Wolsey's Foreign Policy example essay topic

'Wolsey's foreign policy reveals that he had no other aims than to exalt his master's power and his own glory' How far do you agree with this verdict? Wolsey's political principles have been subject to much criticism since his death and to this day historians continue to disagree regarding its validity. The title denies that Wolsey had any 'guiding political principles', however traditional accounts of his foreign policy have attempted to attribute to Wolsey a coherent policy and motivation. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century the emphasis was on Wolsey as 'impresario of a European, balance of power'. A. Pollard considered that the motive of Wolsey's foreign policy was primarily concern for the papacy; he considered that ' as long as Wolsey pulled levers of English diplomacy Henry V remained the favourite son of the Roman church'. Others argued that Wolsey was first and foremost a crusader of peace, supported by his part in the treaty of London in 1518 and the Field of the Cloth of Gold meeting in 1520. This theory however must account for Wolsey's tendency to abandon his aims of peace in order to appease Henry V's desire to prove himself through successes on the battlefield.

Henry V's attempts to emulate his warrior hero, Henry V, must surely have caused problems, if indeed peace was Wolsey's ultimate gain. Scarisbrick explains the discrepancy and argues that Wolsey's foreign policy 'was a peace policy, and for about fifteen years he struggled to make it work'. Peter Gwyn however considered that peace was not Wolsey's ultimate aim, neither was the papacy, but that his loyalty to the king drove his foreign policies, 'Wolsey believed passionately that it was his duty to work for the greater glory of Henry V '. The issue of whether Wolsey did indeed have any political principles or aspirations of peace is a complicated one to prove, one thing is certain though, if his policies were aimed to 'exalt his master's power and his own glory' in the end it wasn't enough to keep him in Henry's favour against the hypnotizing charms of Anne Boleyn. The dynamic of Henry and Wolsey became so powerful that Wolsey was attributed the title of 'alter rex' (second king), as a result Wolsey now had additional motives 'for bringing honour to his master's ince in doing so he brought honour to himself. Certainly one must not forget that ultimately Henry held the power of life or death over Wolsey and this gross difference is evident in Wolsey's fall from power in 1529.

Wolsey's level of responsibility was however unusual, since not only was he the lord chancellor, papal legate, cardinal and the archbishop of York but he also took care of all the administration for the crown, which Henry unlike his father took little part in. The disagreement concerning which policies if any were actually manoeuvred in self-interest by Wolsey continues however his pluralism is considered to be an indication of his love and greed for power. Henry was less interested in domestic affairs and Wolsey's power in that area was therefore immensely strong, however in reference to foreign affairs, Henry did take an active interest and it is unlikely that in these policies, Wolsey would enjoy the same amount of freedom. Wolsey's actual influence over Henry was however obvious and although he remained a loyal servant, many have argued that Wolsey alone dominated British foreign politics from 1513-1529.

Scarisbrick's stance that Wolsey had struggled to make a policy of peace work is supported by the fact that Wolsey had risen to power as Henry V's master of military and 'naval procurement' for his French campaigns in 1512 and 1513. However John Guy argues that between 1514 and 1529, when Wolsey was supposedly ascendant, 'England was not merely several times on the brink of war, but was actually at war twice: with France and Scotland in 1522 and 1523, and the Netherlands in 1528'. Scarisbrick accounts for these inconsistencies quite simply; the peace policy collapsed, due to Henry's chivalric dreams, he 'intervened at critical moments to catastrophic effect'. Later 'revisionists' took this idea and came to the conclusion that the England's success between 1514 were largely due to Wolsey, and its failures to Henry V. However it is unlikely that Wolsey's quest for peace drove Wolsey's diplomacy in 1523 when, unlike a more sceptical Henry V, he not merely 'endorsed plans for invasion and partition of France, but he did so with genuine enthusiasm'.

Wolsey's later triumph is surely inconsistent with his supposed Christian humanist pacifism. Finally his vigorous demands for the 'amicable grant' could only have been because he agreed with Henry that the partition of France was finally within England's grasp following Charles V's victory at Pavia. From these discrepancies historians such as John Guy have concluded that Wolsey's foreign policy was 'pragmatic and opportunist: designed to win power and glory for henry V whether in war or peace'. In Renaissance diplomacy, reputation and the security of the land were arguably most important. Essentially Wolsey's task regarding his foreign policies was to fulfil through whatever means, Henry V's desire to make England great again and be a real rival to Charles V and Francis I. Wolsey was not unaware that involvement in the Habsburg-Valois wars would provide little benefit in military terms, but what he was aware of was that achievement in warfare was fundamental to Henry V, however he was also acutely aware of the expense of war. Some historians have argued that Wolsey wanted to create a balance of power in Europe, if this was the case then England would surely have always joined the weaker side, however in 1522, England joined the stronger, Charles V in his war with France, thus creating an imbalance of power.

In 1523, the war against France resulted in the treaty of More in August 1525 in which England allied with France and dropped their imperial alliance with Charles, this was arguably one of Wolsey's most crucial mistakes. The switching of sides was a result of Wolsey and Henry's fear that Charles was in a too dominant position in Europe after the victory in Pavia. It is difficult to extract a long running policy through these matters and led many to conclude that there was no definite policy. It is clear that Francis and Charles would have easily negotiated the league of Cambrai of 1529 without Henry, had Wolsey not made considerable effort to ensure Henry's inclusion at the last moment. This face-saving exercise would not work for long and hardly made up for Wolsey's unpopularity in England after the debacle of the 'amicable grant' and the mistakes made in 1525. Wolsey's foreign policy was a 'remarkable roller coaster', and his policies became increasingly 'pragmatic and opportunist'.

Henry's main ambitions were French conquests, and although Tournai and Therouanne were captured in 1513, lack of money and manpower prevents military expansion in Europe. Wolsey's only alternative was to present Henry as an ally whose support could have an effect on the 'balance of power'. As a general rule, Wolsey preferred peace over war, I consider this is primarily due to the cost and practicality of war. However when opportunities of partition or for invasion of France presented themselves he was not adverse to taking advantage as in 1523 when Bourbon rebelled against Francis I and in 1525 following the imperial victory at Pavia. After the disaster of the 'amicable-grant' and the re-establishment of the Anglo-French entente, Wolsey sought a second peace treaty. However the French alliance caused England to be at war with Charles V in 1528 and by 1529, Wolsey's diplomacy had collapsed.

However Wolsey was successful in other means, namely reputation for Henry, since he did continually put Henry at the centre of the 'European stage' and ensured that England's prestige as a super power rose. The people of England however were unlikely to be impressed with this side of Wolsey's diplomacy, since to them it was mainly about vanity, but in this matter Wolsey was Henry's servant. The King's expectations on Wolsey's foreign policy were 'unrealistic, even absurd. His task was to do the impossible. That he did so for over a decade is a tribute to his Tran formative genius. I do agree with the verdict that 'Wolsey's foreign policy reveals that he had no other aims than to exalt his master's power and his own glory'.

The reason that there is such difficulty for Historians to discover Wolsey's guiding political principles is because he had none. His policies although her did undoubtedly prefer peace were manoeuvred according to the whims of Henry V, and 'by this means bring honour to is master- and of course, to himself'. Tudor England- John Guy The King's Cardinal- Peter Gwyn Henry V - J. Scarisbrick Cardinal Wolsey- John Guy.