True In One Perspective example essay topic

... o wards the end of having the most control, or power, over our lives and to rebel against control by anything over us. However, do our animalist ic instincts, ironically, not serve the very function they compel us to rebel against? # Has not reasoning itself been employed by our animalist ic instincts to lead us to believe the trick of man: that we are masters of our own free will? How can we control our own free will if, as both Nietzsche and Freud insist, animal instincts dominant our reasoning? In other words, if our free will is based upon our reasoning, which can possibly be at least highly influenced if not completely dictated by our animal instincts, which in turn are the result of molecular-chemical instalment, is our 'free will' not essentially rendered into a predictable chemical product? Basically, if this is indeed true, it would be equivalent to riding upon a dragon [body and mind] that used black magic [animal instincts -to- reasoning] to convince you [soul / will ] that all activities in the dragon's best interest are in your best interest.

The emphasis upon 'mind' is of particular significance, for if this is true, one is equivocally rendered a slave to one's own mind. Consider the question of sexual incapacity cited earlier#: contrary to any actual 'free will' exercised by the individual, the body naturally produces chemicals that manifest themselves into animalist ic instincts that employ reasoning towards man's internal suffering, which is good in a strictly biological sense because it drives the man, regardless of his own individual will, to reproduce. However, if the man does not want to or cannot reproduce, regardless if all other involved factors indicated abstinence was the best action for this individual, under general circumstances, unless another animalist ic instinct acts in opposition, the body will continue to produce chemicals in the brain that influence, or perhaps even control, the man's feeling in this regard. Upon the basis of this idea, it is contended that in fact all animals exercise little or no free will or basically any function whatsoever that is not subsequent to animal instincts, thereby, within the framework of infinitely complex understanding, effectively reducing animals to the simplistic predictability of instincts. The one animal with the potential to surpass these limitations of instincts and interject ' into the life process is man. Possessing the ability to reason, the homo sapiens can do at least two vital things which his relatives cannot: 1.

Recognize and understand that they are being compelled, on a chemically-based fundamental level, by their animalist ic instincts, and, 2. Recognize that with their reasoning they can use their 'force of will' towards a better purpose when their survival is not readily threatened by their present environment, which is a pretense which many of modern man can maintain. The first point is critical towards the freeing of an individual's will: only upon the realization of the influence of instincts upon one's conscious can one hope to initiate one's freedom from this influence. No other animal is even capable of this. However, in some sense, this might be considered a generic realization: the influence of animal instincts upon us has been well noted by most philosophers and is certainly not a dramatic revelation. However, it seems as though most individuals lack the ability to take the next step: to employ our reasoning so that we can consider the implications of this realization from outside a perspective that is exceedingly influenced by the very influence it is seeking to understand.

Animals are, almost without exception, locked into a permanently prejudiced perception of the world, one influenced by everything from one's environment to animal instincts. Man alone is the exception. It is important to note at this point, however, that it is not in fact the intention of this essay to assert that animal instincts are entirely 'bad' or 'evil', depending on your preferred brand of Nietzschian morality. As Nietzsche's frustration with contemporary society is not that we are headed away from our animal past, but that we are not strong enough to win the struggle, our frustration is not that we have animal instincts, but that we allow our animal instincts to subject both our reasoning and our will, as opposed to the inverse. Under the Nietzsche's idea of, which will be subsequently explained, animal instincts are neither good nor bad # - to identify instincts as such would be to define man as something that can be viewed from a fixed perspective; these instincts are rather an aspect of man that represent one of infinite angles by which man can be perceived. Similarly, Nietzsche does not entirely condemn slave morality or even asceticism#, for they are both a part of the sculpture of man that must be looked at from many angles is one is going to hope to discern any idea of truth.

Indeed, Nietzsche notes the benefit of asceticism in allowing man new perspectives: 'Yet it is precisely in our capacity as philosophers we must not be ungrateful for such radical inversions of customary perspectives and valuations, by means of which the human mind has all too long raged against itself, to all appearances recklessly and fruitlessly. It is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect on its road to final 'objectivity' to see things for once through the wrong end of the telescope; and 'objectivity' is not meant here to stand for 'disinterested contemplation' [which is absolute absurdity] but for an ability to have one's pros and cons within one's command and to use them or not, as one chooses. It is of greatest importance to know how to put the most diverse perspectives and psychological interpretations at the service of intellection. #' # To possess 'an ability to have one's pros and cons within one's command and to use them or not, as one chooses.. ' is precisely the end of endeavoring to free one's reasoning and will from the undue influence of animalist ic instincts.

By allowing us to comprehend new perspectives, even if these are erroneous perspectives such as asceticism, our reasoning allows man another vantage point from which to view, and subsequently recognize, the truly bias nature of one's original perspective. Thus, through our ability to reason, humans can understand and, subsequently, realize perceptions outside our own. Nietzsche greatly encourages man to gain as many perspectives on a matter as possible, noting that this is the only means by which to approach objectivity. In other words, every thing must be viewed as if it were a sculpture instead of a flat, one-perspective painting: there is not one perfect way to perceive a thing, but rather in order to fully understand something, one must view it from all possible angles.

We call this conception #. Nietzsche describes it as follows: 'Let us, from now on, be on our guard against the hallowed philosophers' myth of a 'pure, will- less, painless, timeless knower'; let us beware of the tentacles of such contradictory notions as 'pure reason', 'absolute knowledge', 'absolute solute intelligence'. All these concepts presuppose an eye such as no living being can imagine, an eye required to have no direction, to abrogate its active and interpretative powers - precisely those powers that alone make of seeing, seeing something. All seeing is essentially perspective, and so [thus] is all knowing. ' # Perspectivism represents one of the most profound distinctions between the potential of man's animalist ic instincts and the potential of man's reasoning. While animalist ic senses are restricted to one perception, which is habitually regarded as wholly representative of truth through lack of comparison, man's reasoning allows him to surpass the limitations of sole perception and consequently allows us to gain a greater understanding of truth.

Nietzsche himself would contend that allows us a means towards the understanding of truth, though he appears to be wholly inconsistent in his treatment of truth in and of itself. While in many cases he seems to imply that there is no actual truth ('Nothing is true, everything is permitted. ' # as well as 'There are no eternal facts, nor are there any absolute truths. ' #), there are instances in which he seems to imply clearly the opposite: 'Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to be sacrificed to it. Greatness of the soul is needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest service. ' # While seemingly inconsistent in the actual defining of this matter, Nietzsche's treatment of truth is in fact consistent with his idea of, in that his treatment of truth appears to depend upon whatever perception is acting upon truth. This idea of 'truth as in the eye of the beholder', or perspective truth, contrasts sharply with the general idea of 'pure, absolute truth' typically adhered to by society. The ordinary understanding of this 'absolute truth's eems to be that something, if true, is true for everyone, and, correlating ly, that something, if untrue, is untrue for everyone.

Conversely, Nietzschian 'perspective truth's eems to mean that something, if true, is true from a certain perspective, but is untrue from another perspective. Hence, 'truth ' could be defined as saying that everything is true in one perspective, yet untrue in another perspective. As Nietzsche states: 'There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes and consequently there are many kinds of 'truths', and consequently there is no truth. ' # In this sense, the treatment of truth through Nietzsche's appears to be in fact the opposite or denial of the standard understanding of truth as absolute. If it is true that, in regards to truth, 'absolutism' acts as the denial of ', then the two are incompatible and cannot be applied jointly to the same concept.

Thus, the idea of in and of itself, as well as its proposed relation to truth, must be true either absolutely or perspectively. In other words, is either entirely true or untrue in all perspectives or it is true in some perspectives and untrue in others. If the former is true, and is true in all perspectives, then there is something that is true to all perspectives, and consequently absolutism would be true. However, there can be no instance where both absolutism and are jointly true because the two contradict one another. Therefore, must be true perspectively; that is, is true in some perspectives but untrue in others.

Obviously, perspectives in which is true would be aligned with all the stipulations of. In perspectives where was untrue, however, truth would not be subject to the continual transformation allowed by, but rather would enjoy a consistency with the individual holding that perspective. In other words, the perspective would contain a set of true statements to that individual's particular perspective. Although not in an absolute sense, this allows for the existence of a continually perceived truth, which cannot be reasonably present without consistency. In other words, in the sense of one individual's perception, an 'actual truth' can exist.

Furthermore, under Nietzsche's idea of, this perspective represents 'part of the sculpture... that must be looked at from many angles is one is going to hope to discern any idea of truth'. # Hence there exists a segment, or 'angle', which is apart of the whole, or sculpture, that contains 'actual truth', in that individual's perception. In accordance with Nietzsche's belief that perspectives are generated by one's 'will to power' and given that an individual was able to free their reasoning from their animal instincts, and thereby exercise influence over their 'will to power', it is thus possible for one to direct one's perspective. In other words, Nietzsche believes that an individual can change themselves and correlating ly change their perspective, as 'interpretation is itself a means of becoming master over something. ' # Adopting a perspective is then a way of mastering one's experience, or formulating your understanding of them.

As Nietzsche states: 'We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made'. # Hence, in the case of individuals like the one cited in the previous paragraph, whose perception contained an idea of set truth, whenever they create a perspective they generate a new series of set truths [Brenden's NOTE#]. Now, remembering that 'man's reasoning allows him to surpass the limitations of sole perception'#, it is then possible to gain as many perspectives as possible on a matter, each representing a segment, or 'angle', which contains an element of set truth that is apart of the whole, or sculpture. Thus it is possible to approach objective truth.

Nietzsche argues the only means by which we can approach objectivity, or unbiased reasoning, is to gather as many perspectives as possible. It is only through objective reasoning that we can ever hope to have complete 'free will'. Furthermore, it is by understanding things from as many perspectives as possible, by approaching 'objective reasoning', that we can realize the full potential of our reasoning. Even though this idea extends beyond the bounds of our current understanding, it is the supposition of this essay that the greatest potential of our reasoning, through, would be an amalgamation of our understanding that allows us to perceive ourselves in relation to the 'good of the whole'. This is not wholly aligned with the Hindu and Buddhist ideals that both lauds the extinction of one's will and the disappearance of the distinct self into a greater whole - the idea of the water drop ceasing to perceive itself as a water drop and comes to perceive itself as part of the ocean. Rather, this allows one full control over one's will in relation to an understanding of one's self both as a part of and as distinct from the whole.

On some level, this seems to correspond directly with what one might perceive as its polar opposite, the instinct towards the good of the whole. This concept insists upon a symbolic 'joining of the whole' that can be cited as the greatest potential of reasoning and as the most fundamental of animalist ic instincts#, completing a circle which, much like Nietzsche's ideas for viewing a sculpture, can be perceived from all different angles. It is only by endeavoring to perceive man through all perspectives possible that we can hope to gain a true perspective of man. # In conclusion, it is the contention of this essay th.