Soviet Missiles In Cuba example essay topic

On October 22nd, 1962, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President of the United States of America, addressed the nation on television. In his seven-point speech, he informed his audience that long-range nuclear missiles, capable of "striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru" (JFK library p. 3) were being installed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. President Kennedy discussed the United States' response, which included the placement of a naval blockade around the island of Cuba, a request for an immediate convening of the United Nations Security Council, and a heightened military alert. However, it was his third point which sent a chill around the world. "Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union".

(JFK Library p. 3) With these words, President Kennedy informed the world that the Cold War was perilously close to turning hot, and the world stood on the brink of nuclear holocaust. Almost twenty years since the end of World War 2, after two decades of mounting tension between the Soviet Communist Empire and the Western allies, the dreaded nuclear showdown was underway. America and the Soviet Union were on a collision course. How had this come to pass? Although the announcement came as a great shock to the public, the Cuban Missile Crisis had not occurred "overnight"; it had been building for more than two years. In mid-1960, Cuba signed agreements with the USSR and Czechoslovakia, and almost immediately U.S. Intelligence detected the start of a massive, secret arms buildup on the island, sponsored by the Soviets.

(Johnson, Hatch p. 2) Soviet ships began arriving at Havana, and the Cubans unloaded them under extreme secrecy. Over the next year, U.S. Intelligence recorded deliveries of small arms and ammunition, light aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment for military factories. They also learned that Cuban pilots were training in Czechoslovakia on the latest Soviet aircraft. Then, in mid-1961, CIA sources discovered that Cuba was receiving state-of-the-art Soviet bombers, fighters and transport aircraft. At this time, the dilemma for American policymakers was that most of the military equipment could be described accurately as defensive, and therefore not a threat to United States security. However, much of it could also be used offensively, and the main concern was whether or not the Soviets would provide Cuba with missiles capable of attacking America.

(Johnson, Hatch p. 2) Throughout 1961, Soviet ships continued to supply Cuba secretly with military equipment and, then, in 1962, the volume and secrecy of the deliveries increased. In late August, for example, The National Security Agency reported 57 Soviet ships in a little over a month. Confronted with American concerns about this military buildup, Soviet spokesmen repeatedly assured the U.S. government that the equipment sent to Cuba was for defense only. The President alluded to this in his television address:" Only last Thursday... Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again... that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, 'pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba', that... 'training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise... the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance. ' That statement also was false".

(JFK Library p. 3) The crisis began to build to a head in August, when air reconnaissance photographs revealed that the Russians were building numerous sites for SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, known as SAMs. (Johnson, Hatch p. 4) These anti-aircraft missiles were a direct threat to U.S. surveillance aircraft, and construction of 24 SAM sites was being carried out around the clock. Why did the Soviets want to keep U.S. reconnaissance aircraft out of Cuba? John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, was the only one to predict that SAMs were on the island to prevent the United States seeing the construction of offensive nuclear missile installations that could threaten America. Escalation of the crisis continued. On September 15, NSA reported the SAMs' missile defense system was complete and operational.

All reconnaissance flights were now in real danger. Then, on October 15th, Director McCone's prediction was proven correct. Analysis of aerial photographs revealed that construction had begun on sites for medium and intermediate range nuclear missiles just 90 miles from our shores. (Johnson, Hatch p. 2) President Kennedy was informed of the missiles at breakfast the next day, October 16th, and immediately convened a series of secret emergency meetings with senior military, diplomatic, and political advisors, a group that became known as the Executive Committee, or Ex Comm. The Soviets had placed the President and his advisors in an extremely difficult and dangerous position.

The nation was threatened, and there were only five main options for United States response. (History Learning Site p. 3): One... the President could ignore the situation and do nothing, but this would be political suicide. Also, the Russians would see it as weakness and take advantage. Two... he could order a military invasion of Cuba. There would be heavy US casualties and that would be politically damaging. In addition, the Chiefs-of-Staff were not convinced of success, in part because the missile bases were in remote areas, mostly far inland.

Three... he could order an air strike on the missile bases alone, but the Air Force was unsure it could deliver pin-point bombing on relatively small targets. Four... he could call on the Russians to remove the missiles. This option could be dismissed because the Russians had flatly denied, even in a UN emergency meeting, that the missiles existed. Five... he could put a naval blockade around Cuba, quarantine it, and allow no more Russian ships to enter. The missiles would still be in Cuba, but it would buy time for diplomatic efforts to attempt a solution, and the President would be seen to be taking firm action. The tape-recorded minutes of Ex Comm's meetings show that opinion was divided on whether to follow the military or the diplomatic course.

(Goldman, Stein p. 3) Some members of Ex Comm can be heard arguing strongly for an immediate military response. However, the President, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Robert Kennedy recognize that any form of military action will almost certainly be answered by the Soviets, possibly against an ally such as Turkey, and the President decides to try diplomacy, backed by strength, while also placing the military on heightened alert. As President Kennedy announces the crisis on television, and describes America's response including the naval quarantine of Cuba, the military's alert status is raised to Defcon 3. The initial Soviet public response to President Kennedy's actions came when Khrushchev authorized his Soviet field commanders in Cuba to launch their tactical nuclear weapons if invaded by U.S. forces. On October 23rd, all U.S. blockading ships were in place, and the Organization of American States unanimously endorsed the American blockade. On this day, also, new aerial photographs revealed that the Soviet nuclear missiles were now ready for launch.

President Kennedy now knows that at least some of these missiles will be fired at the United States if a military solution is tried. In the tape from an October 19th Ex Comm meeting, the President states that an air strike on Cuba would neutralize the missiles but would likely force the USSR to take Berlin. ".. which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative - to begin a nuclear exchange". (Goldman, Stein p. 3) The world's two great nuclear superpowers were now involved in a game of chicken, but, behind the scenes, the search for a diplomatic solution continued, but, at first, the efforts did not seem promising. When Ex Comm convened at 10 a.m. on the 24th, the mood was tense. The U.S. military alert had been raised now to Def Con 2, the highest level in the nation's history.

(Wiersma, Larson p. 6) Soviet ships, tracked by Soviet nuclear submarines, were steaming closer and closer to the American blockade line, and the U.S. Navy had orders to fire on any ship which tried to force its way through the blockade. Later, Soviet Army Chief of Operations, Anatoly Gribkov, would say "Nuclear catastrophe was hanging by a thread... and we weren't counting days or hours, but minutes". Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara would recall that "I thought I might never live to see another Saturday night". (Wiersma, Larson p. 6) Then, at 10: 25 a message advised that Soviet ships were turning back and Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented. ".. the other fellow just blinked".

(Wiersma, Larson p. 6) However, the crisis was not over. The White House received a letter that evening from Mr. Khrushchev, which read in part:" ... the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of the American naval forces blockading that Island... Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so". (Wiersma, Larson p. 6) On the 25th, President Kennedy sent Premier Khrushchev a message repeating the United States' position.

He also instructed U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to confront the Soviets at the United Nations. When asked directly about the missiles, Soviet Ambassador Z orin refused to comment. Stevenson then showed the assembly the reconnaissance photos of missile sites. The Soviet lies were exposed. The 26th brought a letter from Khrushchev, and the first real hope that a diplomatic solution might be reached. Khrushchev wrote:" You and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter the knot will become...

I propose we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear". (Wiersma, Larson p. 6) Later that night, unknown to Ex Comm, Robert Kennedy went to the Soviet Embassy to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin. When Dobrynin claimed Soviet missiles in Cuba were justified because of American missiles in Turkey, Kennedy offered to introduce the U.S. Turkish missiles into a potential settlement. Dobrynin relayed this information to the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Fidel Castro has contacted Khrushchev demanding a nuclear first strike against the US if there was an invasion of Cuba. The following day, October 27th, SAM missiles shot down a U 2 reconnaissance plane and the pilot was killed, and Dobrynin informed Robert Kennedy that Soviet ships now approaching the naval quarantine do not intend to stop. The Joint Chiefs argued for an immediate air strike, but a message was received that Khrushchev had offered publicly to trade the missiles in Cuba for the US missiles in Turkey, and the President stated: .".. it's going to look to any man at the United Nations, or any other rational man, like a very fair trade" (Goldman, Stein p. 5) Removing the missiles from Turkey was a dangerous move, politically, for the President. Ex Comm decided to respond, instead, to Khrushchev's first letter, which made no mention of a missiles-for-missiles deal. The President's letter read: As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows: You would agree to remove these weapon systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba.

We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba. (Goldman, Stein p. 3) On October 28, the Russian Premier conceded to President Kennedy's demands by ordering all Soviet supply ships away from Cuban waters and agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba's mainland, and the world breathed a sigh of relief. Looking back on the crisis, Robert McNamara believed the world was one step away from nuclear war. That step would be the President ordering invasion of Cuba. What was not known at the time was the presence of 43,000 combat-ready Soviet soldiers in Cuba, or the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons along Cuba's shore.

Khrushchev had also given a standing order to his generals that if he couldn't be reached in the event of an invasion, they had authority to launch battlefield nuclear weapons. If Kennedy had invaded, the Soviets would have used nuclear weapons and President Kennedy would have had no choice but to retaliate. The response would likely have been an attack on Soviet soil, and global nuclear war.