Terrorists On 9 11 example essay topic

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization).

As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to task forces and field training by the US. The US ground forces were almost never used and, when used, were limited to small task force type missions. Furthermore, a majority of terrorist incidents prior to 9/11 usually ended in negotiations (9/11 Commission, 94). Because the government felt that it had a strong understanding of how terrorist situations occurred in the post cold war period, warning signs on the eve on 9/11 were ignored. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had a similar point of view in regards to security. The system they had in place by 9/11 was seemingly successful, for they had avoided hostage situations for 14 years.

Furthermore, airlines were under increasing pressure to lower the cost of flights and make checking in and out of airports more efficient, which naturally led to security problems (Easterbrook, 164). The FAA and major airlines felt that there was no reason to fix a functioning system, and was powerless to make changes anyway due to economic pressures. An uncomfortable state of tension is caused when contradictions occur within the cognitive system. People are therefore motivated to reduce or eliminate this tension state, which is known as cognitive dissonance (Larson, 29). For example, a man who eats 3 hamburgers per day might one day find out that eating food high in fat increases the likelihood of heart disease. Because he likes them, the man believes that eating hamburgers is good (if something is pleasurable, why wouldn't it be good?

). Now he is told to believe that eating hamburgers is bad. Thus arises cognitive dissonance. People have a set of beliefs that is organized and logical. When information is introduced that contradicts those beliefs people have a tendency to react in several ways to reduce the inconstancy with which they have been presented. 1) A person could change his behavior (Larson, 30): the man mentioned above could stop eating hamburgers.

2) A change in environment could occur (Larson, 30): the man could start eating fat free hamburgers. 3) More consistent beliefs (some might call them rationalizations) could be added to the a person's cognitive system (Larson, 30); the man can tell himself that he is on the Atkins' diet and eating the hamburgers will allow him to lose weight and therefore be more healthy (not the correct conclusion to draw from the information, but one which fits the man's logic). The effects of dissonance can change the way in which a person gathers information. A person could develop a selective attention span where he only pays attention to material that reinforces his accepted cognitive system. Interpretation of all material could also be skewed to fit that person's set of beliefs, creating a selective interpretation system (Larson, 31).

When these methods are applied to the subject of foreign policy, the negative effects are obvious. For example, leaders could hold on to a belief system that is no longer valid. In the 1980's, the US viewed the USSR military power as threatening even though they were powerless. (Larson, 32) As a result, the government wasted millions of dollars on the Star Wars ballistic missile defense program that could have been spent on other programs. Another example of a negative effect is that in reacting to dissonance, leaders could also miss key opportunities that would have placed their country at an advantage (Larson 32). For example, because the US refused to believe that Stalin was holding to the agreements at Yalta (Larson, 151), Truman missed a key opportunity to befriend the great power and continue with Roosevelt's Grand Design.

In the case of September 11, cognitive dissonance resulted in intelligence failure. There were several warnings within the US intelligence system, but the government ignored them because the new information did not fit the old paradigm of terrorism, and because the government discredited the warnings, the greatest tragedy on US soil ever occurred. Before September 11, the Federal Aviation Administration perceived that sabotage was a much greater threat than hijacking. This is because there had been no domestic hijackings in a decade, the commercial aviation system was thought to be more vulnerable to explosives than to weapons, and explosives were perceived as deadlier than hijacking and therefore of greater concern (9/11 Commission, 82).

The FAA therefore did not think that a hijacking was even a possibility. There was enough concern of sabotage that a "layered defense system" was implemented where a passenger went through prescreening, check point screening, and onboard security (9/11 Commission, 83). However, these were not effective, as the terrorists on 9/11 were still able to carry out their plan. The blame of the hijackers getting on the planes lies solely on the airport security regulations of the FAA. Prior to 9/11, bags were rarely opened for a thorough inspection and inspectors watching the X-ray machines were not required to stop at each item and examine it individually (Easterbrook, 168). The cursory security was easily bypassed, as it is believed that the September 11 terrorists got their knives through the X-ray machine simply by lying them on their edges between two books, so that to the inspector the blades appeared as nothing more than a dark line (Easterbrook, 168).

Airline security is even more culpable because, prior to 9/11, there had been numerous warnings that improvements were necessary. For example, the report of the presidential commission on airline security, chaired by Vice President Al Gore, strongly recommended that the federal government begin certifying the contractors who run airport screening stations (Easterbrook, 169). Furthermore, "Red team" inspectors, who staged tests of airport security, found it alarmingly easy to smuggle weapons onto planes or enter the tarmac areas without identification (Easterbrook, 164). Due to the cognitive dissonance of the people in charge of security at airports, they were unable to stop the 9/11 attackers. When warned that their security was not strong enough, FAA officials gained information that was contradictory to that in their cognitive system. They used the technique of twisting beliefs to fit this data into their old cognitive model.

Rather than realizing that terrorism had changed, they told themselves that because there had been no recent incidents of massive terror in the airline industry, the system they have in place was not only acting effectively, but efficiently. The FAA used selective attention and interpretation to reduce the amount of dissonance that was raised when they were told that there was a lack of security in American Airports. They held on to a belief system that was not true (sabotage instead of hijackings) that ultimately proved disastrous. The FAA is not the only organization that failed. It appears as though the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed in collecting intelligence as well. The CIA is an entity that was designed to fight the Cold war against the Soviets (9/11 Commission, 90).

It focused on one or two primary adversaries, for decades, which created an environment in which managers and analysts could safely invest time and resources in basic research. Those substantial investments, however, were not easily reallocated to the new enemies that emerged when the Cold War ended (9/11 Commission, 91). Furthermore, there was a history of paranoia within the CIA. During the Cold war it was believed that Soviet spies could be within the ranks of the Agency. This fear continued after the end of the Cold War which made information sharing a highly sensitive issue (9/11 Commission, 91). The CIA almost seemed to not know how to handle to new threat of terrorism because it was still thinking and functioning in a "Cold War" mindset.

The CIA had developed a set of beliefs and information gathering structure that was highly effective against the Communist threat. However, when the threat was removed, the CIA was trapped in a cognitive dissonance. It was uncomfortable with the fact that the Cold War was over and that they had to change their established system to fight a new enemy (terrorists). Therefore the CIA simply adapted an old system that was familiar to them to the new problem. They had difficulty incorporating new types of agents that would be critical to battling terrorists in the Middle East. Also, they were accustomed to being able to present descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence, but now need to work at a much faster pace to report the most up-to-date information in the most efficient manner (9/11 Commission 93).

They were trapped in the past and used selective attention and interpretation to propel them into a more advanced world. Because the CIA was unable to share information and work with the FBI (for fear of Soviet-style espionage), there was a failure in our intelligence system and a missed opportunity to stop the 9/11 attackers. Because of the previous focus on surveillance of states, they were unable to get good intelligence on state-independent groups like Al Qaeda. Finally, because of a failure to adapt to the lightning-fast pace of modern terrorism, they were unable to react in time to stop 9/11.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had its own problems as well. They were granted the responsibility of protecting the US homeland against terrorists, but were not given the proper means to capture them. The Director of the Bureau in 1993 was Louis Freeh. He believed that the FBI's work should be done primarily by the field offices and that there should be significant cuts to headquarters staff and decentralized operations (9/11 Commission, 76). There was therefore little to no central coordination within the Bureau itself.

While they were given more money specifically for the purpose, spending on counter-terrorism remained relatively constant throughout the 90's, and there were very few agents devoted to this section. Furthermore, agents had only 16 weeks of counter terrorism and counter intelligence training (9/11 Commission, 77). The counter terrorism division (Counterterrorism Council (CTC) ) was therefore poorly managed and poorly trained even though the administration recognized the treat of terrorism and gave them more funds. Although the FBI was given the responsibility to guard against terrorists, it was faced with barriers in addition to those created by the Bureau itself. Due to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, a court review of any proposed surveillance activity was required before action could be taken (9/11 Commission, 78). Agents could therefore not effective collect information on terrorists.

In addition, they were starved of information from the CIA, because of previously mentioned difficulty in sharing information with others and thus the possibility of multi-agency action was slim to none. Furthermore, the FBI just did not have the necessary infrastructure to carry out the necessary actions to protect the US against a major terrorist attack. This is in part due to the cognitive dissonance of Louis Freeh. His set of beliefs led him to reduce the central communication system between FBI Headquarters and its field agents.

When given the opportunity to expand the counter terrorism division, nothing was done because it would require an expansion of Headquarters and further coordination. He chose to ignore the extra money given to him to fight terror. His actions lead to miss information within the FBI and the events of 9/11 were not stopped. After the Regan administration, it became the job of the White House to coordinate counter terrorism. The killing of marines in Beirut were not taken lightly and the Reagan administration took the initiative to make sure that such murders would never occur again (9/11 Commission, 98). President Clinton seemed to have an accurate understanding of the threat of terrorism and Al Qaeda.

He saw the effects of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult's release of sar in nerve gas in the Tokyo subway and took measure to make sure that that type of chemical attack could never happened on US soil (9/11 Commission, 101). He proposed a larger budget for the FBI with a major increase in the counter terrorism division. Clinton was briefed by the counter terrorism czar, Richard Clark, on the dangers of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. President Bush also had a strong understanding of the imminent threat of al Qaeda. Therefore it is strange that neither of these presidents took active steps in removing the threat from the world. Certainly, neither president believed that it was conceivable to enter Afghanistan, prior to 9/11, to remove the terrorist threat (9/11 Commission, 349).

The United States had been dependent on proxy governments to gather information on Bin Laden because in order to have used the CIA, it would have needed to establish a secure basing and overflight support from other countries. It would have cost a lot of money and risked the lives of many agents, creating a level of commitment that many felt was uncalled for. In Against All Enemies, Richard Clark argues that George W. Bush failed to act prior to September 11 on the threat of Al Qaeda despite repeated warnings (Clark, X). Clark states that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was skeptical of his warnings on Al Qaeda and that the National Security Council was a place for foreign policy not terrorism (Clark, 230). Clark portrays Vice President Dick Cheney as having a similar attitude; he seemed to think that Clark was overstating the threat of Al Qaeda. Clark only believed that Secretary of State Colin Powell took the terrorist threat seriously.

The Bush administration however can not be to blame, however, because Clark does admit that even if his policies on counter terrorism had been implemented, the events of 9/11 could not have been stopped (9/11 Commission, 343). September 11 was, however, also a result of the cognitive dissonance of the White house. A majority of those in the Bush Administration did not believe that such an attack, on such a massive scale, could ever happen on US soil, and therefore chose not to consider it. Furthermore, Rice's experience in the NSC had been during a time when Communism was seen as the main threat (Clark, 229), and so like much of the CIA her judgment was locked in to a Cold War mindset. Because she was such a trusted advisor to the president, her neglect to realize and emphasize the dangers of Al Qaeda contributed to the success of the attacks. Terrorist were able to take advantage of the disorganization of United States government agencies to successfully attack the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Prior to the attack, the Counterterrorism Council had never even analyzed how an aircraft, hijacked or packed with explosives, might be used as a weapon.

The CIA had communications problems and the FAA found it more important to keep airfare rates low than to secure airport screening processes. The White House made little progress, even during the time of Clinton, to take strong initiatives to wipe out the terrorist threat. The failures of these various groups were the result of cognitive dissonance; no one was willing to accept the information they had as truth. Each organization used selective attention and interpretation to make the new data fit into their cognitive system, and ultimately, predictably, the results were disastrous. Clark, Richard. Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror.

New York City: Free Press. 2004 Easterbrook, Gregg. "The All-Too-Friendly Skies: Security as an Afterthought". Eds. Hoge, James F. and Rose, Gideon. How Did This Happened?

: Terrorism and the New War. New York: Public Affairs. 2001 Larson, Deborah Welch. Origins of Containment. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1985 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton. 2004.