Wilde's Iteration Of Neo Security Complex Theory example essay topic

An Analysis of Grand Strategy through the Lens of Neo-Security Complex Theory Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde attempt to structure a fundamentally new approach to the study of security issues by attempting to incorporate traditional notions of security analysis into a broader understanding of international security that incorporates non-military threats. Their neo-security complex theory does provide substantive insight into how the process of issues occurs and how one can address non-military existential threats within a security studies framework; however, there are some substantive problems that require greater theoretical precision in order to prevent making the process they describe nothing more than a residual category. Ultimately, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde need to incorporate both temporal elements as well as and probability into their approach in order to dis aggregate existential threats. Without such modifications, the existential threat posed by an incoming nuclear or chemical warhead is equivalent to increased levels of radon in the home. In order to show the virtues, flaws, and possible improvements that would allow neo-security complex theory to become a more powerful analytic tool in security studies it is first necessary to briefly explicate the core elements of the approach and show how it diverges from the traditional understanding of security studies. Then one must show how its application would provide substantive insight into particular security practices found in the literature, such as grand strategy.

After doing so, we must address substantive problems generated from the application of the theory and then show how various improvements would strengthen the neo-security project. The neo-security complex theory revolves around an attempt to expand the possibilities of what constitutes a security threat by conceptualizing it as meaning solely a threat to one's physical existence. While recognizing that there are many threats and vulnerabilities that arise both within and outside military issues, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that including all such events would ultimately prove the traditionalists' critique that expanding security beyond military issues inevitably leads to a lack of coherence. The way out of this conceptual morass is to distinguish between political issues and construct security as pertaining to "existential threats to a referent object by a actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind". Like neo realism, neo-security complex theory relies upon levels of analysis as a means to situate actors, issues that pose existential threats, and the interactions between them that constitute security. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde attempt to occupy a middle ground between the implied state-centrism inherent in utilization of levels of analysis by arguing that such hermeneutic devices do not constitute metaphysical truths, but instead constitute pragmatic and convenient tools for the analyst.

However, they also make it clear that they do not subscribe to the notion that it is necessary to jettison these assumptions simply because they reinforce the primacy of state-centered ness and dichotomous relationships between the inside and outside. Instead, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde embrace the notion of units with inside-outside relationships with the caveat that "one should be aware of the tendency for the levels of analysis scheme to reinforce state-centric thinking". The next element of the neo-security complex theory incorporates the notion of sectors that fundamental dis aggregate the totality of security practices into specific areas that allow for a closer analysis of particular patterns. In essence, this is another nod to pragmatic considerations that facilitate an easier grasp of the inherent complexities. Accordingly, the use of sectors "starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity".

The disaggregated sectors utilized by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde to accomplish this task consist of the military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sectors. Regions also play a substantive role in neo-security complex theory since bipolarity is no longer a hallmark of the international system. Instead, power spreads among many different actors. As such, regions become subsystems within the level of analysis framework and manifest themselves in various iterations such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and various other associations. In addition to incorporating levels of analysis, sectors, and regions within the hermeneutic framework there are also elements of both homogeneous and heterogeneous complexes. The former focuses on relationships among similar units within specific sectors, while the latter expands beyond similarly situated units.

The assumption within heterogeneous complexes is that more than one type of actor can interact in more than one sector and at different levels. The determination on which to deploy is contingent upon the judgment of the analyst when considering the case at hand. The key element in expanding beyond the traditionalist notion of security without encompassing anything and everything under its conceptual umbrella is to discern what constitutes the notion of an external threat within particular contexts. By doing so, the analyst may be able to discern the difference between a security practice and the mere politicization of particular issues. Since there is no singular, substantive definition that proves immutable in every circumstance, analysts must discern the definitions of threats by the usage and practices surrounding actors within particular sectors and levels. Borrowing from philosophers of language such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, neo-security complex analysts argue that language does not comport to utterances of fixed representations of objects, but instead derives meaning from actions derived from particular usages: speech acts.

These speech acts originate from actors who attempt to use language to a threat to a referent object and attempt to change patterns of behavior, rules, and norms, to reflect their linguistic construction. For example, within the military sector, the referent would be the state, in the political sector, it would be sovereignty, in the economic sector it would be the material well-being of the population, or the institutions on a domestic and international level responsible for ensuring prosperity, in the societal sector it would be identities. The key to successfully expanding security beyond the military-state-centered sectors is in focusing on how actors successfully these speech acts to the point where they become realities that fundamentally reshape the behavior of a range of actors. Success occurs when functional actors, individuals who affect a sector without being either the referent object or the actor attempting the speech act, actively accept the move by acting in accordance with this redefinition. It is important to note that Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde do not believe that that the actors who engage in various speech acts are not fixed entities. While it is clear that the field tilts towards elites, it is by no means indicative of permanence.

As they state, "no one consciously "holds" the power of. Therefore, it is our view that one can not make the actors of the fixed point of analysis-the practice of is the center of analysis". In order to see if the neo-security-complex theory provides significant explanatory power, it is necessary to apply it to elements of the security literature in an effort to see how such a hermeneutic device will address particular issues within the discipline. Analysts of grand strategy, Richard K. Betts, Edward Luttwak, Barry R. Posen, and Andrew L. Ross, provide compelling case studies for its application. Richard K. Betts' explication of the limitations of grand strategy provide an opportunity to show how neo-security-complex theory has both an explanatory element as well as a proscriptive element that provides guidance for those policymakers and analysts to not merely observe the phenomena of, but actually become active participants in its formulation and implementation. Betts's kepticism concerning the possibility of constructing grand strategy manifests itself in many areas that neo-security-complex theory can address.

The criticisms consist of the assumption that there are no criteria for judging whether a particular strategy is good or bad, that there is an infinite gap between idea and practice, and that bias inevitably clouds the formation of strategy. Neo-security-complex theory offers a means to ameliorate the difficulties presented by Betts since it assumes that there is an inherent subjectiveness that permeates the of threats and that there is no truly objective position. If one accepts the inevitability of these limitations, then it is possible to argue that the measure of a good or bad strategy rests in its success and not its comportment with an immutable metaphysical conception of the good. Therefore, bias is unavoidable since it is part of the human condition. For neo-security-complex analysts, the ability of actors to referents and have functional actors act upon such speech acts constitutes a success and one can extrapolate beyond this to assume that it also constitutes successful grand strategy. The same observation holds true for the gap between idea and practice.

One can use neo-security-complex theory to discern if a particular act of successfully implanted itself in the psyche in accordance with the speech act to the extent that it motivated functional actors to act accordingly. If so, then the gap between the idea and the practice is an order of magnitude narrower than if the speech act did not motivate functional actors. In essence, neo-security-complex theory presents the notion that a key element in grand strategy is particular threats in relation to particular referents. As such, a policymaker can attempt to particular issues as part of the construction of a larger goal. A key example is Iraq. One can argue that the Bush Administration successfully a threat to a referent, the United States, and was able to change the behavior of functional actors, the Congress and American Electorate, to support military action as part of a larger grand strategy to democratize the Middle East as a means to ensure the ultimate goal of protecting the state.

Hence, neo-security-complex theory is not merely an exercise in understanding patterns of complex, but is also an exposition on how to change the dynamics of practices as well. In a more descriptive vein, neo-security-complex theory allows analysts to trace the formation and changes in as a means to make history intelligible and to observe trends. The former example manifests itself in Edward Luttwak's exposition of Roman grand strategy. The Romans used a full panoply of different sectors in order to ensure security and not simply military power. Indeed, Luttwak highlights the fact the military power was not nearly as important or useful as reputation al power, a product of the political and societal sectors of neo-security-complex theory.

This constituted what Luttwak terms "a different Roman world-view and self-image". A case in point where the neo-security-complex theory sheds light on the practices of the Romans is in Luttwak's exposition of grand strategy during the reign of the emperor Diocletian. The practices utilized by the emperor consisted of the political, societal, economic, and military sectors. Diocletian the political sector by instituting a succession scheme called the tetrarch y as a means to prevent the eternal military sector threat connected with civil war and chaos within the political and societal sectors. In addition, the imposition of a tax structure that supported the professionalization of a corrupt military structure the economic sector as well as the political and military sectors.

This complexity exemplifies Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's observation that acts often transcend sectors and affect other levels as well. Barry R. Posen's attempt to explain variance in military strategies along several different dimensions also highlights the explanatory power of neo-security-complex theory in light of variables such as technology and geography. His focus on the utilization of balance-of-power theory and organizational theory to explain doctrinal variance overlooks the importance of. In essence, balance of power is the residue of an a priori process whereby political, societal, and military sectors have successfully imbibed a particular speech act that provided the impetus to engage in a balancing practice. Outcomes in the offense-defense-deterrence relationship also represent the product of particularly successful, with issues such as technology also bleeding over into several sectors and levels. Identifying how and when such strategic shifts occur infers a shift in the relationship between speech acts, referents, and functional actors.

The prevalent grand strategies that inhabit the discourse of policy analysts in the United States and elsewhere also benefit from a deeper understanding of the process of neo-security-complex theory. Posen and Andrew L. Ross examine these approaches as a means to situate the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration. Each of the strategies presented also manifest particular iterations of acts. Despite the state-centric military sector inference within each one, an underlying complexity manifests different patterns and relationships between actors, referents, and functional actors. Fore example, the neo-isolationist approach securities by eschewing offensive action in the military sector by the societal and political sectors. However, this does not mean that such an iteration is immutable.

It is possible that a new that focuses on environmental threats leads to a shading of the boundaries between the societal, political, and environmental sectors. One of the virtues of neo-security-complexity theory is its ability to encompass a greater level of complexity than the neo-isolationist, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy typology can encompass. It is the lack of conceptual flexibility that causes the angst expressed by Posen and Ross in the Clinton Administration's "uneasy amalgam of selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy". Utilizing the tools provided by neo-security-complex theory would allow analysts to discern the continuities and patterns underlying the apparent policy incoherence.

While neo-security-complex theory offers substantive advantages both in the construction and deconstruction of grand strategies, there are substantive areas of difficulty that require more significant conceptualization in order to make the theory immune to some of the incoherence that occurs when some of its assumptions are pushed to their logical limit. Its most glaring omission is a consistent way to differentiate among differing practices. In essence, it tends to be purely descriptive in the sense that it states that is occurring and that it constitutes a particular type of process. Without some means to show variance, neo-security-complex theory exhibits the tendency to become a residual category that can encompass everything.

In addition, the authors admit that here is much bleeding and interaction between categories. Hence, it appears that one can justify any type of inclusion in any sector with enough probing. A way to ameliorate some of these shortcomings is to create two more axes in addition to the sectors and levels explicated by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. These would include both a temporal element and probability. In this instance, the time axis would provide variance for various by categorizing them along a continuum from immediate to future.

Hence, the aforementioned dilemma posed by a terrorist cell with a nuclear weapon would be the object of a more pressing exercise than the rise in the mean temperature due to global warming over a twenty-year period. This is not to demean the existential threat posed by the latter, only to suggest that one would not treat such issues in the same way. In addition, the probability axis would allow differentiation between practices. As a result one would engage in a radically different in relation to the probability that North Korea will attempt to march on Seoul than the probability that The army of New Zealand will sack and pillage Washington D.C. Another difficulty with Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's iteration of neo-security-complex theory is its focus upon the construction of security. There is a distinct tendency to infer that the perception of actors necessarily represents external reality.

The Iraq example shows that the perception that a country may possess and utilize weapons of mass destruction does not mean that it does or that it will. The aforementioned modifications of the theory would also help to alleviate the tendency to downplay material and structural contingency in.

Bibliography

Betts, Richard K. "Is Strategy an Illusion? ". International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 5-50 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde.
Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Renner Publishers, 1998.
Luttwak, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Posen, Barr R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy". International Security 21, no. 3 (1997): 5-53.