Military Involvement In Vietnam example essay topic

More About The 1968 Tet Offensive For several thousand years, Vietnamese Lunar New Year has been a traditional celebration that brings the Vietnamese a sense of happiness, hope and peace. However, in recent years, It also bring back a bitter memory full of tears. It reminds them the 1968 bloodshed, a bloodiest military campaign of the Vietnam War the North Communists launched against the South. The "general offensive and general uprising" of the north marked the sharp turn of the Vietnam War. Today there have been a great number of writings about this event.

However, it seems that many key facts in the Communist campaign are still misinterpreted or neglected. In the mid-80, living in Saigon after being released from the Communist "re-education camp", I read a book published in the early 1980's in America about the story of the 1968 Tet Offensive. It said that the North Vietnamese Army supreme command had imitated one of the greatest heroes of Vietnam, King Quang Trung, who won the most spectacular victory over the Chinese aggressors in the 1789 counter-attack - in planning the 1968 operations. The book quoted King Quang Trung's tactic of surprise.

He let the troops celebrate the 1789 Tet Festival one day ahead so that he could launch the attacks on the first three days of the lunar new year while the Chinese troops were still feasting and not ready to organize their defense. Those who claimed the similarity between the two campaigns certainly did not know the whole truth, but jumped into conclusion with wild imagination after learning that the North Vietnamese attacking units also celebrated Tet "one day ahead" before the attacks. In fact, the Tet Offensive broke out on the Tet's Eve - in the earl morning of January 30, 1968 at many cities of Central Vietnam, such as Da Nang and Qui Non, as well as cities in the central coastal and highland areas, that lied within the Communist 5th Military Region... The other cities to the south that included Saigon, were attacked 24 hours later at the small hours of January 31.

Thus the offensive lost its element of total surprise that every tactician has to respect. But It surprised me that some in the American media were still unaware of such tragic story. The story started some 5 months previously. On August 8, 1967, the North Vietnam government approved a lunar calendar specifically compiled for the 7th time zone that covers all Vietnam, replacing the traditional lunar calendar that had been in use in Asia for hundreds of years.

That old calendar was calculated for the 8th time zone that Beijing falls right in the middle. It was accepted in general by a few nations such as China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong and somewhat in Japan and Korea, mostly for traditional celebrations and religious purposes. South Vietnam used this calendar. With common cultural origin, these countries needed not have their own calendar, particularly it has not been used for scientific and administrative activities. The North Vietnam new lunar calendar differs from the common calendar about some dates, such as the leap months of certain year (1984 and 1987) and the Tet's Eve of the three Lunar New Years: Mau Than (1968), Ky Dau (1969) and At Suu (1985).

South Vietnam celebrated the first day of the Mau Than lunar year on January 30, 1968, while North Vietnam celebrated it on Jan 29, 1968. It was obviously that the North Vietnamese leaders had ordered the offensives to be launched on the night of the first day of Tet to take the objectives by total surprise. By some reason, the North Vietnamese Army Supreme Command was not aware of the fact that there were different dates for Tet between North and South Vietnam. Therefore, most NVA units in the Communist 5th Military Region - closer to North Vietnam - probably used North Vietnamese calendar, and conducted their attacks in the night between Jan 29 and 30, while their comrades farther to the south attacked in the night from Jan 30 to 31. Many in the intelligence branch of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were well aware of the reason why the Communist forces launched their attacks at two different dates. Information from sources among NVA prisoners of war and ralliers about the new calendar of North Vietnam should have been neglected by the American side.

The information was also available in broadcast from Hanoi Radio. In military operations, nothing is more important than surprise. So the Communist forces lost their advantage of surprise on more than half of the objectives. Had the Vietnamese Communists conducted their coordinated attacks at the same H-hour, South Vietnam would have been in much more troubles.

The large scale offensive resulted in drastic human and morale losses of the Communist forces. However, the offensive caused an extreme negative effect in the American public opinion and boosted the more bitter protests against the war. Until lately, the Ha Noi propaganda and political indoctrination system has always claimed the Tet offensive their military victory, and never insisted on their victory over the morale of the American public... Obviously, Ha Noi leaders won a priceless victory at an unintended objective. In South Vietnam, on the contrary, the offensive created an unexpected attitude among the people. After the first few hours of panic, the South Vietnamese armed forces reacted fiercely.

There were hundreds of stories of brave soldiers and small units who fought their enemies with incredible courage... A large number of those who were playing fence-sitters especially in the region around Hue City then took side with the nationalist government. Several mass graves were found where thousands unarmed soldiers, civil servants and civilians were shot, stabbed, or with skulls mashed by clubs and buried in strings of ropes, even buried alive. A large number of VC-sympathizers who saw the horrible graves, undeniable evidence of the Communist barbarian crimes, changed side. The most significant indication of such attitude could be observed from the figures of young volunteers. to join the army. After the first wave of Communist attacks, a great number of youth under draft age - below 20 years old - voluntarily enrolled in the army for combat units, so high that thousands of young draftees were delayed reporting for boot camps.

On the Communist side, the number of ralliers known as "chief hoi" increased about four times. The offensive planners apparently expected the so-called "people upraising", so most secret cells were ordered to emerge. When the attacking units were crushed, cell members had to flee to the green forests. Thus the Tet offensive helped South Vietnam neutralize much of the Communist infrastructure before the Phoenix Campaign got rid of many others. Unfortunately, such achievements were nullified by the waves of protests in America. As in any other developing countries, nobody takes heed of a speech from a Vietnamese official.

But the same thing from an American statesman or even a protester could be well listened to and trusted. So information from the Western media produced rumors that the USA was about to sell off South Vietnam to the Communist blocks. The rumors were almost absolutely credible to the Vietnamese - particularly the military servicemen of all ranks - because of another hearsay that until now have a very powerful impact on the mind of a great number of the South Vietnamese. There have been no poll on the subject, but it was estimated that more than half of the soldiers strongly believed that "it was the Americans who helped the Communist attack the South Vietnamese cities". Hundreds of officers from all over South Vietnam asserted that they "saw" NVA soldiers moving into the cities on US Army trucks, or American helicopters transporting supplies to NVA units.

In Saigon, most people accepted the allegation that the Americans deliberately let the Communists infiltrate the capital city because the American electronic sensor defense system around Saigon was able to detect things as small as a mouse crossing the hi-tech fences. Another hearsay among the South Vietnamese military ran that "none of the American military units or installation and agencies - military or civilian - was under Communist first phase of the offensive (February) except for the US Embassy. And only after nearly three weeks did the US Marines engaged in the battle of Hue, in the old Royal Palace" The allegation seemed to be true. The American combat units, however, were fighting fierce battles in phase 2 (May 1968) and phase 3 (September 1968).

Similar rumors might have been of no importance if they were in America. But in Vietnam, they did convince a lot of people. In the military, they dealt deadly blows on the soldiers' morale. Their impacts still lingered on until the last days of April 1975. The truth in the rumors did not matter much.

But the fact that a great numbers of the fighting men strongly believed the rumors turned them into a deadly psychological weapon which very few or maybe none has ever properly treated in write. S Involvement in the Vietnam War "No new taxes". This is a quote that most all of us remember from the 1992 presidential election. Along with it we remember that there were new taxes during that presidents term in office. There are a myriad of promises made and things done in a presidential election year that have questionable motives as to whether they are done in the best interest of the people or in the interests of the presidential candidate. These hidden interests are one of the biggest problems with the political aspects of government in modern society.

One of the prime examples of this is the Vietnam War. Although South Vietnam asked for our help, which we had previously promised, the entire conflict was managed in order to meet personal political agendas and to remain politically correct in the world's eyes rather than to bring a quick and decisive end to the conflict. This can be seen in the selective bombing of Hanoi throughout the course of the Vietnam War. Politically this strategy looked very good. However, militarily it was ludicrous. War is the one arena in which politicians have no place.

War is the military's sole purpose. Therefore, the U.S. Military should be allowed to conduct any war, conflict, or police action that it has been committed to without political interference or control because of the problems and hidden interests which are always present when dealing with polit United States involvement in the Vietnam War actually began in 1950 when the U.S. began to subsidize the French Army in South Vietnam. This involvement continued to escalate throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's. On August 4, 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in which American Naval Vessels in South Vietnamese waters were fired upon by North Vietnam. On August 5, 1964 President Johnson requested a resolution expressing the determination of the United Sates in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia ( Johnson). On August 7, 1964, in response to the presidential request, Congress authorized President Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any attack and to prevent aggression against the U.S. in southeast Asia (United States).

The selective bombing of North Vietnam began immediately in response to this resolution. In March of the following year U.S. troops began to arrive. Although the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution specifically stated that we had no military, political, or territorial ambitions in southeast Asia, the interests back home were quite a different story (Johnson). The political involvement in Vietnam was about much more than just promised aid to a weak country in order to prevent the spread of communism. It was about money. After all, wars require equipment, guns, tools and machinery.

Most of which was produced in the United States. It was about proving America's commitment to stop communism. Or rather to confine communism in its present boundaries But most of all it was about politics. The presidential political involvement in Vietnam had little to do with Vietnam at all. It was about China for Eisenhower, about Russia for Kennedy, about Washington D.C. for Johnson, and about himself for Nixon (Post ). The last two of which were the major players in America's involvement in regards to U.S. Troops being used (Wittman).

The military involvement in Vietnam is directly related to the political management of the military throughout the war. The military controlled by the politicians. The micro management of the military by the White House for political gain is the primary reason for both the length and cost, both monetary and human, of the Vietnam War (Pelland). One of the largest problems was the lack of a clear objective in the war and the support to accomplish it. The predominant military opinion of the military's role in Vietnam in respect to the political involvement is seen in the following quote by General Colin Powell, "If you " re going to put into something then you owe the armed forces, you owe the American People, you owe just you " re own desire to succeed, a clear statement of what political objective you " re trying to achieve and then you put the sufficient force to that objective so that you know when you " ve accomplished it". The politicians dictated the war in Vietnam, it was a limited war, the military was never allowed to fight the war in the manner that they thought that they needed to in order to win it (Baker).

To conclude on the Vietnam War, the political management of the war made it unwinnable. The military was at the mercy of politicians who knew very little about what needed to be done militarily in order to win the war. There is an enormous difference between political judgment and military judgment. This difference is the primary reason for the outcome of the Vietnam War (Schwarzkopf). The Gulf War in the Middle East was almost the exact opposite in respect to the political influence on the war. In respect to the military objective of the war the two are relatively similar.

The objective was to liberate a weaker country from their aggressor. The United Nation's resolution was explicit in its wording regarding military force in the Persian Gulf. The resolution specifically stated "by all means necessary". (Schwarzkopf). The President was very aware of the problems with political management of warfare throughout the war.

He was very determined to let the military call the shots about how the war was conducted. He made a specific effort to prevent the suggestion that civilians were going to try to run the war ( Baker). Painful lessons had been learned in the Vietnam War, which was still fresh on the minds of many of those involved in this war (Baker). The military was given full control to use force as they saw fit. Many of the top military leaders had also been involved in the Vietnam War.

These men exhibited a very strong never again attitude throughout the planning stages of this war. General Schwarzkopf made the following statement about the proposed bombing of Iraq in regards to the limited bombing in Vietnam, "I had no doubt we would bomb Iraq if I was going to be the Military Commander". He went on to say that it would be absolutely stupid to go into a military campaign against his, Iraq's, forces who had a tremendous advantage on us on the ground, numbers wise. It would be ludicrous not to fight the war in the air as much, if not more, than on the ground ( Schwarzkopf). The result of the Gulf War in which the military was given control, as we know, was a quick, decisive victory. There were many other factors involved in this than just the military being given control, particularly in contrast to Vietnam, but the military having control played a major part in this victory.

In conclusion, although there are some major differences between the two conflicts one fact can be seen very clearly. That is the fact that the military is best suited for conducting wars. Politicians are not. It is not the place of a politicians to be involved in the decision making process in regards to war or military strategy. The White House has significant control in military matters. That control should be used to help the military in achieving its goals as it was in the Gulf War where George Bush said specifically to let the military do its job.

The only alternative to this is to use political influence in the ege Station. 9-10 Jan. 1996. "Interview with Secretary of State, James Baker". Frontline WGBH Educational Foundation. PBS, College Station. 9-10 Jan. 1996.

Johnson, Lyndon B. "The Tonkin Gulf Incident". Message to Congress. Aug. 5, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug. 1964: n. p. Leyden, Andrew P. "The Operation Desert Storm Debriefing Book" Internet Page. University of Notre Dame Law School.

15 Feb. 1995. Pelland, Paul. E-mail to the author. 25 June 1996. Post, James N. E-mail to the author. 26 June 1996 Roush, Gary.

Statistics about the Vietnam War Internet Page. Nov. 1993. United States, Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145. Aug. 7, 1964. Department of State Bulletin 24 Aug. 1965.

Wittman, Sandra M. "Chronology of the Vietnam War". Vietnam: Yesterday and Today Oakton Community College. Skokie, Illinois. 16 May 1996: n. p. ings about the Vietnam War. Most authors studied the war at high echelons, but neglected the morale of the buck privates and the effect of the media in the Vietnam War. No military plan even by top strategists in the White House could succeed if half of the privates believed that they would be defeated before long.

So why should they go on fighting For years, I have been wondering how much the American public was uninformed about the Vietnam War. From "My War" (unpublished) by L.T.

Bibliography

Johnson, Lyndon B. "The Tonkin Gulf Incident". Message to Congress. Aug. 5, 1964.
15 Feb. 1995.
Pelland, Paul. E-mail to the author. 25 June 1996.
Nov. 1993.
Aug. 7, 1964.