United Nations Victory In Korea example essay topic

Direct air and naval surface attacks on the Chinese mainland were probably the most immediate way of striking a hard blow against the Communists. These were also the actions most likely to precipitate a full-scale war. [13] All of the nations allied with the United States against Communist aggression in Korea were strongly opposed to direct attack on China. Since China had no great industrial centers, the most profitable targets would be military and air installations, railroads, and shipping facilities. But experience in World War II had shown that in spite of the best intentions and most accurate bombing, the civil population suffered along with such targets; and any heavy loss of civilian life undoubtedly would be sure to turn many Asiatic nations against the United States. There was little question, moreover, that China, if faced with this bombing, would call upon the USSR to come to its rescue.

Most American leaders were therefore not willing to risk bombing China except as a last resort. In all the discussions of "privileged sanctuary" enjoyed by the Chinese in Manchuria no mention had been made by MacArthur, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that matter, of a similar privileged sanctuary enjoyed by the United Nations Command in Japan. Both naval and air operations against Korea were mounted from Japanese bases, and Japan was the main staging area from which thousands of U.N. troops were sent to fight in Korea. Consequently, if the United States bombed Manchuria to destroy enemy bases, the Chinese might bomb Japan. Whether the Chinese possessed such a capability was certainly a moot point; but it seemed reasonable to assume that with Russian help it would not take them long to acquire such a capability. President Truman stated that he had never been able to believe that MacArthur, seasoned soldier that he was, did not realize that introducing Chinese Nationalist forces into mainland China [13] Other than broadly hint in that the atomic bomb would be effective in Korea, MacArthur did not recommend officially or, as far as is known, unofficially, that thedecision be taken to use the atomic bomb against either the North Koreans or the Chinese, in or out of Korea. would be an act of war.

Certainly, a commander who had been in the forefront of world events for thirty-five years must realize that the Chinese people would react to the bombing of their cities in much the same manner as the people of the United States would have done. The President did not believe, either, that MacArthur with his knowledge of the Orient could really think that he could cut off the vast flow of materials from Russia merely by bombing Chinese cities. The next step would have to be the bombing of Vladivostok andthe Trans-Siberian railroad. Because he was sure that MacArthur could not possibly have overlooked these considerations President Truman was left with the simple conclusion that MacArthur was ready to risk general war. The President was not. [14] Because they were not privy to MacArthur's intentions or to the instructions given him, British officials grew concerned that he might do something that would cause the conflict to spread beyond Korea.

When these misgivings were brought to the attention of President Truman, he attempted to allay British fears by assuring Prime Minister Attlee: There has not been any change in the agreed United States-United Kingdom position that resistance to aggression in Korea should continue in Korea unless and until superior force required evacuation of our troops. Present tactical situation does not reflect any change in this position but rather essential adjustments to cover increased jeopardy to United Nations troops resulting from recent marked decrease in effectiveness of sorely tried South Korean divisions. [15] The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur an interim denial of his proposals on 9 January. They told him that his suggestions were being carefully considered but that, for the time being at least, little chance existed for a switch in the national policy.

The blockade of the China coast, for instance, if imposed, would not take place until the United Nations Command had either stabilized the situation in Korea or had evacuated the peninsula. Nor would American authorities undertake such a blockade without British approval, in deference to the extensive British trade with China through Hong Kong. The Joint Chiefs felt also that any blockade required the concurrence of the United Nations Organization. [16] The naval and air attacks which MacArthur wished to launch on the Chinese mainland would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs at this time, be authorized only if the Chinese attacked American forces outside of Korea, but no decision would be made on the matter until the eventuality arose. Nor did the Joint Chiefs, doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek's troops could have any decisive effect on the outcome of the Korean campaign, intend to approve their use in Korea. They noted that these troops might have a greater usefulness elsewhere in the future.

[17] Neither did they believe that MacArthur should or could count on action outside of Korea to ease the pressure on his forces. They directed him to defend in successive positions, inflicting the greatest possible damage on enemy forces, "subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan". At the same time, they granted him authority to withdraw from Korea to Japan if in his judgment evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses of men and materiel. [18] The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given MacArthur two major interlocking courses of action to follow. Whereas he was to defend Korea, this defense was secondary to his mission of saving his troops from destruction and protecting Japan from invasion.

The second course, withdrawal, must have been, in the minds of the Joint Chiefs, the natural sequel of the first. But MacArthur chose to interpret the directives strictly and found them, therefore, incompatible. Arguing that both directives could not be carried out simultaneously, MacArthur on 10 January asked for clarification of his orders. He tied to this request another hint that American political objectives needed looking into.

He said: In view of the self-evident fact that my command as presently constituted is of insufficient strength to hold a position in Korea and simultaneously protect Japan against external assault, strategic disposition taken in the present situation must be based upon the over-riding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests. It seemed that he was asking the Joint Chiefs to decide which of his missions they considered most important when, in fact, they already had told him. [19] General MacArthur pointed out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his command originally had been sent to Korea to oppose the North Korean Army. There had been no intent that theUnited Nations Command should engage the armies of Communist China, MacArthur claimed; and he doubted very seriously that his troops would have been sent to Korea at alli f it had been foreseen that they would have to fight the Chinese. [20] His men were capable of holding a beachhead line in Korea for a limited time, the United Nations commander believed, but not without losses.

Whether or not these losses could be termed "severe" depended, MacArthur said, "upon the connotation given the term". He angrily decried the unfavorable publicity given the withdrawals of the Eighth Army and X Corps. "The troops are tired from a long and difficult campaign", he complained heatedly, embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their courage and fighting qualities in the misunderstood retrograde maneuver, and their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood and so impelling that the hazards of battle are cheerfully accepted. With these words, MacArthur seemed to be asking, in the name of his troops, that the measures he had recommended be put into effect or that an explanation be rendered to him and his men. [21] Citing the limitations under which he was being required to carry on the campaign against the Chinese-namely, no reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action, no measures permitted against China's continental military potential, and the concentration of China's military force in the Korea-Manchuria sector-MacArthur asserted that the military position of his forces in Korea would soon be untenable. He strongly recommended that, under these conditions and in the absence of any overriding political consideration, his troops should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it was tactically feasible to do so.

[22] The final factor in deciding what course to follow, in MacArthur's judgment, was just how far the United States was prepared to go in order to keep a position in Korea. If the primary interest of the United States in the Far East lay in holding a position in Korea and in pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, "the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept whatever casualties result and any attendant hazard to Japan's security". The decision to remain in Korea or to withdraw was not a matter for him to determine, MacArthur contended. The issue really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea and involves a decision of the highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a theater commander, guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action. [23] Since the directives he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff left the initiative of thedecision to evacuate in the hands of the enemy, MacArthur wanted to know if the present objective of United States political policy was to maintain a military position in Korea indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuating as soon as possible.

"As Have pointed out before", he concluded, "under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea, its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time, up to its complete destruction, if over-riding political considerations so dictate". [24] The Joint Chiefs did not change their directives to General MacArthur despite his objection that he did not understand them. They did attempt to explain them to him. They made it quite clear that, after studying all the factors which he had recently presented, they were under no illusion that the United Nations Command could stave off a sustained major effort by the Chinese for any great length of time. But they wanted MacArthur to stay in Korea along as possible and to kill as many Chinese as possible before pulling out for Japan. This would be in the national interest since it would gain further time for essential diplomatic and military consultations with other United Nations members.

The Joint Chiefs told MacArthur: It is important also to United States prestige world-wide, to the future of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to efforts to organize anti-communist resistance in Asia that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations, and that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors. [26] Washington, they freely admitted. But they were quite concerned about the effect on his men, especially on ROK soldiers, if news of imminent evacuation should reach them. In JCS opinion, any instructions to evacuate would become known almost at once, despite security measures, and any resulting collapse of ROK resistance could seriously endanger the Eighth Army's ability to reach a secure beachhead about Pusan and ho] d it long enough for actual evacuation.

"Your estimate is desired", they told MacArthur, "as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea". Meanwhile, their current directives remained in effect. [26] The President was deeply disturbed by this. MacArthur was saying, in effect, that the course of action decided upon by the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President was not feasible. He was saying that his forces would be driven off the peninsula or, at the very least, suffer heavy losses. MacArthur had always been kept informed but apparently few of the important papers had really found their way to his desk.

President Truman therefore resolved to send a personal letter to General MacArthur setting forth the political aspects of the situation from the standpoint of thenation's leaders. [27] "I want you to know", President Truman wrote MacArthur on 13 January, "that the situation in Korea is receiving the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the gravest importance to the future of America and to the survival of free peoples everywhere". Mr. Truman took special care to emphasize that what he said did not constitute a directive. He merely wanted to let MacArthur know what was being considered in Washington. Mr. Truman called upon MacArthur for assistance in solving some of the problems facing the United States. "We need your judgment as to the maximum effort which could reasonably be expected from theUnited Nations forces under your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis", the President told MacArthur, and enumerated the political advantages which would come with a United Nations victory in Korea.

[28] President Truman cautioned MacArthur obliquely on the latter's proposals for more direct action against China. He warned: Pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities. [29] The President fully appreciated the seriousness of the United Nations Command's military position in Korea at that time and was in no way minimizing the danger.

He recognized that continued resistance in Korea might not be militarily possible; but he suggested that, if MacArthur thought it practicable, resistance might still be continued, after an evacuation, from offshore islands such as Cheju-do. In any event, Truman continued, .".. it would be important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified". Concluding, President Truman lauded MacArthur for his conduct of the campaign. "The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances". [30].