France And Russia Britain example essay topic

Britain went to war in 1914 to defend the integrity of 'gallant little Belgium' Britain's decision to go to war in 1914 was not simply to defend the integrity of France's small neighbouring country. A variety of political, social and economical reasons contributed to the decision, almost all of which can be disputed by different historians. Britain's obligations to Belgium went back nearly a hundred years into history. After France invaded Belgium in 1815 Belgium became part of the Netherlands under the Treaty of Vienna. During the 1830's Belgium was made independent. This was largely brought about by Britain who, in 1939, signed the London Treaty.

This was an international guarantee of Belgium's independence and neutrality. During the Franco-Prussian war in the 1870's both sides held up this agreement. Since 1815 Belgium had never been involved in any international disputes, was never aggressive toward any other country, and was an incredibly peaceful nation. Britain might claim that this was one of the reasons why they did decide to go to war, to protect the rights of this peaceful country. Lord Asquith stated in a letter to Venetia Stanley that 'We have obligations to Belgium to prevent her being utilised and absorbed by Germany. ' However, many historians would disagree with this.

Hayes for example is very sceptical about Britain's motives for joining the war, insisting that she joined for own personal interests rather than 'to protect freedom... and the rights of small nations. ' He points out that these 'small nations' were paid little regard in the post-war settlement. Instead he believes that 'Britain became involved because it was the consensus of opinion that her interests and the balance of power were threatened by Germany. ' Indeed, many historians agree with Hayes that Britain's main reason for going to war was self-preservation. Britain had formed the Triple Entente in 1907 with France and Russia. Wilson's view on why the entente was formed was that without them 'Britain would have been vulnerable to everyone.

' To some extent this is true, as Britain is a small isle that was no longer as powerful as it had once been. But combined with France and Russia Britain was part of a very strong force, particularly as the positioning of the countries covered nearly all sides of Germany. Wilson implies that Britain made the entente because she had no other choice, as without this agreement her nation and her empire were extremely vulnerable. Wilson believes that 'What was really at stake in their preservation was the fate of the British Empire. ' and that Britain joined the war 'to divert attention from the British Empire's vulnerability and to rivet it upon Germany. ' Gilbert also agrees that Britain's reasons for war were not to defend Belgium.

He believes that Britain joined to defend France more than Belgium saying that 'in the event of a German attack on France Britain would have to act whether or not the Germans invaded Belgium. ' This reinforces Hayes and Wilson's views that self-preservation was in the forefront of the British mind. If France was defeated by Germany Britain would be left with only Russia on their side, a country whom they did not completely trust. Not only did Russia have several internal problems at the time of the outbreak of the First World War but Britain was always slightly wary of the fact that Russia was so close to some of it's empire i.e. India, Burma and China.

Steiner agrees to some extent with this theory, believing that Britain did not want the balance of power in Europe tilted as 'If Germany controlled the continent, British security would be menaced. ' However, he does not think the sole reason for Britain going to war was self-preservation. He sympathies with the British government: 'the options available to an Edwardian foreign secretary at the time were limited. No government could ignore the German challenge. ' He implies that Britain had little choice but to go to war, as they could not ignore the possible threat that Germany posed to them and the rest of Europe. The Liberal Government at the time was undoubtedly faced with tough decisions.

The Liberal philosophy was supposed to be committed to a non-interventionist stance in terms of the domestic front. War posed huge problems for them, as governments were more than often forced into interfering with people's lives during wartime. The cabinet was divided in its decision. The 'Interventionists', of whom the Prime Minister Lord Asquith was a part, felt it was wrong to abandon France to her fate and would stand down if this happened. It became very much a political issue, as Asquith feared if the Liberals would not fight the war then the leading opposition at the time, the Conservatives, would. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was morally committed to fight for France.

The fact that Britain had made a naval agreement with France in 1912 made his argument more tangible. The agreement stated that there would be 'naval co-operation' whereby the French would re-deploy their ships in the Mediterranean and Britain would complete operations in the North Sea to counteract any threats. The Foreign Minister Lord Grey was also in favour of war in that he believed that if Germany proved to be aggressive towards Belgium it would be impossible for Britain to stay out of the war. On the other side of this argument were the 'Isolationists'. They felt war was morally wrong and that Britain had no need to be dragged into a European war. Two notable members of this group were ministers Burns and Morley.

The Liberal Government was on very unsteady ground. Asquith admitted in a letter to his mistress Venetia Stanley that 'if it comes to war I feel sure that we shall have some split in the cabinet. ' The 'Interventionists' were fuelled by an incredibly pro-war public, who were in turn fuelled by a shockingly anti-German press. There had been no war between the Great Powers since the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. No member of the public imagined it would last so long or have such devastating effects. Most believed it would be a series of short, quickly decided battles and grand marches that would all be over by Christmas.

Much of the media fuelled this response to war by exaggerating the deteriorating relations between Britain and Germany and creating a German hatred amongst the British public. Since the 1890's the rivalries between Britain and Germany over trade, colonies and naval power had increased significantly. Between 1871 and 1914 Germany became the greatest industrial power in Europe. By 1900 she had outstripped Britain, being second only to the USA on the world stage. Britain became increasingly paranoid about this, finding German products in their homes and workplaces.

Not only was Britain's industrial supremacy being challenged, but also her naval supremacy. From about 1890 onwards Germany began to expand its military forces, spending more than any other European country on armaments, concentrating particularly on their navy. The British became paranoid about German domination in Europe. The Foreign Office too played a part in creating this hostility towards Germany. They used the threat of the 'German menace' to divert attention from the weakening British Empire. However, some papers were against war.

The Guardian, a traditionally left-wing paper, urged that the government should stay out of the war. In an editorial on the 27th July 1914 the Manchester Guardian wrote: 'Not only are we neutral now but we could and ought to remain neutral. ' The Guardian believed it was none of Britain's business to get involved in a European war, that it was morally wrong and that it might even bring the downfall of the Liberal Government. Unlike most other papers at the time, it believed that Britain had nothing to fear from Germany and thought that Russia was more of a threat than anyone else was.

The political situation in Britain at the time also contributed to the government's decision to go to war. In 1911 the Liberals were trying to reform the House of Lords, who at the time were predominantly conservative. However, the leaders needed the vote of John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Home Rule Party, to get the act passed. For some time his party had been pushing for a parliament in Dublin.

Asquith made a deal with Redmond that if he voted for the parliament Reform Act, Asquith would see that Dublin got its parliament. Redmond agreed, and in 1911 the act was passed. Three years later and the Home Rule Act was still being debated. Too concerned with the problems in Europe, parliament decided to leave the motion un-passed until after the war was over. The suffragettes too had been creating chaos, demanding greater women's rights, in particular the right to vote. At this time of political turbulence it is possible that the British government joined the war to divert attention from the country's domestic problems.

Although Britain claimed they held an obligation to Belgium to uphold their peace and neutrality in Europe, it was not the sole reason that Britain went to war. Britain were far more concerned with defending France, as if the Germans defeated France it would leave only Russia as their ally, whom they did not fully trust and who they did not think could defeat the German army. The prospect of being isolated in Europe and the possibility of German dominance was extremely alarming for Britain. The war fever that had swept through the British public helped by the pro-war press put added pressure on the government.

The instability of the government and the domestic problems of Britain at the time may also have played a part in the decision. The German violation of Belgium neutrality in 1914 gave the British government the moral grounds they needed to join the war. A.J. P Taylor wrote that 'The First World War cut deep into the consciousness of modern man... Half a century afterwards the experiences of it are not stilled. ' It has been nearly 85 years since the end of The First World War, and today historians still debate the origins of this devastating event. Historians also contest Britain's motives for joining. The outcomes to both of these questions are far from clear.

A multiplicity of complex interlocking factors, both long and short term, political, economical, social and moral, all fit together to form the answers that even then are unsatisfactory. It is fair to say that the Triple Entente played a major role in Britain's decision, and that self-preservation and fear of Germany followed closely behind. However, these reasons alone do not amount to enough to justify war, and this essay has tried to show why this is true and discuss the other factors involved.

Bibliography

'The First World War' AJP Taylor 'Rivalry and Accord: International Relations 1870-1914' John Lowe.