Sum Of One's Temporal Parts example essay topic

The notion of Persistence gives way to several predominant theories; of which, attempt to account for many possible questions that arise from it. As in most cases of debate, when more than one account of such is held to be true, there will clearly be much disagreement. Two views that claim to account accurately for persistence that remain widely known are, that of an endurant ist (Threeist) and that of a (Twoist). The endurant ist will hold that objects are wholly present at all times, a persistent object 'endures' over time. The conflicting view of a claims that objects are actually composed of temporal parts, more precisely, proper temporal parts. Further, a Twoist (vs. One ist), will say that a name most often refers to the sum of one's temporal parts, whereas a Threeist believes a name to refer to one who is wholly present during all times of its existence.

The two opposing theories stated very simply, as above, give insight as to the nature of their arguments against one another. It does seem, however, that the Twoist's account of persistence gives an exceedingly useful notion in regards towards many more subjects of philosophy, as well as an explanation that accounts for much more in terms of the problems associated strictly with persistence itself. The argument posed by Vaninwagen, a Threeist, against the Twoist is known as the problem of Essential Duration; and the counterpart argument given by the Twoist is referred to as the problem of Temporary Intrinsics. VanInwagen's (modal) argument goes as follows: One could have lived longer than did in the actually world; this must be accounted for by either, one having been composed of more temporal parts that actually was, or at least some of one's temporal parts had a longer duration than did in the actual world. VanInwagen continues with; a two ist must clearly hold that temporal parts have their duration essentially; their duration can not be shorter or longer. It then follows that a person is also a temporal part, which is to say they are the sum of all his or her temporal parts, making this the largest part.

If this is so, says VanInwagen, then the Twoist must hold this duration essentially and one could not have lived longer than did in the actual world. A contradiction is reached, VanInwagen then very quickly disregards any additional consideration of such an avenue. Lewis, a proponent of Twoist, presents an argument that appears to be a more difficult problem in the face of the Threeist, than VanInwagen's modal argument against the Twoist. As mentioned, the problem of Temporary Intrinsics seems to have created much more disturbance on the endurant ist front than any other argument has for. It is also very easily given; a person bent at one time and the same person not bent at another time, given an endurant ist view leads to contradiction. This is very apparent and doesn't require any sort of modality to reach this contradiction, as it seems it is inherent in the Threeist view.

To clarify, if one is wholly present at all times, and one's name is what refers; then at time (1), a person could be bent, and at time (2), this person is not bent. This person now, both has and lacks the property of being bent. The Twoist has no such draw back. Overall, VanInwagen presents a well structured and clearly thoughtful argument against the two ist, but in the end the argument he gives is dependent on assuming premises that he, in fact, does not endorse himself.

No matter how you look at it, this is the case, given it may appear a bit construed. When presented the question of how things persist over time, given the relevant background, it seems one with basic logical abilities can conclude that endurant ist claim is nonsensical; and when given relevant facts concerning the view, a reasonably educated person can see that, if least of all, it is made true by its mere usefulness, not to disregard its other proficiencies.