Visa And Mastercard And Issue Credit Cards example essay topic
These companies, the two remaining credit card brands that make up the main players in the industry, have much to gain in a judgement against Visa and MasterCard. To understand the issues, and stakes a basic understanding of the current industry structure is necessary. Visa and MasterCard are non-stock, not for profit membership corporations owned by thousands of diverse financial institutions (i.e. - banks, credit unions etc. ). The Visa association was formed by a group of American banks in the late 1960's to assist its members in issuing general-purpose payment cards and signing merchants to accept those cards (Allen, 2000, 2). Visa and MasterCard are considered to be an "open" or joint venture relationship with each other and their association members.
In essence, this means any financial institution may join the Visa and MasterCard associations assuming they can meet certain capital adequacy requirements, and comply with certain association rules. In return, Visa and MasterCard provide essential functions to the member banks. They license their members to issue Visa and MasterCard branded credit and debit cards, sign members to accept those cards, market the cards to ensure brand recognition, develop new card products and services, and provide an infrastructure of communications, processing, authorization, and settlement functions necessary for the system to operate. Together Visa and MasterCard account for almost 80% of the overall market share in the credit card industry. Unlike Visa and MasterCard, American Express and Discover are not joint ventures, but are investor-owned, for-profit corporations. They issue all of their respective brands' cards and they alone determine the pricing and other features of those cards (Allen, 2000, 2).
In addition they perform all of the functions Visa and MasterCard perform relating to marketing, developing products and services, and maintaining an infrastructure necessary for running a card network. These networks, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, are attempting to change certain rules enforced by Visa and MasterCard that they deem illegal, unethical, and restrictive of competition. By it's very nature; violations of antitrust laws would be deemed unethical business practice. Therefore determining the guilt or innocence, with respect to antitrust violation, should effectively gauge the behavior involved.
The overriding issue is the legality of a Visa and MasterCard policy whereby, any member institution cannot issue American Express or Discover cards if they also wish to be a Visa / MasterCard issuer. However, at the same time no such restriction is placed upon a member banks ability to distribute Visa if they are a MasterCard association member or MasterCard if the Issuer is a Visa association member. Keep in mind, that Visa and MasterCard consider themselves separate entities competing for the same market share and the favor of the same card issuing institutions. Therefore, Visa and MasterCard effectively allow all financial institutions to conduct business with each other but not with the American Express and Discover networks. The DOJ, as previously stated, sees this as a breach of anti-trust legislation and a violation of the antitrust legislation they are obligated to enforce. For over six decades, the mission of the Antitrust Division has been to promote and protect the competitive process- and the American economy- through the enforcement of the antitrust laws (United States of America Antitrust Division Overview, 2000, 1).
These ethical ramifications go hand-in-hand with the legal determination of guilt or innocence on the part of Visa and MasterCard. Is Visa and MasterCard responsible for developing and perpetuating unethical business practices? American Express believes this is. ".. A classic case of two organizations -- Visa and MasterCard -- working together to restrict competition in the market". Both organizations have devised rules that lock banks into their networks and lock out competition with their bank payment card system (American Express Company, 2000, 2).
The defendants, on the other hand, believe competition is thriving under the current system. Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover and the Department of Justice are the obvious stakeholders. However, additional stakeholders exist who have much to lose. The average consumer using credit cards as a form of payment in everyday life, and the hundreds of thousands of merchants accepting credit cards, on a daily basis, also have a major interest in the outcome of the lawsuit in question. This is an issue wherein each stakeholder clearly maintains vastly different points of view. I will attempt to clarify the differing views each of the stakeholders has.
Visa and MasterCard share a common perspective for the most part so I will discuss their stakeholder position together. To them this is an issue of whether or not the consumer has been adversely affected by the existing industry structure. They argue that some 7,000 U.S. card issuers exist today, and that competition is thriving. Paul Allen, Executive Vice President and General Consul for Visa U.S.A., Inc. says, .".. thousands of Visa member banks issue Visa cards in competition with each other, with MasterCard issuers, and with the proprietary brands, American Express and Discover" (Allen, 2000, 2). They claim competition is fierce and point to the fact mailboxes are constantly stuffed with credit card applications around the country. David Evan from the National Economic Research Association states, "The Visa and MasterCard associations have played important roles in promoting and ensuring competition in the credit-card industry.
Almost every financial institution can join Visa and MasterCard and issue credit cards. Members compete with each other in every dimension that is important to consumer's" (Evans, 2000, 1). American Express and Discover have similar views and desires from a stakeholder perspective, but also differ slightly. They would both like to see the bylaws forbidding Visa / MasterCard association members from issuing Discover or Amex cards abolished. They have both championed the consumer in this argument, but undoubtedly have much more self-serving goals in mind. Their contention is that competition among not only issuers, but among the networks should be enhanced to promote competition.
This competitive enhancement, they contend, can only be accomplished by allowing the Issuing banks in question to partner with Visa / MasterCard and any other network they choose simultaneously. As a result, Amex and Discover argue that innovation and consumer interests will be served. Contrarily, Discover charges a significantly lower cost of card acceptance to the merchant accepting credit cards than the other networks. Therefore, their argument that they could bring a more competitive environment to the table is justified from the merchant's standpoint. American Express, on the other hand, charges a much higher rate to the merchant.
As a result, a significant increase in their market share would have a very derogatory effect on the merchants forced to accept the American Express card because of the increased consumer usage. This very important piece of information should definitely be considered when determining what is in the best interest of the consumer and retail merchant. The Department of Justice has decided Visa and MasterCard are illegally restricting competition. The complaint states that, "The exclusionary rules impair the ability of other networks to compete with Visa and MasterCard" (American Express Company, 2000, 1). The retail merchant is the stakeholder given the least consideration when discussing this issue. American Express clearly has the most to gain if the defendants lose this lawsuit, and the merchants have the most to lose.
As a result, the card Issuing banks (i.e. -Bank One, Citibank, Fifth Third, etc) that distribute Amex instead of Visa or MasterCard stands to significantly increase their merchant fee revenue. The ability to entice Visa and MasterCard member banks away with a higher fee structure will ultimately be a large disservice to the average merchant. Will the everyday consumer benefit if Visa and MasterCard lose this lawsuit? I don't believe they will be significantly affected. The selection of credit card programs from the existing Issuer's currently inundating the market with card offers, are already more than most consumers currently wish to ingest. Providing more issuers the ability to issue Amex and Discover will, in my opinion, do the person on the street no great additional service.
The MasterCard position is that, "the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, not individual competitors. Changing the current structure would do nothing to benefit consumers; it would only benefit a single competitor-American Express, which is already, by dollar volume, the largest issuer in the industry" (Hanft, 2000, 2). The part of the DOJ self-proclaimed mission statement that would apply to this case is, "They prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade... and predatory acts designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power" (United States Government Antitrust Division Overview, 2000, 1). What is the true measuring stick for determining antitrust violations? If it is truly the consideration of whether or not a companies business practices are inhibiting competition, the consumer's best interests, and the best interests of the economy as a whole, then I question the validity of the antitrust suit in question.
In disagreeing with the validity of the suit in question I therefore must cast doubt upon the existence of unethical behavior on the part of Visa and MasterCard. Regardless, on October 9, 2001 Federal Judge Barbara S. Jones ruled in favor of the Department of Justice. The DOJ, American Express, and Discover celebrated their victory, but Visa and MasterCard are already working on their appeal. Which will start the debate all over again. Stay tuned! REFERENCE LIST Allen, Paul (2000, 25 May).
Hearing on Competition and Innovation in the Credit Card Industry. [On-line]. Available: web 05 hug/052500 American Express Company (2000). The Case Against the Card Association [On-line]. Available: web David (2000, 25 May). Available: web 05 hug/052500 Hanft, Noah (2000, 25 May).
Available: web 05 hug/052500 United States Government Antitrust Division Overview (2000). [On-line]. Available: web.