Use Of Tanks In Support Of Infantry example essay topic

The Concept of Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg "The Lightning War" PzKpfw IV Ausf D from 5th company of 2nd Panzer Division in Semis on May 12th of 1940. The foundation of mobile warfare has its roots in Ancient and Medieval World. The German Army late in World War I initially developed basic tactics that eventually evolved into modern mobile warfare. Germans developed those tactics in an attempt to overcome the static trench warfare on the Western Front. Elite "Sturmtruppen" (Storm troops) infantry units were created to attack enemy positions using the momentum of speed and suprise but eventually failed because of the lack of mobility and support needed in order to continue advancing further into enemy controlled territory. During 1920's, British military philosophers Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, General J.F.C. Fuller and General Martell further developed tactics of mobile warfare.

They all postulated that tanks could not only seize ground by brute strength, but could also be the central factor in a new strategy of warfare. If moved rapidly enough, concentrations of tanks could smash through enemy lines and into the enemy's rear, destroying supplies and artillery positions and decreasing the enemy's will to resist. All of them found tank to be an ultimate weapon able to penetrate deep into enemy territory while followed by infantry and supported by artillery and airforce. In late 1920's and early 1930's, Charles De Gaulle, Hans von Seek, Heinz Guderian and many others became interested in the concept of mobile warfare and tried to implement it in an organizational structure of their armies. Heinz Guderian organized Panzers into self-contained Panzer Divisions working with the close support of infantry, motorized infantry, artillery and airforce. From 1933 to 1939, Germany was on a quest to fully mechanize their army for an upcoming conflict.

German High Command used Spanish Civil War (1936-38) as a testing ground for Blitzkrieg tactics, which proved to be a formidable combination of land and air action. In September of 1939, Germany invaded Poland using mechanized ground force (Wehrmacht) working with the close support of the airforce (Luftwaffe) to breakthrough and penetrate deep behind Polish lines of defense - Polish Campaign (Fall Weiss). In May of 1940, during the invasion of the Low Countries and France, the Germans once again used same tactics (including the use of Fallschirmjaeger - paratroops) to shock and disorganize the defenders. From October of 1940 to March of 1941, Germans conquered Balkans using the same proven tactics. When in June of 1941, Germany invaded Russia, tactics of Blitzkrieg allowed them to reach the outskirts of Moscow in December of 1941. Tactics of Blitzkrieg were also implemented with great success by Erwin Rommel in North Africa (1941-1943).

Since late 1942, outnumbered German Army was fighting a defensive war on two fronts and was unable to launch any major offensives with exception of Kursk (June of 1943) and Ardennes (December of 1944) offensive. Overall, tactics of Blitzkrieg were the main contributor of early German victories (1939-1942), when German supply base and logistics were able to maintain the speed of the advancing units. This was not the case on the Eastern Front and in the North Africa, when limited German supply base and logistics were unable to cope with transportation and weather conditions decreasing effectiveness of German attacks and armed forces in general. At the same time, potential of Blitzkrieg was fully appreciated by the Allies, who implemented its tactics on all fronts.

US Army General George Patton used Blitzkrieg tactics in his European operations of 1944. After World War II, tactics of Blitzkrieg were used by Israeli forces during their numerous conflicts with the Arab Nations as well as by American forces during the Operation Desert Storm. Overall, tactics of Blitzkrieg are based on coordinated, concentrated and precise air and land attacks to provide a rapid and powerful punch through the enemy lines in order to eventually encircle the enemy. Important factor behind mobile warfare was communication between the HQ and field units and vice-versa, as well as prepared starting points along with supply base and logistics to maintain the speed of the initial attack.

Although, it is often forgotten that suprise was also very important to the success of Blitzkrieg and that is why Germany never declared war on any country that it attacked. The revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg formed a base for future development of weaponry and warfare. Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940. (PzKpfw 35 (t) and PzKpfw IV Ausf D) The Concept of Blitzkrieg. 1.

Airforce attacks enemy front-line and rear positions, main roads, airfields and communication centers. At the same time infantry attacks on the entire frontline (or at least at main places) and engages enemy. This restrains the enemy from knowing where the main force will attack. 2. Concentrated tank units breakthrough main lines of defense and advance deeper into enemy territory, while following mechanized units pursuit and engage defenders preventing them from establishing defensive positions. Infantry continues to engage enemy to misinform and keep enemy forces from withdrawing and establishing effective defense.

3. Infantry and other support units attack enemy flanks in order to link up with other groups to complete the attack and eventually encircle the enemy. 4. Mechanized groups spearhead deeper into the enemy territory outflanking the enemy positions and paralyzing the rear preventing withdrawing troops and defenders from establishing effective defensive positions. 5. Main force links up with other units encircling and cutting off the enemy.

Panzer's companion - Junkers 87 Stuka - dive bomber. (Ju-87 R-1 Stuka of 2nd Staff el of Stukageschwader 3, Sicily, 1941). German troops parade through Warsaw, Poland. September 1939. (National Archives) Blitzkrieg (German: "lightning war") is a method of fast-moving, air-and-land warfare first used extensively during World War II. German armies invading Poland in 1939 used tanks, armored trucks, self-propelled guns, and dive bombers to break through opposing forces and penetrate far behind their lines.

During the invasion of the Low Countries and France in 1940, the German armored columns again used these tactics to shock and disorganize the defenders. On the Allied side, U.S. general George S. Patton exhibited (1944) particular skill in mobile warfare in Europe. In a blitzkrieg, tanks and troop-transport vehicles were concentrated, and massive attacks by dive bombers were conducted on enemy front-line positions. When these forces had broken through, they continued deep into enemy territory, encircling and cutting off the enemy. The techniques were first developed by the German army late in World War I in an effort to overcome static trench warfare, but the Germans lacked the mobility to succeed.

Between the wars, armored tactics were further developed by Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller in Britain, Charles de Gaulle in France, and Heinz Guderian in Germany. Made chief of German mobile troops in 1938, Guderian led the drive across France in 1940. Bibliography: Corum, J.S., The Roots of Blitzkrieg (1992); Kaufmann, J.E. and H.W., Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaign (1993). Introduction.

Blitzkrieg, or Lightning War, is the most famous battlefield tactic of the German Army of WWII. It changed warfare for all nations during WWII. These tactics were copied and it's concepts were adapted into their armed forces. There are, however, quite a number of people do not know what Blitzkrieg is all about or how it worked. As can be interpreted from the name, speed is an essential factor, but not the only one. Blitzkrieg is not a 'package solution' - every battle is, because of extreme difference of enemy forces, environment, etc., unique.

The tactic itself must be modified for the different conditions, as no tactic can be applied out of the box to every situation. A well-made plan of attack must be flexible in order to work. Background. The history of Blitzkrieg started in the final years of World War One. Machine guns had put an end to the suicidal infantry charges, and therefore, the concept of armored vehicles was born. (Actually armored vehicles were born out of the necessity of breaking the stalemate created on the Western Front with trench warfare).

The first armored vehicles were actually armored artillery tractors - horses were found to be too vulnerable to enemy fire. The concept of an armored vehicle used for direct attacks only slowly appeared, mainly because of the ideas of J.F.C. Fuller. The Mark I and IV were the first real tanks in the world. They were only meant as infantry support and therefore had a very limited speed of about 10 km / h. The success of tanks used in WWI is largely exaggerated, primarily because the Germans used this to justify their loss. The British army did try to make some 'all tank' assaults, but they failed because of the lack of infantry support.

Because of them being knocked out because of poor employment or because of mechanical breakdowns, there were only a handful of British tanks left in the last few months of the war. The Germans only employed a limited number of tanks at the very end of the war. Instead of employing tanks against the enemy, they made good use of so-called 'Stosstruppen', or assault forces. These were small battle groups armed with standard infantry weapons, light mortars and machine guns. These units were very successful, despite suffering low morale.

They were the German elite force - much like the Waffen-SS was in WWII (NOTE: That Felix Steiner modeled his Deutschland Regiment after these storm troopers, which fit very well into the Blitzkrieg tactics developed between the wars). The success of these assault forces was the fast hit-and-fun tactics that were employed. In the 1920's and 1930's, the German army concentrated on armored warfare, while the British and French armies lost their interest in making further developments in armor and tactics. This is understandable to some extent. The Germans first encounter with tanks on the battlefield was fear at the approach of these behemoths. They saw the tank not only as a weapon of huge proportions that could open the battlefield and end the trench warfare, but could also be employed to raise havoc in an enemy's rear causing confusion and panic.

To the British, who had seen the true behavior of the Mark I and IV tanks in respect to their mechanical and battlefield performances, considered all of the lives that were lost while using them in costly advances. They felt that to continue using them in future warfare in the role as main battle forces was not justified. Instead they manufactured and employed light tanks for reconnaissance and infantry support. Regular tank formations including medium tanks were very uncommon because many British generals were from the artillery branch and they feared that their beloved artillery would not survive if tanks became popular, as the artillery would not be able to keep up with the tanks. Method of Progress. The Blitzkrieg consisted of a number of steps.

One of the keys was quick and narrow penetration into the enemy's lines. During WWI the front lines extended for hundreds of miles and advances were carried out on a large front, often covering tens of miles. Blitzkrieg penetrated the front lines using only a 3-4 mile front and used artillery and armor to punch these holes through. These penetrations were conducted at the place of the German's choosing; usually the enemy's weakest points, and often depended upon surprise to achieve success.

Smaller panzer formations with small build up areas were used so enemy intelligence wouldn't detect a massive troop concentration and then be able to counteract the situation. These small build up areas also worked to gain a surprise advantage over the enemy forces opposite the point of attack. Then large follow up forces were used to spread into the enemy's rear and encircle the defending forces. These smaller panzer forces were concentrated into a small front and packed a lot of firepower to initially overwhelm the defenders on that front, push passed them and then strike the vital areas in the enemy's rear, i.e. headquarters, communications, etc., and securing vital crossroads and bridges.

Concentration, speed and surprise were the keys. With only a few divisions present at the front at the start of the attack, the roads were clear for the spearhead forces. To use larger formations would clog up the slim line of advance. Reserves (including anti-tank guns for enemy counterattacks) and various services (repair, medical, etc.) would occupy the side roads, thus avoiding the main routes of advance but still being close.

Reconnaissance (Aufl " a rungs) units and engineers would scout the area along with reconnaissance aircraft in search of areas of vulnerability for the panzer formations to exploit and the reserves to follow up. Also, enemy areas of strong build up and resistance were recognized and avoided. The point of attack bypassed them and the follow up formations would reduce these by siege if necessary. Also supporting the advancing panzers were Stuka and towed artillery, later supported by mobile artillery.

One of the great lessons to be learned from World War II is that a relatively small change at the tactical level can have a tremendous effect on the strategic situation. Such was the case when the German army introduced mechanized divisions -- the panzer divisions. On a purely technical basis these units were not dissimilar to armored divisions deployed and experimented with in other countries and while these showed some promise they hardly represented a significant deviation from the norm in the armies of the great powers. However, when combined with the "storm troop" tactics developed during the First World War, these mechanized units proved to be the basis for an entirely new form of warfare and a new term entered our vocabulary to describe it -- Blitzkrieg. Germany solved the problem of static trench warfare by 1918 but it went virtually unnoticed at the time.

With American troops flooding onto the Western Front and German troops in full retreat after the spring offensive collapsed, there was not the time to give serious consideration to the effectiveness of the German tactical doctrine by the allied camp. Besides which, the lack of mechanization made the "storm troop" tactics that the German army had developed ineffectual at the strategic level. The mobility necessary to make these tactics work simply did not yet exist. One reason for the allied victory in World War I was the use of tanks in support of infantry attacks -- a British technological advance.

There were other reasons as well, but tanks featured prominently in almost all the explanations. The mechanical limits on early armored fighting vehicles, however, led most military experts to conclude that this new element in land warfare should be relegated to an infantry support role. Visionaries, meanwhile, seized on the tank as a revolutionary weapons system and argued for its massed employment in fully mechanized units instead of the parceling out of armored assets to the infantry units which was the norm for post Great War armies. In the Soviet Union of the 1930's the idea of fully mechanized armored units was actually adopted for a while as official doctrine. Once the full implications, especially the industrial requirements, of such a doctrine became apparent there was a reversal in official sanction. The kind of fully mechanized army being proposed was simply beyond the capabilities of the Soviet state to provide.

A typically Stalinist means of revising doctrine was applied to the Soviet officers who favored the mechanized idea -- the military purge. In Britain and France the officers who favored mechanized units during the twenties and thirties were too junior to win doctrinal arguments with their respective institutions. The military leadership in both countries retained the Great War perspective that tanks were an infantry support weapon. This should not be seen as an unreasonable position since, after all, this is the use tanks were put to in the First World War and it had proven successful.

So, while the seeds of mechanization were everywhere, the soil was not fertile. Germany's inter-war experience was similar to that of the other great powers although there was a somewhat higher willingness to experiment with new ideas. Tanks were viewed primarily as an infantry support weapon by most of the senior officers. Even the rise of Hitler and his apparent support of mechanized warfare did little to change the generals' point of view.

Besides, Hitler's interest in armor was primarily based on its propoganda value and one could argue that the only reason fully mechanized units were encouraged under Hitler was that they looked really impressive on parade. No one expected these units to have a war-winning quality. When the war began and Poland was eliminated within a month of operations by the Third Reich's army, few military observers showed any concern. There was a complete lack of insight into the strategic implications of this new use of armored units.

Only after France was eliminated from the war in six weeks (an accomplishment that had proven impossible in the four years of the First World War) did observers begin to reconsider their assumptions about how wars were to be fought. By then, most of Europe was already under German hegemony. When the Soviet Union was invaded about one year after France had been defeated, their military was still trying to reform in a way that was consistent with the German pattern. Unfortunately, such radical changes take time to institute. This inevitable lag nearly cost the Soviet Union its survival. The territory lost in the first six weeks of Barbarossa took three years to recover and the social and economic damage done was not overcome for decades afterward.

All of the Third Reich's success in the first period of the war can readily be attributed to the remarkably effective combination of mechanized units and "storm troop" tactics. It was a combination that few military experts viewed as revolutionary until after the effects were observed on the battlefield. Once revealed, there was a strict time limit on the German Blitzkrieg's effectiveness because viable countermeasures would inevitably be developed be its enemies. This weakness, rather than the more frequently cited one of lack of economic production, doomed Nazi Germany to defeat if presented with a lengthy war. Its entire success depended on the inability of its enemies to adapt to the new form of war before they were defeated.