Taiwan And The People's Republic Of China example essay topic

Taiwan's past and present are inextricably linked to that of the People's Republic of China. Therefore, one cannot begin to postulate and critically comment upon a possible "Taiwan future" without first assessing the prevailing political climate of her mainland cousin: the People's Republic of China. Given the current rhetoric espoused by both Taipei and Beijing, one may argue that three possible "Taiwan futures" emerge as most likely to occur. These scenarios, from most to least probable, are: 1) peaceful reunification with the PRC; one country, two systems; 2) a referendum declaring Taiwan a sovereign state, independent of the PRC; and 3) reunification achieved via a PRC initiated military action.

It is not insignificant that the Republic of China, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China, Communist Mainland China, have consistently and unequivocally asserted a sacrosanct principle regarding the state of Sino-Taiwanese relations: that there is only "one China". Furthermore, in February 1972, the United States and the People's Republic of China issued a joint communique'e stating, .".. the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" (web). Therefore, one may argue that the first and most likely scenario for a possible "Taiwan future" is "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems". The foundation for "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems" was laid in January 1979 when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China called for an end to military hostilities between the PRC and Taiwan. The Standing Committee asserted that in its quest for national reunification, the PRC "will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures". In September 1981, the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Ye Jianying, reiterated this policy.

Jianying avowed, .".. after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region" (web). Furthermore, in January 1982, China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, remarked that in the event of national reunification the PRC would continue with its socialist system while Taiwan could maintain capitalism. In August of 1993, the State Council of the People's Republic of China outlined the government's basic position regarding "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems" in a white paper entitled The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. This paper addresses three fundamental components that form the framework for "one country, two systems". The first component requires Taiwan to reaffirm that it is an inalienable part of China and acknowledge that the seat of China's central government is in Beijing. Given the current political climate in Taipei, an affirmation of the sovereign rights of the PRC, although unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, is at least conceivable.

Taiwan's newly elected Democratic Progressive Party president, Chen Shui-bi an, has in recent months retreated from the pro-independence platform that he was elected on. Mr. Chen, in fact, has made overt conciliatory gestures towards Beijing. For example, he has stated that barring a PRC invasion his government will not seek to change Taiwan's official name from the "Republic of China" (The Economist Intelligence Unit). The second component propagates the idea that socialism on the mainland and capitalism Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side.

At first glance, this seems implausible. Taiwan's gross domestic product measured in terms of per capita purchasing power parity dwarfs that of her socialist mainland cousin -- $16,500 to $3,600. In fact, many Taiwanese believe that the disparity in the standards of living between China and Taiwan is a major obstacle to reunification The third component asserts that Taiwan will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions in China by its high degree of autonomy. Specifically, Taiwan will retain control over its legislative, judiciary, economic, and military affairs. On the surface, this appears to be an egalitarian concession on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. However, it is important to note that although economic controls have been weakening in the PRC, political controls remain tight.

Historically, the CCP has maintained its political monopoly through the use of force. As long as the People's Liberation Army is loyal, the CCP is secure. Political dissension is not likely to be tolerated. In light of the recent reversions of Hong Kong and Macao, one may argue that the Taiwanese are best advised to carefully monitor Beijing's policy of political and economic non-interference in these regions before adopting the "one country; two systems" proposal. Ultimately the likelihood of "peaceful reunification; one country; two systems" in Taiwan may depend upon the perceived successes of reverted Hong Kong and Macao.

Peaceful reunification is not the only possible "Taiwan future". Traditionally, the Republic of China has also endorsed the "One China" principle. However, one may argue that self-determination, although currently not as probable as peaceful reunification, will continue to gain momentum as successive generations of "new Taiwan people", who possess a culture and an identity "different" from Mainland Chinese, are born. Additionally, the existing political climate in Taipei is changing. A discernible power shift has already occurred.

In May of this year, the Democratic Progressive Party's candidate, Chen Shui-bi an, won the presidency on a platform of pro-independence. Nonetheless, it is significant to note that Mr. Chen's government has severely toned down its pro-independence stance since the election. The new government has publicly stated that it will not employ the "state-to-state" diplomatic policy that was endorsed by the previous KMT President, Lee Teng-hui. Mr. Chen's powers will be limited by the DPP's minority status in the Legislative Yuan. However, as the last remnants of the Nationalist Kuomintang are swept away, the DPP is likely to gain greater sway in National Assembly.

Therefore, the possibility of a referendum declaring Taiwan a sovereign state, independent of the PRC, cannot be summarily discounted. For its part, the government of the People's Republic of China has adopted a "wait and see" attitude with regards to Mr. Chen's government. Although the official policy of the PRC is peaceful reunification, the NPC Standing Committee has consistently reiterated that it will use force if necessary to suppress a pro-independence movement in Taiwan, which it still considers a "renegade" province. In January 1999, the Chinese Vice Premier, Qian Qi zhen, stated that attempts to decide Taiwan's future by means of referendum are tantamount to "playing with fire" and "it would be a disaster for Taiwan" (web). Given the current rhetoric espoused in Beijing, it is not conceivable that the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan will call for independence in the foreseeable future. Peaceful reunification and independence are not the only plausible futures for Taiwan.

The third and least likely scenario is forced reunification achieved via a PRC military action against Taiwan. Although highly improbable, an invasion from the mainland is not inconceivable. China remains the only major world power with unsatisfied territorial claims. Therefore, the PRC remains vociferous in its assertion that. ".. any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity" (web). One might conclude from this statement that a military action against Taiwan is inevitable if peaceful negotiations fail. Nevertheless, there are three key obstacles precluding a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

The first obstacle that precludes a PRC invasion of Taiwan is the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States (as much as any treaty can) to the defense of Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion. One may argue that the People's Republic of China is not yet ready to enter into a direct confrontation with the US. The second obstacle that precludes a PRC invasion of Taiwan is the absence of a littoral fleet capable of making a sustained assault on Taiwan. With the Taiwanese army firmly entrenched in the Pescadores and on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, an amphibious assault on Taiwan would be akin to swallowing a "poison shrimp". The third, and perhaps most important, obstacle that precludes a PRC invasion of Taiwan is stigma attached to the employment of nuclear weapons.

It is highly unlikely that the PRC would be willing to use nuclear weapons against other Chinese. It is possible to envision three distinct "Taiwan futures": 1) peaceful reunification with the PRC; one country, two systems; 2) a referendum declaring Taiwan a sovereign state, independent of the PRC; and 3) reunification achieved via a PRC initiated military action. However, until the political winds in Beijing change, it is unlikely that Taiwan's current ambiguous status on the world stage will change. For the time being, Taiwan's future remains cloudy and uncertain.