pulled him into the cab of his truck and drove him to Daniel Freeman Memorial Hospital (Cannon, 1997, pg. 309).
As the rioting intensified, it soon became clear that the Korean shopkeepers who ran liquor stores and supermarkets in the poor areas of South Central and Korea town (see fig. #1) were being targeted, and received the bulk of the looting and fire bombings. At the end of the riots, 1,867 Korean owned businesses were burned or looted, and losses were estimated at $347 million (Kwong, 1992, pg. 88). As the community raged around them, many in the Korean community of Los Angeles mobilized to come to the aid of their friends and associates who owned these stores. Persons of Korean decent came to help protect Korean shops, brandishing weapons from baseball bats to handguns and assault weapons (Cannon, 1997, pg. 323). The reasons for the Korean businesses being targeted are many, and will be investigated in the next section.
As the evening of April 29 progressed, the fires burned freely in South Central Los Angeles. By midnight, there were 500 fires reported to the City of Los Angeles Fire Department. By the end of the riots, 7,000 fires had been reported (Charting the Hours of Chaos, web fires/920429 LA-Riots / LATimes-2002-0429-0501/2002-0429 la times Charting The HoursofChaos. htm, viewed March 17, 2005). The fire crews responding to the first calls came under sniper fire and were confronted by well armed rioters, forcing them to abandon the fire lines until they could secure police escorts (Vernon, 1993, pg 20). Every fire truck being sent to a fire would have to be accompanied by police escorts armed with assault rifles to provide tactical support. The sheer number of fires and lack of police resources meant that many of the fires that would burn over the 4 nights would totally destroy the buildings, and spread to many adjacent units.
Figure #1: Source: web after midnight on April 30, California governor Pete Wilson announced that a state of emergency has been issued for the city of Los Angeles. This allows for the governor to dispatch state resources such as The California Highway Patrol and the California National Guard to assist in bringing order to the lawlessness occurring in Los Angeles. He also uses his powers to enact a curfew in all parts of Los Angeles affected by the rioting (Charting the Hours of Chaos, web fires/920429 LA-Riots / LATimes-2002-0429-0501/2002-0429 la times Charting The HoursofChaos. htm, viewed March 17, 2005). This curfew allows police and California National Guard units to arrest and detain anyone found on the streets between dusk and dawn (Salak, 1993, pg. 43). Unfortunately, due to poor planning, the National Guard units were not available to be deployed until the afternoon of April 30. By the end of the day, Governor Wilson will order the deployment of over 6,000 state troops into Los Angeles.
These well armed troops will be joined by over 4,000 United States Marines on May 2 (Charting the Hours of Chaos, web fires/920429 LA-Riots / LATimes-2002-0429-0501/2002-0429 la times Charting The HoursofChaos. htm, viewed March 17, 2005). By the time the dusk to dawn curfew is lifted and the state of emergency is declared over on May 4, 54 persons lie dead, 2,383 persons are injured, 12,111 persons have been arrested and over 7,000 fires have been put out across Los Angeles (Charting the Hours of Chaos, web fires/920429 LA-Riots / LATimes-2002-0429-0501/2002-0429 la times Charting The HoursofChaos. htm, viewed March 19, 2005). Damage and losses will total almost 1 billion $US. It is by far the most deadly and costly civil uprising in the modern history of the United States (Falkenrath & Rosegrant 2000). The Powder Keg & the Spark In 1992 the County of Los Angeles was a sprawling metropolis with a population of over 9,000,000, (10,103,000 in 2004) (California State Demographic Research Unit, California Department of Finance, web. com / topics /Geography / ge 01. htm, viewed March 10, 2005) and covering an area of 10,517 Km 2 (Land and Water Area of Los Angeles, web. com / topics / Geography / ge 01. htm, viewed March 10, 2005) consisting of 88 communities. This area is commonly referred to as Los Angeles.
It is one continuous urban area 160 km long and 115 km wide (Cannon, 1997, pg. 15). Smack in the middle of this massive urban region sits the area known as South Central, home to the poorest residents of Los Angeles, and almost 99% black and hispanic. The 1990 statistics show that South Central consisted of 630,000 residents packed into 80 Km 2, and don't include the thousands of illegal aliens, or "undocumented workers" (Cannon, 1997, pg. 15). The area could easily be described as a powder keg, awaiting one spark to set it off.
This section will explore what made this urban area so explosive and the incident that provided the spark. i) LA- Rich vs. Poor, Black vs. White If you are to ask anyone what their impression of Los Angeles is, the image of Hollywood stars and starlets will likely be one of the images that springs to their mind. Media is saturated with images of beautiful, rich, young stars lounging at their beach houses, driving their Ferraris and Jaguars and going to exclusive parties at Los Angeles's hot night spots. This demographic is, of course, less than 1% of the population of Los Angeles, and their gated mansions are far away from the real life in Los Angeles. For the majority of this city life consists of leaving their house or apartment every morning, driving through horribly congested freeways, or hopping on a city bus to work and heading back home in the evening. On the surface, life in Los Angeles was not that much different than life in any other large urban centre in the world. In 1992 as it is today, the City of Los Angeles was deeply divided, with most of the middle and upper class white citizens living in the San Fernando Valley, West LA and outlying communities such as Santa Monica, while the poor black and hispanic residents lived in the depressed areas of Watts, East LA and South Central (See Fig.
#1). In the 10 years leading up to the 1992 riots, South Central's largely blue collar residents had been rocked by several large industrial plant closures such as Bethlehem Steel, 1,600 employees; General Motors, 4,500 employees; Max Factor, 1,000 employees; and Goodyear Tire, 1,600 employees (Goetz Wolf, in Inside the LA Riots, 1992, pg 144). These closings, combined with a large influx of hispanic immigrants willing to work in the new garment industry that had sprung up in the area of South Central meant that the median wage in South Central was only $17,000 (Cannon, 1997, pg. 11) and unemployment in the black community soared. In 1991 the median household net worth for Anglos in Los Angeles was $31,904. For non Anglos, that number fell to $1,353 (Los Angeles Community Reinvestment Committee, in Inside the LA Riots, 1992, pg 32). With these numbers it is easy to see that Los Angeles was a city divided, with a large number of blacks and hispanics feeling that "The American Dream" of wealth and happiness was reserved only for the white majority. ii) Crack Cocaine and Gangs In the early 1980's, a potent, cheap and highly addicting form of cocaine, called crack cocaine, was introduced in Southern California.
A seemingly endless supply flowed into Los Angeles and into the hands of the thousands of crack addicts, who mostly populated the poor areas of East LA, South Central and Compton. The distribution of crack had become a very lucrative business to be in, and was controlled by the two predominant black gangs in Los Angeles, the Bloods and the Crips. Membership in these gangs skyrocketed from approximately 50,000 in 1983 to 127,000 in 1991 (Alonzo, 1999, pg 10). The incredible amounts of money to be made, along with large numbers of gang members competing for drug sales turf in a relatively small area (see fig. #2) had turned much of East LA into a war zone. Gang related murders in Los Angeles County shot up from 212 in 1984, the year before crack cocaine really exploded on the scene, to a staggering 803 in 1991.
(Alonzo, 1999, pg 11) This number represents only gang related murders in Los Angeles County for 1991. By contrast Canada had 582 total murders in 1992 (Gimbarzevsky, 1995) and Australia reported 339 in 1995 (Homicide Deaths, Australia 1995, Flinders University, Adelaide, web viewed March 20, 2004). The gang violence took a huge toll on the inhabitants of South Central and the rest of East LA. Not only was their neighborhood the poorest in California, but it was increasingly dangerous just to step out their front door. This also made South Central a focal point for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), whose methods and tactics were seen as racist and greatly damaged the LAPD's reputation in these areas. Fig #2 Source: Territoriality Among African American Street Gangs in Los Angeles web ) The LAPD- Protectors or Occupying Force?
The Los Angeles Police Department had gained a very bad reputation for brutality and racism, even prior to the 1991 videotaped beating of motorist Rodney King, which provided the spark for the riots and will be discussed later. Between the years 1990 and 1999, the LAPD was named in 282 civil cases for assault, shooting suspects without cause and other force related issues. These cases resulted in $66,250,410 in awards against the city of Los Angeles (Lon sway, 2002, pg #2). The prevalent feeling towards the LAPD in the areas of East LA was that it was a corrupt and racist institution, and one not to be trusted (Cooper, 1992, pg 13).
As mentioned in the previous section, East LA was a very dangerous place to live in, thanks to very high numbers of gang members on the streets. The problem became much more acute in the mid 1980's thanks to the introduction of crack cocaine. In response to this environment, LAPD chief Darryl Gates undertook a radical and military style approach to policing the area. In 1980 the "community resources against street hoodlums" (CRASH) unit was formed. The purpose of CRASH was to have a dedicated group of officers on the street who would get to know gang members by name, gather intelligence on gang activities and provide tough and visible deterrence on the streets (CRASH Culture, http: // web viewed March 21, 2005).
Members of the CRASH unit were hand picked by chief Gates for their toughness and "fearlessness" and for their ability to work with the community and extract information (CRASH Culture, Interview with former LAPD chief Gates, web pages / frontline /shows / land /scandal / crash culture. html., viewed March 21, 2005). The CRASH unit even had a motto, "We Intimidate Those Who Intimidate". CRASH was viewed as a great success throughout the law enforcement community, even as whispers about corruption and unspeakable acts of brutality were being heard (CRASH Culture, Interview with former LAPD detective Mike Hohan, web pages / frontline /shows / land /scandal / crash culture. html., viewed March 21, 2005). The mystique surrounding CRASH came to a halt in 1998, when CRASH officer Raphael Perez was arrested in the act of stealing 8 pounds of cocaine, valued at over $1 million, from an LAPD evidence locker. In an effort to reduce his sentence, Perez began to talk about the rampant corruption and brutality within the CRASH unit (O'Connor, 2000, Pg 1).
What Perez revealed was LAPD officers who routinely sold confiscated cocaine and crack back to street level dealers, stories of torture and brutality, and that most CRASH officers carried "drop guns" that they would plant on the bodies of suspects that they had shot and killed or wanted to send to prison for a firearms offence (CRASH Culture, Interview with former LAPD detective Mike Hohan, web pages / frontline /shows / land /scandal / crash culture. html., viewed March 21, 2005). The investigation into the CRASH unit is ongoing, but has resulted in several convicted individuals being set free and criminal convictions against many former CRASH officers. iv) Rodney King and Latasha Harlins There are two incidents which stand out among the hundreds of cited by black activists that illustrate the views held by some in the LA black community that there is no justice for blacks in LA. The first incident is the beating of Rodney King. This incident has been very well documented and viewed worldwide as a prime example of police brutality. I will not be debating the incident, or rehashing it here, but will provide a brief synopsis.
In the early hours of March 3, 1991 Rodney King led the LAPD and California Highway Patrol on a 13 km chase on the freeway and surface streets of Los Angeles (Cannon, 1997, pg 25). While attempting to arrest Mr. King, officers from the LAPD were videotaped by a civilian striking him 46 times with their batons, shocking him twice with their "TASER" guns and punching and kicking him while he lie prone on the street. Mr. King suffered serious injuries in the incident and 4 LAPD officers were charged with assault and battery and violating Mr. Kings civil rights (Owens, 1994, pg 78). The 4 were placed on trial, and on April 29, 1992 the verdicts were carried on live TV, one officer guilty of excessive force, the other 10 charges ending in acquittals.
These acquittals, handed down by a jury of 10 whites and 1 asian and 1 hispanic (Owens, 1994, pg 165) provided the spark that turned into the 1992 Los Angeles riot. The second incident that shocked the black community of LA occurred on March 16/1991, 13 days after Rodney King's beating. Latasha Harlins, a 15 year old high school student, was walking to school in South Central and stopped in at the Empire Liquor market Deli to buy a container of orange juice. The Empire Liquor Market Deli was owned by Soon Ja Du and her husband Hung Ki Du (Cannon, 1997, pg 108), and was just one of the many Korean owned liquor and grocery stores in East LA.
The presence of these stores angered many in the community. The prices in these shops were considered unfairly inflated and the shopkeepers were considered rude and suspicious of their mainly black customer base. Harlins entered the store and placed a container of orange juice in the top of her back pack and approached the counter with money in her hand to pay for it. As she approached, Ms. Du accused her of trying to steal the juice and a verbal argument ensued. Hawkins eventually placed the container on the counter and turned to walk out of the store, and Ms. Du fired one shot from a. 38 calibre revolver, striking Hawkins in the head and killing her instantly (Cannon, 1997, pg 109).
The incident was witnessed by a friend of Hawkins, Lake shia Combs, and captured on the stores video surveillance system. Soon Ja Du was indicted for Murder, and in October of 1991 Soon Ja Du was found guilty of the far lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to 400 hours of community service and placed on 5 years probation (Wilkinson, 1991, pg A 1). This verdict outraged the black community, who saw it as proof that there was no justice for blacks in Los Angeles, and served to further divide the black and Korean communities. Long Term Planning This section will discuss the measures that could have been undertaken to mitigate the damages caused by the 1992 riot by looking at the 4 areas that an effective emergency plan must incorporate, prevention / mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery. i) Prevention / Mitigation This means measures that could have been taken to ensure that an event doesn't happen, or if it does, that the effects on the community are lessened (Mancock, Tristan & Lunn, 2004). In the case of Los Angeles, this may mean that the entire structure of the city may have to be reexamined.
Many large cities in the USA are set up in a way which creates large areas of low income or government assisted housing. In placing all persons of lower economic status, and in many cases racial status, in one large area these cities run the risk of having a large portion of their population feeling forgotten, disaffected and alienated. In short, a breeding ground for the type of "us vs. them" mentality that existed in East LA and led to the riots. Urban planners need to disperse pockets of low income and assisted housing throughout the entire city, causing the integration of the lower socio-economic groups with the middle and upper class. Not only does this planning prevent the alienation of these groups, but allows a greater chance of breaking the cycle of poverty and violence that many in South Central LA are trapped in (Vernon, 1993, pg. 246). ii) Preparedness Preparedness means that if / when the emergency situation occurs, all the resources that will be needed to deal with it are adequately prepared and can be mobilized quickly (Mancock, Tristan & Lunn, 2004). Robert Vernon (1993, pg 11), who was the LAPD Assistant Chief of Police in 1992, writes in his book L.A. Justice, Lessons From the Firestorm, that. ".. the LAPD tactical manual had clearly set out the procedures to be followed in the case of civil disobedience...
". . Because it was written out in the manual, does this mean that the city of Los Angeles was prepared? No, it does not. Unless both senior and field commanders are well briefed in the procedures, they will not be carried out. It seems almost unbelievable that, with much advance notice that verdicts were going to be handed down in the trial of the 4 officers charged with assaulting Rodney King, there was no effort made by the LAPD to ensure that watch commanders were prepared to intervene should a not guilty verdict be handed down and tempers began to flare (Vernon, 1993, pg 12).
Equally surprising was that the Chief, Darryl Gates, was attending a political event in Brentwood, CA. on the 29th of April, and not in LA's state of the art underground Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (Cannon, 1997, pg 300-01). This lack of co-ordination in anticipation of the event surely led to a small insurrection at the intersection of Florence and Normandie streets (Vernon, 1993, pg. 18) becoming a massive and out of control riot, requiring military assistance to quell.) Response The response to an emergency is the steps which are taken during an emergency situation to minimize the effects and ensure that those affected are given relief and support (Mancock, Tristan & Lunn, 2004). It is widely thought that had police response to the mob situation which occurred when the 6 LAPD officers came under attack (Vernon 1993, pg. 18) at the outset of the riots been as the LAPD manual called for, the riots would never have escalated to the heights that they reached. According to most riot control action plans, an overwhelming police presence should be presented and the mob controlled and dispersed as quickly as possible at the onset of civil disobedience (McMahon, 2001, pg. 34). In 1992, this clearly did not happen. Due to the lack of preparedness, the LAPD abandoned South Central LA and allowed the riot to gain strength and proceed unchallenged for 3 hours before they returned (Vernon, 1992, pg. 304).
Further, once the National Guard was called in, they were unable to be deployed into the field for 8 hours, due to the fact that they had insufficient ammunition and equipment (Wenger, 1994, pg. 3). Obviously this situation needs to be rectified. If the required equipment is not available, the needless delays in obtaining it will allow for needless suffering and losses to the community. iv) Recovery The term recovery refers to the process of supporting and assisting affected areas in regaining emotional and physical well being, as well as restoring the physical infrastructure (Mancock, Tristan & Lunn, 2004). Unlike many natural disaster type emergencies, this area of the emergency plan was much easier to implement. The physical trauma suffered by victims of the riots was well managed by the local EMS system and hospitals. Other than the need to provide paramedics with police protection, the medical system in Los Angeles was able to treat the injured within their normal operating capabilities (The Emergency Medical Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, viewed March 23, 2005, http: // web) Immediate federal aid under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was issued and clean-up of the affected areas initiated shortly after order being restored (Salak, 1993, pg. 40).
In the larger picture though, the infrastructure was never fully rebuilt. The citizens of South Central have one of the largest ratios of people to stores in the state (Wolff, G., 1992, pg 114) and continue to live in the cycle of poverty, unemployment and alienation that existed prior to the riots (Cannon, 1997, pg 621). Unless these conditions change, I believe that the City of Los Angeles has not seen its last large scale civil disobedience event.
Bibliography
The following references were utilized in the production of this paper. Alonzo, A, 1999, Territoriality Among African American Street Gangs in Los Angeles, MA thesis paper, University of Southern California, Department of Geography Cannon, L.
1997, Official Negligence;
How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD, Random House Canada, Toronto, ON. Cooper, M., Kwong, P., 1992, Inside the LA Riots;
What really happened and Why it Will Happen Again, Institute for Alternative Journalism, Los Angeles, CA Electronic source, Charting the Hours of Chaos, viewed March 17, 2005, web fires/920429 la times-2002-0429-0501/2002-0429.
la times... htm Electronic source, 1996, Homicide Deaths, Australia 1995, viewed March 20, 2005, web Research Centre for Injury studies, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia.
Electronic source, Medical Care for the Injured; The Emergency Medical Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, viewed March 23, 2005, http: // web //medical / contents.
html. Electronic Source, CRASH Culture, viewed March 21/2005, web / pages / frontline / shows / land / scandal / crash culture.
html Falkenrath, R., Rosegrant, S., 2000, The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Riots, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Gimbarzevsky, B., 1995, Canadian Homicide Trends 1961-1994, https: //teapot.
us ask. ca / can. firearms//homicide. html Mancock, I., Tristan, C. & Lunn, J., 2004, Introduction to Emergency Management, CD ROM, Charles Sturt University, Australia.
McMahon, R., 2001, Civil Disorder Resolution, Command Strategies and Tactical Responses, University of Minnesota, St Paul, MN.
O'Connor, A, 2000, CRASH Set Up Latinos to be Deported, The Los Angeles Times Newspaper Owens, T.
1994, Lying Eyes;
The Truth Behind the Corruption and Brutality of the LAPD and the Beating of Rodney King, Thunders Mouth Press, New York, NY. Salak, J., 1993, The Los Angeles Riots, America's Cities in Crisis, The Millbrook Press, Brookfield, CT.
Staff writer, 1992, The Toll, Los Angeles Times Newspaper Vernon, R.
1993, L.
A. Justice; Lessons From The Firestorm, Focus on the Family Publishing, Colorado Springs, CO. Wenger, Lt. Col. W., 1994, The 1992 Los Angeles Riots, A Battalion Commanders Perspective, Infantry Magazine, US Army, Fort Benning GA.
Wilkinson, T, 1991, Korean Grocer Who Killed Black Teen Gets Probation, The Los Angeles Times Newspaper.