Tokugawa Sh O Gun example essay topic

What Accounts for the Stability of the Tokugawa Regime? In the first half of the Seventeenth century, the regime perfected by Ieyasu Tokugawa and his successors was based on the accepted system of dai my^o domains which Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had been developing prior to Ieyasu's rule. It was thus basically feudal in structure, but it represented a highly organised and stable stage of feudalism, unlike Europe ever experienced. The reasons for the stability of such a regime are quite numerous, and demonstrate the government's capability of maintaining a time of peace for the better part of two centuries. They maintained this peaceful era by the strict regulation of the other powers of Japan, and thus there own influence was an omnipresent force throughout the nation. After the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, by which Ieyasu's total control of Japan was attained, in order to achieve quick stability, as stated, he made use of the thoroughly familiar Daily^o System.

Upon achieving this rapid yet superficial form of stability, he endeavoured to make various improvements so as to solidify the permanence of his own power, and subsequently Tokugawa rule in general. This first method which he adopted to secure his position was by the division of land post-Sekigahara. The sh^o gun reserved for themselves a huge realm consisting of a quarter of the agricultural land of the country, located largely around their Kanto headquarters in Edo and the old capital region around Kyoto, but also including all the major Japanese cities, ports and mines. The other three quarters of the land was divided between three types of dai my^o. Firstly, there were the 'related' dai my^o which consisted of various branches of the Tokugawa family, most notably the three large domains of Wakayama, Mito and Nagoya. Then there were the many fud ai ('hereditary') dai my^o, who had been Ieyasu's vassals pre 1600, with their rather small fiefs in central Japan.

Finally there were the to zama, who, during the battle of Sekigahara, had either been Ieyasu's enemies or powerful allies and still posed a threat to his rule. These to zama held relatively large fiefs at the western and northern ends of the islands, far form the strategically important central part of the country. Thus the Tokugawa coalition of sh^o gun, 'related' dai my^o, and 'hereditary' dai my^o (both of which were loyal to the sh^o gun), held well over half the agricultural land and virtually all the central and most strategic regions, and so any potential threat to Tokugawa rule was minimise d. Ieyasu's decision to establish his new capital city at Edo was an important one. It meant that he cut himself loose from Kyoto and would rule Japan from the centre of his military power. However, he did not aim to found Edo as only an administrative and military capital, but also the economic and cultural centre of Japan.

Based in Edo, the not only supervised directly the cities and the quarter of the land that constituted the sh^o gun's realm, but also acted as a supervisory government for the whole nation. This consisted of various councils, most of whom were part of the sh^o gun, but the top two councils were made up of a few selected 'hereditary' dai my^o. These councils served as chairmen, but only in monthly rotation so as not to acquire a foothold in a position of power. Needless to say the to zama were excluded from the running of the. They were not necessarily loyal and held both much sway and land in the far off territories, and thus were a threat to stability. Because of the fact that it is solely a hereditary position, the Tokugawa Sh^o gun proved in the end to be an ineffectual leader, and so it was a position that sank once again to that of a symbolic role.

However, the was an efficient enough bureaucracy to function without sh^ leadership. This is because, even though it depended on one's hereditary rank, there were always many more eligible men at each level than posts available, and so it was possible to choose the more able ones for actual service. Furthermore, this bred a certain amount of competition which encouraged people to try harder in order to attain a position in the government and thus led to a higher level of competence. Also, there were occasions that a man of outstanding ability was raised in rank and income by the Sh^o gun so to qualify them for the higher posts. But it was not only the way in which the government was run that furthered Tokugawa stability.

The dai my^o's domains too were run in a manner which could not jeopardize the status of the Tokugawa regime. Shortly after the battle at Sekigahara (1601), Ieyasu made all the feudatories sign a written oath of loyalty, by which they swore to obey all orders from Edo, and not to give protection or shelter to the enemies of the sh^. In theory the dai my^o were autonomous, with their own laws, but such laws were shaped to conform closely with those of Edo. In reality they were kept under strict control and surveillance and were often treated as little more than local officials to the sh^o gun. An example of the control exerted upon the dai my^o is that during the first half-century of Tokugawa rule there were 281 cases of dai my^o being moved from one domain to another (so as to weaken their hold of the loyalty of the peasants), and 213 cases of the confiscation of a domain because of the lack of an heir (thus preventing anyone vying for the rule of the domain and disturbing the state of peace) or for alleged misrule. Although this interference was much more infrequent in later years, the sh^ still monitored the domains closely, insisted on its right to approve of all dai my^o inheritances and marriages, restricted castle construction and the size of military forces, prohibited direct relations between the various domains, and called on the dai my^o for heavy contributions for the construction of its own castles and other public works.

This was done to keep the dai my^o's financial situations stretched and to hinder the development of any type of power or influence which would lead to being detrimental to the Tokugawa regime. However, the most effective method of controlling dai my^o, deterring their insurgence and keeping them financially stretched was the sank in kota i, or the system of 'alternate attendance'. Perfected in the 1630's this system decreed that a dai my^o spent alternate years in residence at the sh^ court and in his own domain. Also, during the year in which he resided in his own domain, a dai my^o's wife and heir were to be left in Edo as permanent hostages. And the years in which he lived in Edo, tended to turn him and his family into Edo courtiers, somewhat out of touch with the people of their own domains.

Furthermore, it was very expensive to maintain one or more large residences in Edo and the castle in the domain, and the trip itself proved to be a huge financial burden. On this annual trip to Edo, especially along the Tokai do highway from Kyoto, a tradition of 'showing off' evolved. These great dai my^o processions competed with each other in magnificence, and were so lavish that they were remarkably financially taxing. Along with their contributions to the shogun, the maintenance of their castles and houses in Edo, and these trips, the dai my^o's financial situations were commonly in no position to rally any sort of uprising or challenge to the ruling power. In addition to the supervision of the government and the dai my^o, the sh^ also exercised strict supervision over the non-feudal classes, namely the Imperial Court and religious establishments. No administrative function was left to the Throne.

The emperor was commanded by powerful officials, and his sole prerogatives were the appointment of the Sh^o gun and certain other offices of state, which were purely ceremonial. Neither was the Imperial family allowed to own land, it was allotted a tiny 187,000 kok u (a measurement of rice production - equivalent to that of 4.96 bushels) to the Imperial Court and noble families, which was less than a tenth of one percent of the nation's agricultural production, in truth the poorest dai my^o was richer than the Imperial Family. Only 600,000 kok u was allotted to the maintenance of the religious establishments. This crippled the influence over the populace of the Imperial Court and Religion, two factions which were potentially unfavourable to the status of the power of the Tokugawa regime. As well as the stabilizing of Political situations, albeit through the docking of other potential competitors for power, social conditions were stabilized.

Ieyasu used the teachings of the twelfth-century Chinese Neo-Confucian scholar Chu Hsi, and made a sort of Tokugawa orthodoxy from them. These teachings divided society into four classes. Namely, these were the Warrior-ruling class (originally Scholar-rulers, adapted to fit Tokugawa society), peasants, who were the primary producers of wealth, artisans, the secondary producers of wealth, and then the merchants whose function was classed as being basically parasitic. This fitted perfectly, as Japan was at that time, an agricultural community, ruled by the warrior class, which avoided trade with the outside world, due to its international isolation. Lines were drawn between the social classes, the most prominent being the line between the warrior class and the rest of the nation. Theoretically, inter-marriage was forbidden but in truth there was little or almost no contact between them and the other classes as they lived either in the confines of the confines of the dai my^o castle or in Edo.

As there was not much contact with other classes, there was no resentment from below and everyone seemed quite content within their own class and with the laws that the passed. However, this time of peace and stability could not have occurred if it was not for the near total isolation of Japan. The international isolation came about because of the arrival of western influences and Christianity. Since their arrival in 1549, Portuguese missionaries were allowed to attempt to convert whomsoever they pleased, achieving some success in various parts of the country.

However, after Hideyoshi united the country, he began to look on Christianity as possibly subversive to unified rule. Therefore Hideyoshi banned Christianity in 1587 and ten years later crucified nine missionaries and seventeen of there converts. In a short while, Christianity was suppressed and nearly all Westerners expelled from the country, bar a few Dutch traders permitted in the bay of Nagasaki. Furthermore, to keep out Christian indoctrination, Japanese were not allowed to leave nor were those Japanese who were away at the time of the suppression of Christianity allowed to return to the country. This indeed did keep out any sort of Christian indoctrination but at the same time it kept out any other indoctrination and also the social evolution which was taking place around the world. Thus the regime was in a bubble, existing in a country that was isolated enough to remove all foreign pressures of the political and economic system.

The maintenance of the political and social divisions and local autotomies of the Tokugawa system probably would have proved impossible if Japan had not established relative isolation from outside pressure during this period. The reassertion of firm control by a warrior class through an essentially feudal pattern of government could be seen as an unfortunate and anachronistic reversion to feudalism. But seen in another light, it was merely the standardization and perfection of known techniques of rule, which in a relative short period of time produced for the Japanese a stable and carefully organised form of government, which maintained a state of peace between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.