Europe 1989 Revolution Or Reform example essay topic

EUROPE 1989 - REVOLUTION OR REFORM? The transition from communist rule to multi-party democracy in Eastern Europe and the USSR is one which has confounded contemporary political scientists, evading traditional parameters of both reform and revolution. By studying the events of 1989 in a sequential and comparative manner, we find that the process followed a third strategy - one of 'negotiated' or 'co-ordinated' transition, in which existing regimes, accepting the inevitability of change, engaged previously illegitimate oppositional movements in an attempt to preserve political continuity. This process produced radically different power arrangements which were indeed revolutionary in character, but falls short of constituting a 'revolution' in its own right.

In the countries of what used to be the 'Soviet world system', dramatic and fundamental changes took place in 1989, sweeping aside the existing socialist regimes, introducing multi-party elections, and reopening the region after nearly 50 years of authoritarian or totalitarian rule. Observers have labelled these events as the 'glorious' or 'velvet' revolutions, but if in fact we are to use this term, we must then look not only at the outcomes, but also to the modalities of the processes involved. Skocpol provides a comprehensive analytical model from which we can distinguish social revolutions from other categories of transition or rebellion, with a broad definition of "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures... accompanied and in part carried through by class revolts from below". She elaborates to include "intense socio-political conflicts" which culminate in "mutually reinforcing changes in social political structures" as prerequisite features of an 'authentic' revolution. Looking to the events of 1989, only traces of such dynamics are present. No previously marginalised group acted to 'break' the legitimacy of the existing regime and assume sovereignty in its own right, and there was no widespread bloodshed or power vacuum to be contested.

In fact, legal order was not for a moment suspended or disregarded. In this sense, the changes appear more as reform, or transition - effected not from below as a manifestation of mass, class based action, but from above, in the form of concessions made by the ruling elites. The changes were instituted by the very authorities which were undergoing transformation, and this continuity in process is what effectively deters us from labelling 1989 as an era of revolution, in that no breach of the existing political or legal order was required for change to take place. Many commentators have likened 1989 to the 1848, the year of widespread revolution in Europe. In both instances, mass discontent with rigid, authoritarian rule, and a desire for general liberalisation are what precipitated the crises. However, in 1989, there was no repeat of the bloodshed of 1848.

Janos Kis has advanced two primary reasons for this difference. Firstly, the condition of modernity by the end of the twentieth century had created a much larger population given to consumer durables and asset accumulation, and that such peoples have an increased stake in preserving law and order. Secondly, the rising interdependence of societies as a result of a growing international division of labour has led to the increased awareness of the need to stabilise societies in crisis. It then follows that local elites themselves are more conscious of their dependence on outside actors for success, and that they are more readily accessible to advocacy of compromise solutions by other groups. Yet, it is difficult to deny that revolutionary change did occur in this period. Timothy Garton Ash has coined the neologism of 'refolution', in order to accommodate this paradox, as democratisation indeed displayed properties of both revolution and reform.

To extricate ourselves from semantic debate, however, it is best to compare the processes which occurred across different setting during this period, drawing conclusions from similarities and differences in both process and outcome. We should first look to the conditions prevalent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that precipitated the various crises of the existing regimes. Gale Stokes has analysed changes within the Soviet system of centrally planned economies, identifying specific events and trends that led to its eventual collapse. First, the ideology of Marxist-Leninist state socialism was dealt a blow to its legitimacy after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in which Warsaw pact troops moved to suppress a liberalizing administration. This revealed the inability of the system either to reform itself, or present itself as legitimate in the eyes of the population. Next, to improve productivity and economic growth, planners had to engage in a strategy of importing new technology from and exporting goods onto the world market.

This ran counter to the fixed pricing mechanisms of the Soviet economic system, and this contradiction ultimately threatened the integrity and ability of the regimes to maintain rule. As reform became inevitable, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to initiate a programme of social and political liberalism within the USSR. Glasnost was essential to the success of the reform programme, which until this point had been confined to economic restructuring. Realising that the entrenched bureaucracy was an obstacle to reform, tentative steps were made toward competitive elections, and the creation of a 'real' legislature to challenge the hegemony of the politburo, whilst retaining both the leadership role of the party - creating "pluralism within a socialist framework". One of the most remarkable decisions made at this time was to discard the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention on behalf of client regimes in the European satellite states.

This removed the single largest constraint on reform in these countries. Inhabitants of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere had long since abandoned hope of anything other than a 'reformed socialism'. The overhanging presence of the USSR and invariable threat of military involvement had now been removed, and possibilities for fundamental change were at least tangible. This does not mean that people had previously given up on reforming their own governments in Europe.

Despite decades of police state surveillance and repression, workers and academics alike had cultivated numerous movements for change. I will focus in this essay on two specific cases - those of Poland and Hungary. I do this, as I believe that the events in these states encapsulate the reasons for, and the processes by which a transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the USSR was affected. Poland can be seen as somewhat of a trendsetter for democratisation in the region. A long tradition of resistance to state socialism had always been present due to the strong influence of the Catholic Church, and the survival of independent peasant smallholdings. In the early 1980's, a mass opposition movement emerged under the name of Solidarity.

Formed in the shipyards of the Poland's Baltic coastline, the organization served three specific functions; that of independent trade union, alternative political formation, and national-liberation front. As an umbrella organization, it created an effective united opposition to the Communist party, staking out a moral-ethical position of 'anti-politics', developing against the existing institutional order. Gorbachev's doctrine of non intervention, or a shift from power monopoly to power hegemony for the party, laid the foundations for Polish opposition to engage in a strategy not of revolution or reform, but of 'co-ordinated transition', with each group recognising the legitimacy of the other, and working to produce a mutually acceptable political compromise. This innovation became the blueprint for democratic transition in other countries of Eastern Europe.

The key concept here is that the entire process kept within the existing framework of constitutionality and legality, excluding violence in favour of consensus. This model has also been defined as a 'constitutional revolution'. There is not space in this essay to permit a detailed account of the events that led to this form of transition. However, it can be summarised that once external constraints had been removed, as well as internal obstacles in the form of a progressive party leadership, overwhelming social unrest in the form of strikes led the existing regime to pursue negotiations with Solidarity as a means of maintaining their own position of political control. Negotiated transition in this instance was conducted between the party, Solidarity, and major social organizations, usually allied with the ruling party itself. A pact signed between these groups on April 6th created a new bicameral legislature, to be elected by free, contestable elections.

Although opposition parties could only stand for 35% of seats in the Sejm (lower house), the first elections handed Solidarity 100% of all available seats, and all but one seat in the Senate, or upper house. Mass defection from the ruling party after the elections gave Solidarity an eventual majority, and in September, the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe was formed. What is crucial here, however, is that many former party members remained in key posts, and that this was a 'contractual government', not yet 100% freely elected - it took a further two years before the transitory institutions were removed and Poland became a fully functioning democracy. The case of Hungary provides another good conceptual framework of co-ordinated transition. Within this state, we find what was probable the most liberal version of state socialism which existed in the region.

Market mechanisms, and a lack of travel restriction had helped to create a society with a visible middle class, consumer oriented society, described as the "world's leading example of mature post-totalitarianism". Throughout the 1980's, further socio-economic liberalisation, and embryonic democratisation placed it far ahead in terms of reform, with experiments in multi-party 'political proto-pluralism' as early as 1985. The presence of reformers within the leadership such as Imre Pozsgay and Karol y Grosz facilitated the move toward political liberalisation. With the removal of hard-liner Kadar from the position of general secretary, and the 'green light' from Gorbachev to initiate further reform, legislation was passed which permitted the establishment of political parties.

In February 1989, the central committee of the ruling party issued a statement accepting the idea of a multi-party electoral system. Following events in Poland, where the government had conceded to formal negotiations with Solidarity, the Hungarian opposition realised that a united coalition as per the Solidarity model was the only chance for effective negotiation. Borrowing the institutional structure of the 'Oppositional Roundtable' developed in Poland, the ruling party entered into negotiations with oppositional groups in June, finally signing a pact in September. These negotiations created new electoral laws, and set dates for the first free elections, and in doing so constructed a new, fully amended constitution in the process. The Hungarian transition was thus gradual and peaceful, owing much to its already existing, albeit fledgling, pluralistic political model.

Indeed, events here (as well as in Poland) were almost completely overshadowed by similar transformations taking place in Moscow. Gorbachev had ordered partly free elections for the first time in the history of the USSR, for the Congress of Peoples Deputies. This can be read as the catalyst for the eventual disintegration of the USSR, beginning with demands for autonomy from the Baltic Republics, but what is interesting is that the European states, so long under direct political control from Moscow, had preceded the USSR and gone ahead with democratisation regardless of developments in the centre of power. More to the point, it signalled a sea change within the entire Soviet world system, as the party renounced both its monopoly of 'truth' and its willingness to enforce that right. This may be the most 'revolutionary' act of 1989 - undoubtedly democratisation within the USSR itself had immense global ramifications, but may not have proceeded with such rapidity had the satellite states not acted first. The events in Hungary and Poland had a profound resonance throughout the entire region.

As these states began to liberalis e their political spheres, inherent contradictions of the Soviet system escalated. On September 11, in adherence to the 1951 United Nations Convention on refugees, the Hungarian Foreign Minister announced the opening of the Austrian border for citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Within the next few months, thousands of East Germans began to pour across the frontier, and occupy diplomatic missions within the socialist states themselves. Despite the continued hard line rule of GDR premier Erich Honecker, the removal of Soviet support, combined with the momentum of democratisation in other states severely weakened the ability of the regime to suppress dissent. As demonstrations exploded in size and fervour, the leadership was forced to enact legislative concessions.

One of these, the removal of rules for permanent emigration, was the lynch pin in effectively bringing down the entire GDR regime. Thousands gathered in anticipation at the Berlin wall, where guards, overcome by sheer numbers and succumbing to the rumours themselves, opened the border. The situation can only be described here as 'revolutionary' - no negotiations, consultations or roundtables had yet been convened. In this instance, the sheer will of an entire people had put an end to decades of totalitarian rule. The case of the GDR is one example of the 'snowball' or 'domino' effect in which changes in one state had a profound impact on others in Eastern Europe. The transition in Czechoslovakia can be used to illustrate this point.

After the Prague Spring of 1968, the Czechoslovakian regime became one of the most conservative regimes of the communist bloc, pursuing a neo-Stalinist model along with Bulgaria and Albania. Yet, it capitulated suddenly and unexpectedly in 1989. On November 24, the leadership of the communist party resigned, and a new leadership began negotiations with two social movements that had hitherto been considered illegal - Civic Forum, headed by dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Violence. Although this was an effortless power transition acclaimed around the world as a 'model' revolution, At illa Agh points out that these events concealed a continuity of cultural attitudes and political institutions below the surface.

"It was only a quick accommodation process for both the Czech politicians and the population, in which the ethical dimension and moral superiority of movement party and civil society were over emphasised, although it was no more than a sober and healthy pragmatic reaction by the population to accept the inevitability of the new situation". This idea is given weight by the fact that the Czechoslovak Communist Party continued to draw strong electoral support after the transition, and adds to the argument that this was not by any means a revolution, velvet or otherwise. By comparing these events in their entirety, it is clear that there was no one revolutionary 'moment' during which a seismic shift in power occurred. In most cases, the basic laws permitting free elections were passed by the old regime's last Parliament in strict adherence to the rules of communist constitutions. In this light, the changes resembled reform from above rather than revolt from below. There can be no doubt that grass roots organizations and widespread discontent played a significant role, especially in the cases of Poland and Hungary, which acted as powerful catalysts for change elsewhere in the region.

Radical institutional change was the defining feature of 1989, as much as was the lack of traditional revolutionary change. It is in this statement that the paradox of the transitions is laid bare. Neither revolution nor reform are adequate terms to describe these events. What in fact occurred was a series of coordinated transitions, each with a forceful demonstrative effect that provided impetus for continued change elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the USSR.