Violence By The Military Regime In Algeria example essay topic

Chris ThormanPOLA 293-04 Research Paper April 7, 2003"Thus, what motivates men to slay the enemy is anger", Sun Tzu says in The Art of War. The conflict between Algerian Islamic fundamentalists and the Algerian military backed government is rooted in anger. The conflict, which began as skirmishes between government forces and Islamic fundamentalists, has taken on the proportions of a civil war as fundamentalists carried out kidnappings, assassinations and other forms of civil disturbance. The government has tried pacifying the Muslims by including Islamic leaders in the government, but extreme violence committed by both parties in the conflict has made a peaceful solution difficult to achieve. This violence has claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000 people in the years between 1990 and 2002.

The Roots of Anger The clash between the fundamentalists and the military government stems from Algeria's experimentation with political liberalization. The attempt to create more points of view and more political parties in the government has backfired horrendously. The violence of modern day Algeria stems from the failure of mild democratization in the North African country. Following nomination by the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, Chad li Bendjedid was elected President in 1979 and re-elected in 1984 and 1988. The National Liberation Front ruled as a virtual one-party regime until the political system was reformed in 1989. Antigovernment sentiment stemming from corruption, housing shortages, unemployment, and other severe economic and social problems boosted the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) despite the party's quite public commitment to theocratic rule under Islamic law.

This seemingly innocuous act was actually quite revolutionary. For the first time, an Arab country had authorized the creation of a political party that had made the creation of an Islamic republic its main goal. A new constitution was adopted in 1989 that allowed the formation of political parties other than the FLN. It also removed the armed forces, which had run the government since the days of the 1980's, from a designated role in the operation of the government. Between 1989 and 1990, forty-four new political parties emerged, many with distinct social agendas.

These agendas included human rights, independent women organizations and other cultural movements. Among the scores of parties that sprang up under the new constitution, the militant Islamic Salvation Front was the most successful, winning more than 50% of all votes cast in elections in 1990 as well as in the first stage of national elections held in December 1991. Faced with the real possibility of a huge FIS victory, the government canceled the second stage of elections in January 1992. This action led to a violent reaction on the part of the Islamists.

The rise of the FIS was no chance occurrence. Since the 1967 Arab Israeli war, Islam had been quickly on the rise. Many young people were looking for some identity, something they could cling tightly too as a national identity. Henri Sans on said in 1983 that Algerians want "to have Islam as the transcendent norm or even as a principle of membership, of reference, of justification, of finality on the one hand, and, on the other, secularity as a practical norm or even a principle of action".

The huge percentage "win" of the FIS could also be attributed to other factors as well. Many other political parties abstained from the 1991 election. Thus, leaving the FIS as an outlet for these voters. The rise of the FIS struck a naked chord in Algerian society.

Many citizens longed for order and a relief from corruption in the government. Also, citizens clung to the new order of daily life that they foresaw under an Islam regime. A delivery boy said this: "After 1988, the country was magnificent, I assure you; you could go out, nobody would make trouble for you, nothing like that. With the FIS, I assure you, nobody dared to steal any more or get in a fight- nothing". For this common man in Algeria, the FIS preached what he wanted to hear. Along with this, the Gulf War also fueled Islam not only in Algeria but also throughout the Middle East.

The FIS Islamists called for a halt to the Iraqi invasion but also for the removal of "unbelievers" from Saudi Arabia. The Gulf War further solidified fundamentalists' anti-Western attitude and brought this controversy to the international arena. The cancellation of the seemingly FIS dominated election by the army in early 1992 led to widespread disagreement. A State High Commission was formed immediately following the cancellation of the election.

This commission instituted a state of emergency throughout the whole of Algeria. The army put Mohamed Boudiaf in power, who immediately banned the FIS in March and then attacked the FLN. As one could imagine, Boudiaf rattled too many people and was assassinated on June 29 of that same year. This event closed the period of free elections in Algeria and opened up a more chaotic and deadly period that would last into the next century. Random Violence Becomes the Norm On August 26, 1992 Algerian fundamentalists began a new war against their militarily backed governmental opponents. In an Algerian airport, a bomb attack attributed to Islamic fundamentalists, killed ten civilians and wounded many others.

For the first time since their colonial independence from France in 1962, nameless terrorism had struck random members of the Algerian society. Between February 1992 and September 1992, at least four hundred governmental security workers were killed. The violence began quickly and increased extremely fast as well. A review of some of the violence that occurred between only March and August of 1993 include: the murder of three of Algeria's intellectual elite, an ambush where forty-nine soldiers were killed, seven Islamists murdered in July, fires of terrorist origin destroyed nearly 75,000 acres of forest, along with schools and other governmental buildings. The scope of Algerian violence in this period alone is horrific.

In 1994, violence established itself as the premiere form of interaction between the government and radicals. Between February 1992 and December 1994, approximately 30,000 people had been killed. The number of people killed everyday in 1994 was estimated between forty and sixty. An interesting fact about the radical violence after 1992 was that much of it was focused on not only random targets but on Algeria's cultural elite as well. Authors, attorneys, artists and especially journalists were targeted as supporters of the military regime. Violence was not limited to only Islamic radicals.

State sponsored violence by the military regime in Algeria has come under protest by international groups such as Amnesty International. This state violence included imprisonment without trial, executions and torture. The seemingly indiscriminate nature of the government's repressive control only added to the casualty list. Dialogue Begins In early 1994, Algerians were given a sense of hope that the violence would stop when the High Security Council named General Lia mine Zeroual as president. Zeroual, in his first speech as president, announced that he was prepared to make "serious dialogue" between the government and the radicals. This comes after a serious void of dialogue.

Intense violence had been raging for two years without any diplomatic attempt to stop it. Zeroual's attempt at peace was a weak one. He dismissed his more hard line Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior in hope that he would gain more legitimacy from the radical Islamists. Two key members of FIS, A bassi Madan i and Ali Benhadj were released from prison and put under house arrest.

This move was seen as too feeble by the Islamists and the violence continued. Five car bombs exploded simultaneously in Algiers a month later. The radical leaders demanded that all political prisoners before agreeing to anymore negotiations. The negotiations had failed and a prospect for peace had been extinguished. France was also in a precarious position in Algeria as well. Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962 and each country continued to have a large stake in the other's economy for a long time.

But as violence against even French citizens living in Algeria began to increase, France had to ask itself what to do. Islamists had made it very clear that they wanted France to have no part in Algeria. For 132 years, Algeria formed the core of France's overseas prowess. Algeria assumed a crucial role in shaping France as an imperial and economic power.

A relationship like this does not simply disappear. Islamists often accused France of supporting the military regime. In 1994, France stopped giving Algerian visas and closed its border with Algeria in order to stop the immigration of refugees from Algeria. Warm feelings still remain though. In a 2001 survey, more than half of France's population thought that the government should apologize to Algeria for human rights abuses that occurred during the 1957 war of independence. Presidential Elections and BeyondZeroual called for presidential elections in 1995, though some parties objected to holding elections that excluded the FIS.

Zeroual was elected president with 75% of the vote. By 1997, in an attempt to bring political stability to the nation, the Rassemblement National Democratique (RND) party was formed by a more progressive group of FLN members. Zeroual announced that presidential elections would be held in early 1999, nearly 2 years ahead of the scheduled time. Algerians went to the polls in April 1999, following a campaign in which seven candidates qualified for election.

On the day before the election, all of the candidates except Abdelaziz Bouteflika pulled out, amid charges of widespread electoral fraud among the candidates. Bouteflika, the candidate who was backed mainly by the military, as well as FLN and RND party members won with a 70% of the votes cast. He was inaugurated on April 27, 1999 for a 5-year term. President Bouteflika's presidential goals focused on improving the safety and stability of Algeria. After he was elected, he proposed a governmental amnesty for those who fought against the government during the 1990's, unless they had engaged in 'blood crimes,' such as rape or murder. This Civil Concord policy was widely approved in a nationwide referendum in September 2000.

Government officials estimate that 85% of those fighting the regime during the 1990's have accepted amnesty and have been brought back into Algerian society. Bouteflika also has launched national committees to study education and judicial reform, as well as restructuring of the state bureaucracy. His government has set high goals for economic reform and attracting foreign investors. Three years into Bouteflika's mandate, the security situation in Algeria has improved markedly. However, terrorism has not been totally eliminated, and terrorist incidents still occur, particularly in remote or isolated areas of the country. An estimated 100-120 Algerians are killed monthly, down from a high of 1,200 or more in the mid-1990's.

In 2001, Berber activists, who constitute the largest ethnic minority in Algeria, in the Kabyle region of the country, reacting to the death of a youth in gendarme custody, unleashed a resistance campaign against what they saw as government repression. Strikes and demonstrations in the Kabyle region have become commonplace as a result and some have spread to the capital. Chief among Berber demands were recognition of Amagizh (Berber) as a national language, restitution for death of Kabylies killed or wounded in demonstrations, and some type of autonomy for the region. The Berbers accomplished one of these in 2001 when Berber became the second official language of Algeria.

The religious strife that has marked the latter part of the 20th century and on into the 21st in Algeria does not seem likely to end soon. Religious differences often come into question in the Middle East and in Islamic countries and Algeria has seen its share of them. Much of the violence in Algeria seems to stem from a question of legitimacy. Legitimacy is needed for a regime to control its citizens and both sides of the Algerian civil war seem to lack it.

For the military government, corruption has decimated its legitimacy and its inability to control the Islamic radicals has also led to its failure. The Islamists, on the other hand, also have a legitimacy debate because much of Algeria shies away from the group's vicious medium for its political ideas. It seems that with violence still occurring today in 2003, but on a much smaller scale than the mid 1990's, peace may be close. But still, the downgraded violence seems to be at a "tolerable" point now. One major issue that seems to have never developed in Algeria is one of an open dialogue between the two warring parties. Even in the Arab-Israeli conflict, dialogue existed as an alternative to violence.

Despite the numerous false starts of the peace process, cease-fires were arranged and the violence died down. In Algeria, there seems to have been an absence of any negotiations within the first two years of the fighting. Again, the question of legitimacy comes into context. Who the legitimate representatives of both the military regime and the Islamic radicals was always in question. Both sides did not want to give any ground and haven't done so for nearly 12 years.

Algeria's outlook depends on the willingness of President Bouteflika to work with the Islamic radicals and with the religious fervor from which the armed Islamic militant groups work with.

Bibliography

1 Abdelaziz, Testas, "The roots of Algeria's religious and ethnic violence", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25 (May-June 2002) pp.
161.2 "Algeria - Islamists vs. the Government", APS Diplomat Redrawing the Islamic Map, Vol. 43 (Feb 11, 2002) pp.
N.A. 3 Hafez, Mohammed, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54 (Autumn 2000) pp.
572.4 Perkins, Kenneth J., "France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 55 (Autumn 2001) pp.
679.5 "Survey: France Should Apologize to Algeria", Xinhua News Agency, May 9, 2001, pp.
1008129 h 2567.6 "Berber Rights", Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. 21 (March 2002) pp.
40-41.7 "Berber Language Gains Official Status', Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. 20 (Dec 2001), pp.
49.8 "Algeria - Rich vs. The Poor", APS Diplomat Redrawing the Islamic Map, Vol. 43 (Feb 11, 2002) pp.
N.A. 9 David Butter and Catherine Richards, "Better Outlook for Algeria", MEED Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 43 (October 15, 1999) pp.
4.12 "Violence in Algeria", Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. 21 (March 2002) pp.
40-41.13 Whitelaw, Kevin, "A Holy Month of Bloodshed; Algeria", U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 124 (Jan 19, 1998) pp.
50-51.14 Keel, Gilles, "Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria", Daedalus, Vol. 124 (Summer 1995) pp.
109-119.15 Stora, Benjamin, Algeria, 1830-2000 A Short History, London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
16 Martinez, Luis, The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
17 Hunter, Jane, "Boudiaf assassination clouds Algeria's future", Africa News, Vol. 36 (July 6, 1992), pp.
2.18 Stone, Martin, The Agony of Algeria, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp.
210.19 "President Bouteflika", MEED Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 44 (August 25, 2001), pp.