Wars Between The British And Chinese example essay topic
There was restricted access to Chinese officials, and yet they were constantly "plagued by official interference". Britain was very much aggravated by China's attitude toward the West and the implications on the British economy. The Chinese believing themselves to have a self-sufficient economy, showed little interest in Western products. If any foreign trade did take place it was strictly restricted and controlled by the government and the Chinese saw it as 'favour '. It was not seen to be a part of official Chinese transaction hence there was no need for formal diplomatic relations, and so there was to be no direct communication between foreign merchants and Chinese government officials. "It was not a right... but a privilege that could be withdrawn by China for any misbehavior " The Chinese lacked interest in British goods.
A letter from Qianlong to King George in 1793 stating that "strange and costly objects do not interest (him) " because the Chinese Empire "possess all things " makes it quite clear that they did not want the commodity... whatever it was. In his following second mandate to George, Qianlong rejects bilateral trade as "wild ideas and hopes " and "unproductive of good results... impracticable " Despite the irritations of confinements; some trade did take place between the British and a limited and authorized number of Chinese merchant houses; the 'Hongs'. As in India, the East India's Company (EIC) enjoyed a monopoly of commerce in China and according to Grey,' this trade went 'relatively smoothly '. Much money went to the funds of the 'Hoppo' though, the controller of the Canton customs and 'assisted him in fulfilling his extra-legal responsibility to supply the best part of a million dollars annually to the Emperor's private purse '.
300 taels gratuity went to the Hoppo of which 1,500 taels was the measurement fee. The fact that the demand for Chinese tea had risen so greatly in the 19th century complicated matters. Pitt had reduced the British imports on Chinese tea (from an average of 110% to an average of 10%). He anticipated correctly it would reduce smuggling, whilst the cheaper price would promote more consumption, and the treasury would benefit from higher taxation revenue.
The tea import trebled... and had become a national drink. Moreover it became a very convenient commodity for taxing. The problem however was that too much silver was leaving Britain and going to China for its import. As trade grew, Britain found itself to have a large and rising trade deficit with China. Since China wanted little from Britain, both countries paid in silver instead of the barter system and although it was quite a nice earner for the Chinese, it was not particularly for the British. There was much effort to promote the sale of Indian products in China (such as Indian raw cotton and indigo), but their export had not proved to be as stable as they had hoped.
(According to Macartney, Europe "now required no less an annual sum than one million, four hundred thousand pounds "). Increasingly anxious to balance their trade, the British devised a third-party trade: British goods were traded for Indian opium, auctioned in Calcutta to private traders in order to avert trouble with China (being that the valuable tea trade might be at stake) and sold to China. In order to stem the outflow of silver from China, Chinese officials began aggressively enforcing its laws against opium use and distribution and these legal practices "denied (foreigners) equal execution of its laws". The actions of Chinese authorities against this lucrative trade infuriated British politicians despite the fact opium was illegal in Britain as well.
In 1753, the EIC formally requested the prohibition of anti-foreign placards, banners and an end to the system of "security merchants " so that there could be unrestricted access to otherwise 'aloof' officials. In the face of the Anglo-Chinese relations deteriorating for some time now, Britain tried to establish good diplomatic relations with China... In 1782, Macartney was sent to make contact with Beijing. His letter back to Whitehall highlights Britain's hopes for aiding its own traders and "claiming the Emperor of China's particular protection for them". As Britain was already very much involved in India, according to Macartney Britain's "principle Neighbours there " it would be very appropriate to "cultivate a friendship ", "increase communication " and "establish sufficient means of representation and transaction of business".
Marcatney's mission had cost the British lb 78,522 and had been a complete failure because the Emperor refused all six of Marcatney's requests, and in a separate mandate to George, Qianlong even goes so far as to threaten Britain; "It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country thereafter". Then there was the Macao incident whereby the British invaded Chinese territory fearing that the French would size it from the Portuguese. The Chinese were infuriated because the British had essentially invaded Chinese land and the British were annoyed because although they had succeeded in getting the Portuguese to pay a ransom they had experienced casualties in the subsequent skirmish with China. The Capture of an American steamer off Canton waters by a British warship offended China further. Once again it seemed that Britain was encroaching upon China's jurisdiction. The Amherst mission of 1816 not only put an end to efforts of peaceful negotiation from both sides... but a few misunderstandings such as the Kowtow issue went so far as to aggravate both parties even more.
Hsu insists that with a situation like this, the British had 3 possibilities available to them: " (1) abandon the China trade, (2) submit to the Chinese treatment (3) change the situation by military means. For Britain, the most powerful state on earth and the mistress of the seas, the first two courses were unthinkable, leaving the only alternative -force". It appears that with these two countries in stalemate, Britain had to take the initiative to make China finally respond... for up until now they had shown just how "un bothered (they were) to the importance of the concerns which were entrusted to their attention". These amounted to long-standing grievances between the countries, but in the meantime the decline of the Canton system also played a part in bringing about the War.
It is important to remember that from the Chinese point of view, trade was tolerable so long as it maintained in Canton, was them selling chief articles for silver and if it was solely conducted by the East India's Company (EIC) or on it's account. But now all these conditions were changing. Until the early 19th century the East India Company's policy was one of limited production with a high profit margin. As laissez-faire ideology and free traders' influence grew in Britain, so did opposition to the EIC monopoly. It was in 1810 that their monopoly seized to exist.
Traders not content with just the abolition of the EIC hoped that Canton too ought to be released from its trade restrictions, and so began to force more the issue of increased trade rights. However, according to Grey, the Government had little intention of forcing China to change her system of commerce rather it was intent upon resolving its current issues with her so as to make the existing system more "predictable and tolerable"- thus far they had found it "scarcely compatible with the regulations of civilised society... " The trend in private growers and traders outside EIC (now no longer subject to it) brought opium from Turkey and increased pressures -because Britain was forced into a price war, making opium a cheaper good and mass consumption became possible. In only 20 years (1780-1800), private trade rose from 688,880 taels to 992,444 taels. It was becoming harder to control and contain trade in Canton. Despite strict government regulations, foreign trade in China expanded during the late 18th century and early 19th century.
This primarily took the form of 'Country trade' and between 1829 and 1855, opium smuggling developed rapidly along China's South Coast. Since of course the Chinese state did not really want this product, (in 1800) Canton was no longer permitted to trade in Opium. Consequently, opium was smuggled to opium depots in between two provinces (where neither provincial official was keen to control) and be put on smaller private ships. The Chinese would then come and load the opium onboard special boats ('fast crabs') designed to row quickly up a river and disappear just in case Chinese patrols were in the area. From 1780-1800 country trade had risen from 1,020,012 to 3,743,158 and opium was being developed as a commodity that the Chinese did want. In only 15 years, the smuggled opium rose to 35,445 chests- a growth of 400% (overtaking the Portuguese who had imported modest amounts of opium to China, but for medicinal value and by the late 1830's more than 30,000 chests, each of which held about 150 pounds of the extract, were being brought in annually by the various foreign powers.
And that's how eventually despite this restriction; the Opium trade increased and shows why there was such a big jump. By the 1830's the balance of trade had turned against the Chinese. Some authorities assert that the trade in opium alone reversed China's formerly favourable balance of trade. In 1839, China had spent 100 million taels on Opium, whilst it only received 40 million taels in revenue. "The drain of silver greatly weakened the Chinese government.
One government official wrote, "If we continue to allow this trade to flourish, in a few dozen years, we will find ourselves not only with no soldiers to resist the enemy, but also with no money to equip the army". Interestingly, the British manufacturing industry lobbied towards the outlaw of opium -because the Chinese were spending so much on opium that they did not have money to spend on their goods. Pretty much everyone apart from missionaries and a couple of trading houses were involved and making a profit on the side -since it is recorded that the Emperor had his own representative in Canton we can conclude that even the Imperial offices were profiting as well despite forbidding its import in 1800. In the meantime, widespread addiction occurred and China faced added problems. Practically all men under 40 were Opium smokers, and it affected all class of people. It encouraged criminality because it was so illegal and there was quite an extensive smuggling network on both the Western and Chinese side.
It worried the Chinese government that officials were involved almost certainly as well; whether it was because they were corrupt because they were taking bribes or drugged. The army became corrupt and the tax farmers defrauded the people. The central bureaucracy declined in efficiency, and the generally weak emperors were unable to meet the challenges of the time. Population growth at the beginning of the 19th century meant people were becoming more mobile, looking for jobs, becoming less sedentary and the traditional Chinese fabric was breaking consequently making the external influence far more aggravating. By the mid 1830's the Emperor begins to worry about the whole situation and sent edicts to many of the empire's officials asking what should be done about Opium. Quite a strong voice came up for legal ising it.
It would eradicate smuggling and allow for taxation. This was the voice of liberals some of which wanted even to change and reform even the education system. But other more high ranking officials (the more conservative Chinese more concerned about the return to the pro-Confucius principles) were more organised and sent memorials for the out right ban of opium to totally eradicate it. It imposed extremely severe punishments, including death, for smoking and trading opium. The fact was that attempted solutions failed to satisfy either party. Perhaps this was because both strove for different outcomes.
Certainly whilst the Chinese wanted a solution to the crisis that they felt Opium was causing, Lord Napier's (failed) attempt in 1834 to establish 'equal relations's hows quite clearly that the British wanted even more lee-way to push their opium. It is interesting to conjecture what would have happened had those any of those solutions been heeded -particularly that of those few Chinese officials. The Chinese and British governments were characterized by very different value systems, institutions and ultimately concepts of interstate relations. There was a clash over such issues as extradition, diplomatic conventions, and the freedom or restriction of trade. The Opium War was seen as a way of establishing 'protocol' once and for all.
When a Chinese man met his death at the hands of drunken British sailors, one of the vital issues surrounding the causes of the Opium War surfaced. Extraterritoriality in foreign policy meant, among other things, that a Westerner accused of a crime in China could be tried by the court of his nation's consulate in China, and not in a Chinese court. The sailors involved were punished by Elliot, who refused, however, to hand them over to the Chinese who would have put them to death. After all, there was a belief that if you fell into the clutches of the Chinese law, then you for done for. From the Chinese point of view the culprits were repeatedly going unpunished, and when a gunner accidentally killed two Chinese men the Chinese authorities detained the chief, besieged the factory and halted trade until the gunner would be handed over and strangled.
The fact that on top of all this the Chinese had added that the sentence had been soft since only one life had only been taken for the two... further "irritated foreign sensibilities, producing greater anxiety and endless protest against the Canton authorities". In addition, the relationship between the traders and Chinese was steadfastly deteriorating and led to numerous boycotts of the trade. The Opium War was the physical manifestation of Britain's frustrations about China's restrictions on foreign trade -that is why the Treaty of Nanjing, which concluded the first Opium War in 1842, opened a series of additional ports to British trade and trade routes. The trouble that caused the Opium War was primarily over Britain's 'right' to trade irrespective of the article of trade or Chinese Governments approval. The moral controversy of the trade processes disputed in the opium war was increased dramatically by the identity of the product involved.
It could be that opium importation was only in response to demand / market forces (after all, there had been a significant breakdown in the social fabric in recent years due to internal pressure mentioned earlier on). And most probably Britain had no imperialistic designs on China or she would have been more interested in, and commendatory to Marcatney's mission that revealed how vulnerable and backward a country China was. Thus we can see that there were even broader problems leading to the War; a conflict of two cultures. After so many costly missions to China, Britain in particular must have felt snubbed by the Chinese who were resistant to change. This fuelled public opinion and left may including those who might have otherwise felt the Opium trade to be immoral that China 'deserved' to be 'taught a lesson'. Similarly it fired Chinese public opinion especially in incidences to do with British diplomats' rebuff of Kowtowing.
It literally made being in the company of the Emperor -impossible, and since it was only by the Emperor's decree that a change could be made -further diplomatic relations did not go very far, especially since there was much corruption within the Chinese government. Perhaps, indeed one book is correct in saying that the War "began in terms of Chinese stagnation and Western dynamism " for this seems to be fundamental to why war could not have been avoided. In his treatment of the Opium war, Pelissier suggests that the Opium was the inevitable path of such hostilities between Britain and China and that the article of trade -'Opium' "overshadowed " these matters. Hsu goes further to explain that without Opium "a conflict between China and the West would still have erupted because of their differing concepts of international relations, trade, and jurisprudence... (and their) contempt (for each other) could not coexist".
This notion could be supported if we consider that opium was unmentioned in subsequent post-opium war treaties. But then Hsu argument does not mutually exclude any of the Western powers; and does not specifically explain why war broke out between the British and Chinese. Moreover it seems unlikely to me that the Opium War was simply caused by a clash of two cultures, "the conflict between a self-sufficient agrarianism and industrialist expansion " or about Britain's desire to expand trade because this would imply that it might have been fought over any substance. Nonetheless, there were many other factors that occurred in the run up to the War which doubtless had a part to play in bringing about the conflict. Some pay particular attention to the appointment of a new commissioner at Canton, 'Lin'. Often it is the man on the spot that has much to do with the way events unfold.
Lin had battled the problem of drug use in other provinces and saw Canton as a way of finally eliminating the source, for it was his actions that instigated Britain's armed aggression on China; in 1839 he called for all stocks to be handed over and burned and to show he was serious, one of the foreigners were publicly arrested and strangled. Further, events led to more agitation with all foreigners. Told to leave, they were left on the mainland with a population that had become even more hostile to them, and getting food and water became very hard. The Americans handed it over straight away, but British merchants were less happy to do so and so had theirs confiscated. This may have provided Britain with the excuse they needed for a 'showdown' to settle previous and on going grievances because whether or not it was a factor on its own (or not) they would later claim that the Chinese had confiscated British property (even though it was supposedly 'private traders's tock that was confiscated) and gave them justification to use warfare on the Chinese in demand for indemnities.
At the same time things might have turned out differently because the British chief superintendent of trade in Canton, Captain Charles Elliot, was putting pressure on the Chinese government to legalize the opium trade, but since decisions in China have to be taken by British officials because news takes 4 to 6 months from London- Elliot suffers very much from that. In fact the same thing happened to Lin who after the confiscation and destruction of the Opium wrote to Queen Victoria in 1839, making the assumption that the British government was not involved in the opium trade, and pointed out that it would be in the best interests of both nations to halt the trade. "There is a class of evil foreigner that makes opium and brings it for sale... it is not of course, either made or sold at your bidding... I am told that in your own country smoking is forbidden.
This means that you are aware of how harmful it is. Any foreign ships that arrive with opium, will be set fire to along with any other goods on board... intending to harm others, you will be the first to be harmed". The letter never reached England. With hindsight had these deeds been realised the War could have been prevented (that is of course if one takes the view that Britain was not already 'willing' for a war.) In the end it was marginal consent in Parliament that made the military expedition to China possible and it was really a series of skirmishes as the British occupied positions around Canton.
The outcomes however, were immense. Principally, it has been argued; "determined relations between China and Britain". The Chinese suffered and it seems amongst other things a contingence of Indian soldiers in the British army engaged in activities which were bound to cause havoc with local peoples; such as reportedly raping women. This was known as the scanter league incident which was very important to the Chinese was a big incident because it struck local inhabitants. Inevitably the War ended with China's backward army being overwhelmed and defeated. The size of China, and the size of their armed forces, prevented them from going further north.
Plus, their experiences of India had shown them how difficult it would have been to deal with occupying such a land. Although some did go further north, had China not been defeated when it had and give to the demands of the British, then they might have gone further. Commissioner Lin was sent to exile in the Northwest and the first of the unequal treaties, the Treaty of Nanking was signed. It is referred to as an unequal treaty because it was basically signed at gunpoint, breached upon China's sovereignty and essentially did not treat them as equals. China was forced to reimburse Britain for seized opium and pay for the British military expense to China. This was $6 million and although the Chinese were aware that this sum was not good for them, it was tolerable.
Hong Kong was signed over to the British (basically giving them a foothold and further ground to meddle with China's affairs), new ports were opened in Shanghai, Ningpo, Amoy and Foo chow, extraterritoriality was guaranteed, and Britain was granted a "most-favoured-nation" status. Foreigners were entrusted to collect taxes for Shanghai and thus "an important part of the Chinese machinery of state thereby also came under foreign control". Because of the extent of trade and the large number of westerners ("over a thousand ") around these ports -societies in these areas also became very western and Shanghai in particular economically flourished. Undoubtedly, the main outcome of the Anglo-Chinese war was that it opened China to the West. French and Americans quickly followed suit and demanded the same terms of the Treaty. The Chinese agreed because they could not afford further conflict at this time, but also the reality of the matter was that they would not be able to distinguish the French and Americans if they pretended to be British.
China's potential to trade was limited anyway but in this way they could cut the British profit with the competition from the French and Americans. An added value was that the French and Americans would owe their new found privileges to the Chinese rather than the British allowing them to pass of as them... in the future they could hope that their gratefulness might protect them against further encroachment. There was no doubt in the Chinese mind that the great effort for profit would eventually push these three countries into conflict and then the Chinese would be able to profit over the 'barbarians'. The most-favoured-nation clause was particularly damaging to China's interest, because it would (in later years) spiral out of control as further unequal treaties would be signed paving the way for facilitating the scramble for Africa.
Indeed, only a year later, a supplementary treaty was drawn up, the 'Treaty of the Bogue' whereby a tariff was imposed but much lower than China had wanted. The Chinese granted extraterritoriality because they thought that the westerners were so very different that they ought to be governing themselves; this would also reduce the burden of ensuring their governance. Extraterritoriality of course led to more problems and tensions as foreigners would obviously commit a crime and be set free. These were obvious infringements on Chinese suzerainty but from the Chinese point of view it was a temporary concession because one of the clauses was that in a few years the treaty cold be renegotiated. They slowly planned to get the foreigners out. But of course they did not have that until the mid 20th century.
China had many vassal nations; it claimed to be a "universal overlord " and since it had essentially become (as Hsu puts it) "humiliated " and "reduced to semi colonial status " -its position and the security of its tributary states had been greatly weakened. Foreigners would later feel able to trespass in those lands as well. Certainly China's internal pressures were ever increasing and this was almost certainly made worse by the War and their defeat to the British. First and foremost, China lost the drug war even thought there was no formal mention of opium in the treaties. Hence- continued the socio-economic descent of the Chinese in that manner.
But also due to the new treaty ports; the influx of inland traffic from Canton to the lower Yang zi lessened a great deal and hit employment in those areas; such as boatmen... Whilst, those in the treaty ports were made wealthier. It is unclear why the Chinese granted such allowances to the British and the West; had it been because they had no choice for the time being and they were sure that they were only giving temporary concessions? Or were they na " ive and badly informed about the Pandora's Box they had opened. What is certain is the gulf between East and West was so far apart, that they were totally ignorant of the concepts of International Law which they could have used against the British.
Certain members of the Chinese ruling class did become more aware of this. 'Here were the new barbarians, really very powerful -with their own laws, and this was the platform on which they ought to fight against them'. They start a movement of strength in China and started to use Western concepts and international law against the West. But it was not until really much later that the youth became more educated about this.
In a more positive light, the War awakened the Chinese and presented an opportunity (or pushed) them into a new era of history. Ultimately neither side was happy. The Chinese wanted it scrapped and the British wanted more. The conflict resulted in two more wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) between the British and Chinese and much hardship for the Chinese people in subsequent events. The Opium Wars would end up having lasting effects on China that are evident even in the present day.
Bibliography
o Cheng, Lest with Spence, The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection (New York & London, 1999) o Chesneaux, Bast id & Berger e;
China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution (translated from the French by Anne Destenay (Sussex, 1977) o Grey, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800's to the 1980's (Oxford, 1990) o Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 2nd edition (Oxford & New York, 1975) o Hsu;
The Rise of Modern China, 3rd Edition (Oxford and New York, 1977) o Wales;
The Opium War through Chinese eyes (London, 1958) o Pelissier;
The Awakening of China (edited and translated by Kieffer in London & Southampton, 1967).