Happiness In Terms Of Pleasure example essay topic

What Is Happiness, And Is Our Own Happiness The Only Thing We Ultimately Desire Happiness, according not only to utilitarianism but also to popular culture, is something that we should not merely desire, but actively pursue. This seems to be, at first glance, a plausible, indeed laudable, goal, but there is one inherent detail that needs to be explained what happiness actually is. This is especially important in the case of a philosophical doctrine like utilitarianism, to which the idea of happiness is axiomatic. In this essay, I will argue that most attempts to define the concept by using objective definitions of pleasure are impossible, and that pleasure itself, although an element of happiness, is unsatisfactory. An attempt will be made to suggest that virtue and morality, whilst commendable, cannot even form part of a subjective reading of happiness A case will, though, be made to argue that despite the inability to find a satisfactory definition, happiness is merely one of a group of feelings which we ultimately desire. In Utilitarianism, Mill defines happiness as pleasure and the absence of pain, and the antonym was defined as pain and the privation of pleasure.

Jean Austin has pointed out that in his essay, Mill appears to sometimes use pleasure interchangeably with happiness. If this were Mills intention, then Mill is using it erroneously. Pleasure is a temporary experience, whilst happiness relates to an overall assessment of ones feelings over an extended period. I may have been depressed all week, but I got momentary pleasure when I attended a concert. Thus a better reading of Mills definition, which he does in fact give, would be to see happiness as the net balance of pleasures contrasted to pains. This goes some way to being more satisfactory: if I had an enjoyable week I could say that I had lot of pleasurable experiences, and if there were only a few minor disappointments it could indeed be said to be a happy week.

Conversely, if it were truly unbearable save for one incident, it would be absurd to say that happiness was obtained at least once during that week. Yet, it still seems forced to consider pleasure to be the sole ingredient of happiness. A manic depressive may, despite experiencing many pleasurable experiences, still be unable to be considered happy. Despite these limitations, it still appears that pleasurable experiences are the backbone to any attempt to define happiness. Many things, though, can be said to offer pleasure, yet it may be hard to justify most forms of temporary pleasure as a form of happiness. A pleasurable sensation can be obtained more easily from alcohol than from hiking, yet we would consider someone who preferred the former to the latter to be a drunkard.

Any definition of happiness would not wish to allow chemically induced forms of pleasure to be an acceptable form. Mill wrote of a difference between higher and lower pleasures, the latter being more sensuous and the former more intellectual. Yet by suggesting this, he is turning pleasure into an objective issue: how people consider the actions of others. I may prefer listening to Mahler's symphonies at a concert whilst my friend may prefer dancing and drinking all night long in some nightclub.

Indeed, we might equally abhor each others choice. To say that the former is a higher form of pleasure is not very far from displaying snobbery. Pleasure, and what constitutes it, is a subjective decision. Further, some forms of pleasure that we should condone are likely to be classed as lower pleasures. Is an intellectual who has read every publication about hill walking, contributed to debates on what kind of footwear is more appropriate for various types of terrain, and maybe even written extensively on the theory behind the sport, yet never actually set foot on a moor in his life indulging in a higher form of pleasure than someone who heads out into the wilderness at every opportunity Most of us would be inclined to consider the latter to be experiencing a higher form of pleasure, yet Mills distinction seems to suggest the former would. [1] Any attempt to redefine the categories to allow for such examples would ultimately fail: what gives pleasure and what does not is a matter for the individual.

For these reasons, any attempt to define happiness in terms of pleasure is unlikely to lead to a satisfactory result. Indeed, there is a case that a certain element of pain may be needed to achieve happiness. Risk-taking is usually applauded by society: even if the plan fails one can learn from it. It may even lead to a more fulfilling life, in which one is continually striving for happiness yet has to undergo numerous setbacks.

This, though, also seems to suggest an objective form of happiness: someone wants an easy, risk-free life is likely to be just as happy as the risk-taker. We, when asked to pass judgment on who we consider to have had the more fulfilling, and thus happier, life may disagree, but to do this to suggest that happiness is objective, rather than subjective. Novell Smith has described this quite acutely when he says that a drunkard and a gourmet both aim at pleasure, but what pleases each of them is a different thing. If pleasure is to be accepted into a definition of happiness, it can only do so in a subjective way. Whilst pleasurable actions might be said to contribute to happiness, their temporary nature needs to be accounted for. Moreover, one may wish to do things that do not provide pleasure, yet still lead to happiness.

The obvious paradox of masochism aside, there are cases where this can be suggested to do so. A martyr may choose to go to the stake because of a belief of some reward for remaining true to ones beliefs in the next world. As will be discussed later, a hedonist may feel that he therefore gets pleasure from this expectation, but it still can be said that he is not gaining pleasure from the actual process. If happiness cannot be defined, can it still be said to be the only thing we ultimately desire Before hedonism is discussed, it is worth looking what is meant by to desire. Austin accuses Mill of using this verb to cover the same ground as the verb to want, which by doing makes the statement that we desire pleasure a necessary truth. That this extension is an erroneous one is easy to explain: to want suggests immediacy.

One can want ice cream or a life free of poverty, and both may be said to be obtainable at some point in the short-run. To desire suggests some goal that, whilst it may be fulfilled, has to be striven for. To take part in a gold rush because one wants gold suggests there is a chance of obtaining it, bringing immediate pleasure. To do so because one desires gold not only suggests some form of satisfaction that will be gained, but also a sense of yearning for something that may not happen. [2] If this logic is followed (providing it is correct), then one can want pleasure, but happiness can only be desired. I may fulfil a want for pleasure from canoeing, but I cannot fulfil my desire for happiness by going out on the water once.

Of course, as will be discussed, there is neither any reason why one can only desire one goal, nor is there any validity in saying that happiness is all that can be desired. A hedonist would argue that ultimately all human actions are done for the sake of pleasure. Thus, all our actions are undertaken because we only desire happiness. The immediate criticism is that we do things we do not enjoy, like undergoing a painful dental operation. This can quickly be countered by saying that we desire the pleasure of the painless mouth we will have after the operation. Yet, as has often been pointed out, all actions can be ultimately broken down into the quest for pleasure.

Charity work may be considered undertaken because one feels that it is beneficial to society, but closer analysis would seem to say that it is only undertaken because one enjoys the pleasure obtained from doing it. Thus, all altruistic actions are selfish. Gosling gives an example of parents undergoing poverty and hardship in order to provide for a decent education for their children. It might be argued, following the reasoning above, that pleasure is their motive, even though they may not live to see its fulfilment. A counter argument suggests that they do it not for pleasure, but because they consider it their duty: virtue thus excludes hedonism. Gosling gives three attempts to try to reconcile the pursuit of pleasure with the concept duty: one of them involves the people blindly following irrational notions, another is that they are stoical and see pleasure in hardship, and a third is that society, noticing they failed to undertake one duty, may think he fails in all their duties and responsibilities.

Surprisingly, he appears to miss a simple method of reconciling the two: they may be thrown into such moral angst that until they decide on a course of action they cannot sleep at all, are miserable, or some other ailment. By choosing to do what they consider their duty, they are able to have a more pleasant life. Admittedly, blind obedience to a concept of duty is not to be applauded most of us value independence but such a criticism is likely to degenerate into an unacceptable objective form of happiness. The above can thus be used to give a hedonistic reason for altruism. Indeed, it can be said that hedonism and altruism are not incompatible: giving money, time, and / or services to charity, whatever the motive, is still altruistic. Novell Smith is right in saying that if such actions are undertaken in order to satisfy ones generosity, this means his motive was generosity.

He is right to say that selfishness implies hostility to others, making altruism compatible with hedonism. Many philosophers, like Mill or Aristotle, have considered virtue to be an extremely important aspect of happiness. It is easy to understand why. If one were to seek happiness from torturing animals, it would be absurd to consider his happiness as advanced as that of St Francis of Assisi. Virtue is a form of happiness that is to be applauded, to be aimed for, and is the noblest form. Yet to hold such a form is to suggest that happiness is an objective concept.

What constitutes virtue or morality is decided externally. All societies have a moral creed, and we all judge the morality of the actions of another. What is morally acceptable to one, say abortion, may be abhorrent to another. But earlier, happiness was defined as a subjective concept. Altruism may indeed give one a warm glow and a feeling of pleasure, and increase ones overall happiness.

But to say that one who dedicates his life to others is happier than one who only begrudgingly puts loose change in a charity box is to make happiness an objective judgment. Most of us, I am sure, would relish a society where all aided one another, and selfishness et al were banished from the earth. Whether this would make each individual happier is another question. For these reasons, any definition of happiness which includes a concept of virtue is flawed.

If this accepted, then it is easy to follow through that happiness cannot be the only thing we ultimately desire, as this would prevent universal altruism or virtue from being a goal we should all aim for. Happiness may indeed be desirable. An individual may consider that he cannot walk past suffering without feeling an urge to help another, else his happiness would suffer. This remains valid. All that is being denied is that happiness is sole end we desire as a society. [1] Admittedly, he does go on to suggest a superiority of the active over the passive, yet in this example it can be said that both are equally active one in the drawing room, one on the moor.

[2] Is there a difference in motive The obtaining of the gold is what is being sought in both, but I am trying to suggest that to say one wants gold is different to saying one desires it. To want appears only to be used as an expectation of immediate fulfilment. Austin thinks it is a wide verb, yet she lists a number of close synonyms like to wish, to choose, which she argues are not the same. Yet to want cannot cover the same area as to wish unless one is confusing the two verbs. To use her example, I wish to be young again is correct: I want to be young again is either wrong, or merely the restating of a wish but with a different verb.