Valid Justification Of A True Belief example essay topic
We may ask ourselves whether it is appropriate to claim that George has knowledge of the time every time he utters it. The answer is NO. Irina has been amused by his Russian utterances and has thus never told him what the words he says mean in English. So if Irina were to ask George what time it was, in English, he would be unable to tell her without looking at a watch or clock. This is due to the fact that when he speaks the time in Russian, his mind is not really referring to the time. The chip implanted in his brain clearly calculates the time on its own, not requiring the use of any of his bodily functions.
The only interaction that the chip would have with George is to cause him to utter the appropriate numbers. So, since his brain is not involved in any calculating processes and all he does is utter the time in a foreign language, it is clear that George does not understand what he is saying. Without understand, it is obvious that he cannot form a belief based on what he are saying. If the requirement for knowledge is a true belief that is either justified or connected by natural law to a factual truth, then in the absence of a belief, there can be no knowledge. We may also ask ourselves whether Irina knows the time. The answer once again is NO.
She believes that she knows the time because whenever she has tapped George on the shoulder, he has given her the correct time. The truth is, that Irina is probably right in her belief that George will not make a mistake because the chip implanted in his brain is really good, but Irina is not justified in her belief because she has no knowledge of the chip's existence. This situation pertains to David Hume's argument about causal relations. According to Hume, "we cannot prove that every event has a cause nor that the same cause will always have a like affect but we see two events in a constant conjunction and unjustifiably infer a necessary connection" (P. 44). Hume argues that our convictions about cause and effect are based solely on experience or custom but those are not sufficient reasons for justification.
If, for a substantial length of time, in every instance where Irina has tapped George, he has told her the correct time, she would eventually begin to associate tapping him on the shoulder with getting the correct time. It is natural for her to make this inference but it is not justifiable. An interna list would surely agree that George has no knowledge of the time. Knowledge for the interna list, is based on valid justification of a true belief. This justification comes in the form of reasons, which can be accessed consciously by the mind. For instance, if I were to claim that I knew Madonna was coming to play a concert in Toronto and someone asked me how I knew this, valid justification would not consist of my saying that she is my favorite musician and I just have a telepathic connection with her so I know what she is up to.
Instead, for an interna list account of knowledge, my reasons would have to consist of my having read about her upcoming concert on the internet and the fact that ticket master is selling tickets for her concert. George not only lacks reasons to support his belief, but he has no belief to begin with. He must have an understanding of what he is saying in order to form a belief and this understanding is crucial to the formation of the reasons, which will support the belief. Since George has no understanding of what he is uttering, he cannot form a belief about the time and if he cannot form a belief, he certainly cannot form reasons for justifying that belief. Although the externa list does not require justification for knowledge, he does require either a reliable process that arrives at truth in the right way or a natural or law like connection between a belief and a true fact. But both the and the substantive naturalist require a belief.
For instance, lets say there exists a doctor who is the best doctor in the country at diagnosing illnesses and diseases. If we were to ask this doctor how he does it though, he would not be able to tell us. He does not understand by what process he arrives at correct diagnoses. But even though he does not understand exactly how he does it, he is confident in his mental capabilities and has strong beliefs about the fact that he always gives a correct diagnosis. It is clear that this doctor knows what he doing and knows that he is right when he gives a diagnoses because he has a great performance record. Even though, he does not know what that method is, his belief in his knowledge and his performance record allow for it to be accepted as knowledge.
Although George has a great performance record and we know that he arrives at truth via a reliable method, he is not aware of these two things and thus has no beliefs regarding them. Without any belief about whether or not he knows the time, or substantive naturalism cannot be applied to George. According to the interna list, Irina, like George, does not know the time. This is due to the fact that she has no valid reasons for believing that he is still giving her the correct time, once her watch has stopped working.
Her only reason for believing that she knows the time is the fact that in every instance, so far when she has tapped George on the shoulder, he has given her the correct time. For the interna list, this is not sufficient justification. It is viable that he has just made lucky guesses every time, and so he can make a mistake at any time. Since the chip implanted in George's brain is a really good one, that prevents him from committing errors but Irina knows nothing about the chip's existence. Based on the lack of knowledge she has about George's strange utterances, Irina is unable to conjure up valid justification for her belief that she knows the time. An externa list, more specifically- a substantive naturalist would argue against the interna list and claim that, in fact, Irina does know the time.
Since justification is not required for the externa list account of knowledge- performance record is quite sufficient. If George has been correct about the time, in every single instance that Irina has tapped his shoulder, then she is justified in believing that she knows the time. He is not required to be able to explain how he knows it in order for her to trust him. The fact that he has never made a mistake is sufficient grounds for believing that he always gives the correct time. Of course some discrepancy could arise if she has only tapped him on the shoulder three times before her watch broke. An externa list would argue that she must have tested it a substantial amount of times before believing that he will always give the correct time.
The example of Mr. Truetemp really puts into question the viability of externalism. His situation is very similar that of George, except for one deciding factor, which is that he has both an understanding of what is popping into his head and a belief about it. The would try to argue that because Mr. Truetemp has a belief about what the temperature is and because we know that he is following a reliable method, then he knows what the temperature is. The substantive relativist may try to argue that based on his performance record, he has knowledge.
There is clearly something amiss with these notions. The first main problem is that Mr. Truetemp has never checked a thermometer to see if his belief is correct. So according to his conscious being, there is no natural fact that connects to his belief. A belief must be connected to a true fact but if Truetemp is not aware of the true fact, then he cannot know that his belief is true.
The second problem is that Truetemp is not aware of the existence of the device in his brain so he does not know that he arrives at the correct temperature through a reliable method. If he is unaware of the process that leads him to his belief, it seems strange to claim that he knows the temperature. There are endless examples and counterexamples exemplifying how countless epistemological theories work or do not work. Ultimately, we cannot know if we know anything at all. But it appears as though, for daily life, the interna list account of knowledge is the least problematic. A validly justified true belief seems to be a certain way to provide us at least the knowledge that we hope we can have..